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Divine Action, Determinism,  
and the Laws of Nature
A longstanding question at the intersection of science, philosophy, and 
theology is how God might act, or not, when governing the universe. Many 
believe that determinism would prevent God from acting at all, since to do 
so would require violating the laws of nature. However, when a robust view 
of these laws is coupled with the kind of determinism now used in dynamics, 
a new model of divine action emerges.
This book presents a new approach to divine action beyond the current 
focus on quantum mechanics and esoteric gaps in the causal order. It bases 
this approach on two general points: First, that there are laws of nature is 
not merely a metaphor. Second, laws and physical determinism are now 
understood in mathematically precise ways that have important implications 
for metaphysics. The explication of these two claims shows not only that 
nonviolationist divine action is possible but also that there is considerably 
more freedom available for God to act than that which current models allow.
By bringing a philosophical perspective to an issue often dominated by 
theologians and scientists, this book redresses an imbalance in the discussion 
around divine action. It will therefore be of keen interest to scholars of 
philosophy and religion, the philosophy of science, and theology.
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1  Philosophy and divine action
Deists believe in God but not “organized religion.” God created the uni-
verse, but that exhausts the deistic job description. Theists – organized or 
not – believe that God also continuously upholds the universe in existence. 
Whatever else God might do goes by the name special divine action. This 
might refer in part to miracles, although what a miracle is precisely is a 
matter of some debate. The term is typically used for God’s activity within 
nature, regardless of whether anyone knows about it.
For the most part, the question of special divine action has been the pur-
view of theologians. There has long been a division between those who 
believe that God sometimes breaks the laws of nature and those who deny 
it. Most laypersons and even scholars are initially puzzled by this second 
camp. “Why can’t God break the laws of nature?” As we will see in Chap-
ter 2, some theologians believe that God cannot; others believe that God 
will not – or at least not often.
Some in this debate not only have backgrounds in theology but were 
once well-credentialed scientists: John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and 
 Robert Russell are prominent among them. I have observed over the years, 
however, that many of the arguments in the literature are, properly speak-
ing, neither issues in theology nor issues in science; rather, they are mat-
ters of philosophy. A few philosophers of religion have made important 
contributions to the question of divine action, but there is one corner of 
analytic philosophy that has largely remained silent: the philosophy of sci-
ence. This book is a step toward breaking this silence, bringing something 
of an outsider’s perspective to the debate. This is sometimes useful. Rob-
ert Griffiths was a condensed matter physicist who turned his attention to 
quantum mechanics only after being asked to teach a course in it. He went 
on to found one of the standard interpretations of quantum mechanics: the 
consistent histories approach. Philosopher of science John Earman wrote 
a short book on David Hume’s argument against miracles some years ago, 
refuting Hume through the rigorous application of Bayesian probability 
theory (2000). (As one might imagine, Hume scholars were not altogether 
pleased by this intrusion.) My hope is that bringing philosophy of science to 
bear on the question of divine action will suggest new ways of approaching 
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the main arguments.1 At the very least, I intend to present material that one 
will not generally find outside philosophy of science journals.
Some will not find this perspective helpful. Others will be puzzled by my 
conclusions, especially those that do not fit well with current trends in theol-
ogy. Such is the messiness of interdisciplinary work. Among the theologians 
mentioned in the next two chapters, there is broad agreement on two doc-
trines: The first is nonviolation: if God acts within nature postcreation, this 
action ought not violate the laws of nature. The second is determinism: if 
nature were deterministic, special divine action would entail the breaking of 
natural laws. Without some sort of openness or plasticity within the natu-
ral realm, there is nothing God can do that would not thereby count as a 
violation. Many believe that the second issue has been resolved by quantum 
mechanics, which is normally thought to be indeterministic. In other words, 
nature is not deterministic, and so the second of these two doctrines is no 
longer a worry.
Philosophers of science reading this literature will have two questions: 
The first is, what do theologians mean by “laws of nature”? There are a 
variety of ways in which one might understand natural laws, ranging from 
those with no metaphysical significance to others that determine every phys-
ical event. What, precisely, a “violation of law” amounts to changes depend-
ing on which interpretation one holds. This relationship between laws and 
violations need be made explicit to even know whether there is a problem of 
divine action to be resolved.
The second question has to do with physical determinism. For most 
philosophers and theologians, determinism is an obstacle to be overcome. 
Determinism of this sort, with its roots in the seventeenth-century thought 
of Spinoza and Leibniz, would preclude moral responsibility. In short, you 
aren’t responsible for your actions if you literally do not have any choice 
in the matter. This attitude is in contrast with physicists who work hard 
to uphold determinism in the face of prima facie violations. They typically 
take breakdowns in determinism to indicate an error of some kind, with 
the (possible) exception of quantum mechanics. These differing attitudes 
between philosophers and theologians on one hand and physicists on the 
other are due to an important conceptual shift. What “determinism” now 
means in mathematical physics is only distantly related to its philosophical 
counterpart.
Sorting this out is important since current models of divine action pre-
suppose indeterminism of some sort. For many of those models, physical 
determinism in a world of robust laws would prevent special divine action. 
“Not to worry,” we are told, “since quantum mechanics is famously 
indeterministic.” Well, maybe. Deterministic interpretations of quantum 
mechanics continue to gain adherents, especially Everettian many-worlds. 
By the end of this century, physicists and philosophers of physics might 
no longer consider quantum mechanics to be the realm of ontological 
randomness.
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For most science-and-religion scholars working on divine action, the 
return of deterministic physics would be bad news indeed. Indeterminism 
opens a range of possibilities that would otherwise have been closed in the 
deterministic world of classical mechanics (or so it is commonly thought).2 
Consider a parallel argument regarding free will, understood as libertarian 
freedom.3 In a deterministic world, there is no free will. One’s “choices” 
are as much the product of the laws of nature as is the trajectory of a tennis 
ball. Libertarians rejoice, then, that quantum mechanics has refuted physi-
cal determinism. Free will is at least possible, although indeterminism alone 
is not sufficient for freedom. This same indeterminism is likewise thought to 
allow for avenues of divine action that would be impossible in a Newtonian 
world. That physics might reembrace determinism is therefore a source of 
great concern.
For my part, I will argue that this worry is misplaced. Determinism need 
not be the bugaboo that it is normally portrayed – “bugaboo” being a tech-
nical term in philosophy of science. If an older understanding of natural 
laws is coupled with a physicist’s view of determinism, a new approach to 
divine action emerges whereby God would no longer be constrained to work 
within the indeterministic gaps of exotic physics. The neoclassical model of 
special divine action is not dependent on any one interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.4 But that’s getting ahead of ourselves a bit. Let’s first consider 
where things stand today.
1.1 Distinction
There are broadly speaking three approaches to divine action, although the 
latter two are usually collapsed into one. Interventionists believe that God 
sometimes violates the laws of nature. Many theologians reject this view 
as naïve, and we will consider some of their arguments in the next chapter. 
Noninterventionism will be restricted here to the view that God created and 
sustains the universe but does not immediately bring about specific events 
within nature. Remove the clause about sustaining, and one is left with 
deism, which few are willing to embrace.5 Panentheists and others focused 
on the God–world relationship also fall into this category. What I will call 
nonviolationism, which is usually subsumed under the second group, is a 
middle position. Like interventionism, it holds that God actively governs 
creation, causing events that would not likely to have happened otherwise. 
Like noninterventionism, it holds that God seldom if ever breaks the laws 
of nature.
Why invent a new category, especially when nonviolationists refer to 
themselves as noninterventionists? There are two answers. The first is that 
failing to do so causes confusion. There are important differences between 
the two approaches to the degree to which God is active in the universe. Sec-
ond, arguments aimed at one are not always relevant to the other. Consider 
Alvin Plantinga’s work on the question of divine intervention. He begins 
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by showing that, for theologians such as Langdon Gilkey, divine action is 
limited to God’s creating and sustaining the universe. Here Plantinga quotes 
Gilkey himself:
Thus contemporary theology does not expect . . . wondrous divine 
events on the surface of natural and historical life. The causal nexus in 
space and time which the Enlightenment science and philosophy intro-
duced into the Western mind . . . is also assumed by modern theologians 
and scholars; since they participate in the modern world of science both 
intellectually and existentially, they can scarcely do anything else. Now 
this assumption of a causal order among phenomenal events, and there-
fore of the authority of the scientific interpretation of observable events, 
makes a great difference. Suddenly a vast panoply of divine deeds and 
events recorded in scripture are no longer regarded as having actually 
happened. . . . Whatever the Hebrews believed, we believe that the bib-
lical people lived in the same causal continuum of space and time in 
which we live, and so one in which no divine wonders transpired and 
no divine voices were heard.
(Plantinga 2008, 371)
Gilkey is clearly a noninterventionist. Modern scientific folk cannot ration-
ally believe in miracles or any other sort of divine action after creation itself. 
This view is further articulated by John Macquarrie:
The way of understanding miracle that appeals to breaks in the natu-
ral order and to supernatural interventions belongs to the mythological 
outlook. . . . The traditional conception of miracle is irreconcilable with 
our modern understanding of both science and history. Science pro-
ceeds on the assumption that whatever events occur in the world can be 
accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world; 
and if on some occasions we are unable to give a complete account of 
some happening . . . the scientific conviction is that further research will 
bring to light further factors in the situation, but factors that will turn 
out to be just as immanent and this-worldly as those already known.
(Plantinga 2008, 372)
Plantinga traces this sort of “hands-off theology” back through Rudolf Bult-
mann. Thomas Tracy (2009, 230) extends it further, starting with deism, 
through Schleiermacher and the early liberal Protestants, down through 
Bultmann and Gordon Kaufman. If, as we are told, science has taught us 
that nature is a closed continuum, theology must give up divine intervention.
One result of such thinking has been the naturalizing of biblical miracles. 
The feeding of the five thousand (Matthew 14:13–21) might be understood 
as Jesus prompting his audience to spontaneously share what little food they 
had with others, thereby feeding everyone. Perhaps the crossing of the Red 
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Sea in Exodus was made possible by high winds, a tsunami, an earthquake, 
or some combination, each of which has been proposed as a natural expla-
nation.6 As William Pollard sums up, “Biblical miracles are, like that in the 
exodus, the result of an extraordinary and extremely improbable combina-
tion of chance and accident. They do not, on close analysis, involve, as is so 
frequently supposed, a violation of the laws of nature” (1958, 115).
Nonviolationists agree to an extent, consistently arguing against divine 
intervention. Robert Russell calls his own model of divine action noninter-
ventionist objective divine action (NIODA). One might therefore be for-
given for lumping them in with Bultmann, Gilkey, and Macquarrie.7 That 
would be a mistake. As Russell has emphasized, he and other members of 
the Divine Action Project (DAP) are “hands-on,” not “hands-off,” in their 
theology, rejecting deism and typically believing in an active God (private 
discussion). It isn’t special divine action postcreation that worries them or 
even that God brings about specific events; it is action that requires the 
violation of the laws of nature. The goal of their program is to find ways 
in which God could act without such violations. It is unfortunate, then, 
that this camp self-identifies as noninterventionism. In any case, I believe 
it would be useful to distinguish the hands-off approach of Leibniz and 
Bultmann (noninterventionism) from the hands-on view of Russell et al. 
(nonviolationism).
Thoroughgoing noninterventionists do not like this middle position, see-
ing it as a kind of soft intervention. Even if there are windows through 
which God can act without breaking natural laws, such approaches have 
“simply replaced one mode of interference with the world – that in which 
the laws of nature are set aside – with another, in which those laws are used 
as tools” (Knight, 2007, 26). Noninterventionists take the other two camps 
to differ merely by degree of divine manipulation.
Is this fair? To a point, yes. In spirit, nonviolationists agree with interven-
tionists that God takes a more hands-on approach to nature. In practice, 
however, their models allow for such a limited range of physical effects that 
they are functionally much closer to hands-off noninterventionists. As I will 
argue, there is little that God could do by way of the causal pathways pro-
posed by nonviolationists in the divine action literature. For it to survive as 
a research program requires a reexamination of foundational assumptions 
about the laws of nature and determinism.
1.2 Overview
Here then is the plan for the rest of the book. Chapter 2 analyzes the cur-
rent terrain regarding divine action. The first question is, Why not inter-
vention? Theologians point to a variety of issues: conflicts with science, 
inconsistency on God’s part, and the problem of evil prominent among 
them. These concerns motivate both noninterventionism and nonviolation-
ist models for divine action, several of which will be critiqued. Most of 
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these approaches, I will argue, allow for too little freedom on God’s part. 
In other words, if that is the way God interacts with nature, there is not 
much that God can do.
Chapter 3 is an extended discussion of one nonviolationist model: God 
working through quantum indeterminism. The central idea behind Rus-
sell’s NIODA is that God could act through ontologically random quantum 
events without breaking any laws. The model presupposes that quantum 
fluctuations are readily amplified into the macroscopic realm. This is not 
the case. Dynamical systems theory, continuum mechanics, and condensed 
matter physics show that such fluctuations are prevented from bubbling up 
within macroscopic systems. While some look to chaos theory to overcome 
this problem, chaotic systems are not nearly as prevalent as the popular 
literature indicates. Once all the relevant physics is considered, models of 
divine action based on quantum randomness and chaos are far more limited 
than they are generally assumed to be. Unless some sort of new physical 
mechanism is discovered, the amplification problem cannot be solved.
Having established the need for a new model of divine action, we begin to 
address some foundational issues in Chapter 4. To this point terms like “vio-
lation” and the “laws of nature” have been used as if everyone knew what 
were meant. Not only is this false, but leaving such concepts at an intuitive 
level also obscures an important shift in the history of science. The very 
idea that there are laws of nature is a modern innovation. The ancients and 
medievals did not believe in such laws – a claim that is often met with puz-
zlement. “Of course they did!” I am told. “Aristotle believed in an orderly 
world. Ptolemaic astronomy might have been wrong, but it clearly presup-
posed absolute regularities in nature.” Well, yes, all that is true, but it is also 
beside the point. That nature contains regularities is not a modern discovery. 
But what is responsible for those regularities? For Plato it was the Forms. 
For Aristotle, it was essences and natures. While the idea of “natural law” 
had a long tradition in ethics, at least back to the Stoics, it took Descartes to 
unambiguously apply the idea to physics. This was no incremental change. 
If there was ever such a thing as a Kuhnian paradigm shift, this was it. The 
ramifications for divine freedom, empiricism, and special divine action will 
be discussed.
Chapter 5 moves into the contemporary philosophical question about the 
nature of the laws of nature. If intervention entails the breaking of natu-
ral law, what precisely is being broken? There are four main approaches 
in philosophy of science: Humean reductionism, supervenience on causal 
powers, the structure of possible worlds, and nomological realism. The first 
denies that laws have any metaphysical significance. They are merely state-
ments that allow us to organize and systematize scientific knowledge. The 
second takes laws to depend on dispositions – a technical term. These are 
responsible for causal regularities among events in this view, not for the laws 
themselves. The third agrees that laws are not fundamental; it but grounds 
them in relations among possible worlds: the ways in which reality could 
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have been different. The fourth take laws themselves to be fundamental: 
They are metaphysically real and cannot be reduced to any of the other 
three accounts.
What the problem of divine intervention amounts to is a function of 
which view one holds. In the end, I argue that early modern natural phi-
losophers largely had it right. Laws are not created entities or powers that 
act as intermediaries between God and nature; they are best understood as 
expressions of God’s will for nature.
Chapter 6 turns to the question of determinism. While it is a common 
idea in philosophy, theology, and physics, the disciplines generally do not 
agree on its meaning. Philosophers and theologians often employ a notion 
of physical determinism that was introduced in the seventeenth century, 
pointing to classical mechanics as a paradigm case. Physicists, in contrast, 
use a mathematical definition based on the underlying differential equa-
tions. This latter approach opens new possibilities for divine action. It is not 
the case that God could only act within a deterministic, classical world by 
breaking the laws of physics. Nonviolationist divine action would have been 
possible even under classical mechanics. The search for causal gaps in exotic 
physics – quantum mechanics, chaos, etc. – was poorly motivated from the 
start. Moreover, if trends in the philosophy of quantum mechanics hold, 
the standard interpretation8 may well be supplanted by the deterministic 
many-worlds view. A model of divine action is needed that could survive 
such a shift.
Chapter 7 completes the narrative, showing why all this previous work 
was required. By this point, we will have considered how the laws of nature 
were understood at the birth of classical mechanics. For Descartes, Newton, 
and Boyle, theism was not merely an appendage to an otherwise naturalistic 
approach but rather an inextricable part of their theorizing. In Chapter 5, we 
see where their view fits within the current metaphysical landscape regard-
ing laws. Coupling an early modern approach to laws with the mathematical 
determinism explained in Chapter 6 produces a new view: the neoclassical 
model of special divine action. It is nonviolationist yet not dependent on 
any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. One charge this sort of 
divine action is liable to is that it violates the conservation of energy. I deny 
that, but understanding why requires some undoing of the conventional 
wisdom regarding conservation.
The final chapter will consider a few possible objections. These include 
whether this model entails a kind of occasionalism whereby God is causally 
responsible for every physical event. In the history of philosophy, occasion-
alism is usually considered something to be avoided, yet Robert Larmer 
(2017) has recently tried to paint me with the occasionalist brush. We will 
see what options are available.
Philosophers of science are often an intellectually conservative lot by 
training. Getting the science right is a high priority, but drawing meta-
physical lessons is not. If anything, physicists are now far more speculative, 
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positing realms of infinite universes and hidden dimensions. Philosophers 
of science, in contrast, often disappoint readers for refusing to go out on 
a metaphysical limb. This, then, is an atypical book. I will venture out on 
several such limbs in the chapters to come, some thinner than others. And 
I suspect that few readers will be willing to follow me out onto each one. 
In any case, a way forward on the question of divine action is presented 
here that challenges many of the assumptions made today about the laws of 
nature, determinism, and causal closure. My hope is that most readers will 
find something helpful along the way.
1.3 Acknowledgments and loose ends
The proposed model of divine action advances a program suggested by 
C. S. Lewis ([1947] 1978, 57–60) and developed by William Alston (1994, 
50), Plantinga (2008; 2011, chap. 4), and Robert Larmer (2008, 149–50; 
2014, chap. 5).9 This is not to say that they would embrace it in every detail. 
Larmer’s own view of the nature of law is at odds with that presented in 
Chapter 5. And Plantinga accepts the charge of occasionalism that I will 
attempt to dodge. Such divergences are to be expected given the variety of 
views possible on the laws of nature. The premise of this book is that my 
predecessors’ ideas can best be advanced when they are more fully inte-
grated with the history and philosophy of physics.
This book develops arguments that I first considered in chapter 4 of The 
Physics of Theism (Koperski, 2015) and draws on material from several pre-
vious works: “Divine Action,” Dictionary of Christianity and Science, Paul 
Copan, Tremper Longman, Chris Reese, and Mike Strauss, eds. (2017); 
“Divine Action and the Quantum Amplification Problem,” Theology and 
Science 13, no. 4 (2015): 379–94 and “God, Chaos, and the Quantum 
Dice,” Zygon 35, no. 3 (2000): 545–559; and chapter 5, “Breaking Laws of 
Nature,” Philosophia Christi 19, no. 1 (2017): 83–101.
As for acknowledgements, several people provided valuable feedback 
on early versions of these ideas, including Jim Bradley, Travis Dumsday, 
Doug Geivett, Michael Murray, and Robert Russell. Others fielded specific 
questions along the way: James Hitt, Al Lent, David Nichols, and Peter 
Rose-Barry. I received especially valuable comments on chapter drafts 
from Robert Bishop, William Lane Craig, Paul Gould, Rope Kojonen, Ben 
Nasmith, Brian Pitts, and Del Ratzsch, with extensive feedback from Rob-
ert Larmer and Philip West. My thanks also to my editor, Joshua Wells; to 
an anonymous reviewer for Routledge, who pushed me to consider mate-
rial that I had not originally intended; to the John Templeton Foundation, 
which supported this book with a generous grant (ID 61070); and to the 
Office of Sponsored Programs at Saginaw Valley State University. Finally, 
my thanks to John Polkinghorne, who first got me interested in the question 
of science and divine action 20 years ago. Polkinghorne himself believes that 
physics will in time discover a depth and breadth of openness in nature that 
chaos and quantum mechanics merely approximate (1996, 36). I believe 
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that Sir John is essentially correct but that the greater openness he predicted 
has been there all along, waiting to be acknowledged.
Notes
 1 Or at least that’s what I have talked Joshua Wells, my editor at Routledge, into 
believing.
 2 The conventional wisdom is represented here:
The far-reaching consequences of this common willingness to accept a “no-
inherent-room-for-God” constraint coming from Newtonian physics cannot 
be overemphasized. Prior to the rise of Newtonian physics, Christian thinkers 
simply did not perceive the logical difficulty of asserting simultaneously that 
God acts at specific times and places and that the world retains its own causal 
efficacy and integrity. However, the supposed compatibility of these two ideas 
dissolved in the face of Newtonian determinism, which left in its wake human 
and divine agency as newly felt problems.
(Wegter-McNelly 2008, 162, quoted in Dodds 2016, 159)
All versions of determinism accept the ontological thesis that the state of the 
universe up to and including the present time t determines the universe’s state 
in subsequent moments. Obviously, if what happens at time t + 1 is determined 
by the physical state of the world at t, no place remains for divine action.
(Clayton 2008, 187)
 3 Many libertarians hold to the principle of alternative possibilities: Whatever 
choice one is inclined to make, if that person is free, he or she has the ability to 
choose otherwise. So while it appears that my pen will remain on my desk for 
the rest of the afternoon, it is within my power to alter the future ever so slightly 
by putting the pen in my pocket – a power or capacity that does not depend on 
circumstances being otherwise. The choice is simply up to me.
 4 “Classical” in the sense of classical mechanics.
 5 Robert Larmer disputes this characterization of deism, providing textual evidence 
that even many deists held that God sustains the universe (2018). While Larmer 
may be correct about this, I will continue to use the more typical view of deism.
 6 See (Oord 2015, 136–40) for more examples and discussion. While the Exodus 
14 account specifically mentions a “strong east wind,” interventionists take the 
sudden appearance of the wind to be a miracle.
 7 I have heard nonviolationists say that Plantinga (2008) wrongly treats them as 
quasideists. That complaint has some merit, at least prima facie. Making a dis-
tinction between nonviolationism and noninterventionism should make matters 
clearer for both advocates and critics.
 8 While this is often now called the Copenhagen interpretation, that properly refers 
to Niels Bohr’s approach, which tended toward antirealism about the quantum 
realm itself. What I am calling the “standard interpretation” is closer to von Neu-
mann’s formulation.
 9 It would also count as “interventionist determinism” in Leigh Vicens’s taxonomy 
(2012, 328), but she does not recognize nonviolationism as a third possibility.
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2  Mapping the terrain
What exactly is the problem with God breaking the laws of nature? If “spe-
cial divine action” is unfamiliar, there is probably some question about why 
a theist would be worried about such things. Isn’t divine intervention the 
very thing that distinguishes theism from deism? Isn’t intervention in some 
sense the default position?
The first question is based on a false dichotomy of sorts. There are not 
only two options: either (i) the disinterested Creator of deism or (ii) the 
interventionist God who routinely breaks the laws of nature. Most theo-
logians today choose a third option – “none of the above,” and this chap-
ter explores the terrain between those two extremes. But in terms of the 
“default position,” I agree that these noninterventionist and nonviolationist 
alternatives bear the theological burden of proof on this question. Without 
some argument to the contrary, the biblical God would most naturally be 
understood as sometimes acting contrary to natural laws.1 Let’s begin then 
by considering what motivates these alternative views. They are presented 
here without critique.2
2.1 Why not intervention?
The argument that God would not intervene in nature is not new and goes 
back at least as far as the conflict between Gottfried Leibniz and Isaac 
Newton.
2.1.1 Leibniz and the divine clockmaker
The many debates between Newton, Leibniz, and their respective camps are 
well-documented by historians of science (Janiak 2016, sec. 6). Both men 
appear to have independently discovered calculus at about the same time, 
which is not as implausible as it might sound. Unlike today, mathematical 
advances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely propelled 
by the needs of physics. Given that both Newton and Leibniz required new 
tools to describe the same area of research (mechanics), it is not surprising 
that they would discover the same underlying mathematics.
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On the theological side, Newton’s supporters allowed for divine interven-
tion in nature. They believed that such action might be necessary to keep 
the solar system stable, for example. Leibniz, on the other hand, argued that 
an omniscient deity would not act that way. The creation of an infinite God 
would not need maintenance:
According to [the Newtonian] doctrine, God Almighty wants to wind 
up his watch from time to time: otherwise it would cease to move. He 
had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. 
Nay, the machine of God’s making is so imperfect, according to these 
gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordi-
nary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work.
(Leibniz and Clarke [1717] 1956, 11–12)
In other words, Newton and his follows are positing a lesser god, one that 
lacked the foresight to make a universe without the need for occasional tink-
ering. An omniscient, omnipotent deity, Leibniz argues, would have gotten 
it right in the first place. An infinite clockmaker would make a clock that 
would keep perfect time forever without winding or adjustments. The same 
goes for the universe as a whole. A god who needs to intervene in nature 
would be incompetent. To think as the Newtonians do is to “have a very 
mean notion of the wisdom and power of God” ([1717] 1956, 12). Schleier-
macher would pick up this same argument a century later3, and it continues 
to motivate noninterventionists to this day.4
2.1.2 An inconsistent god
As we will discuss in Chapter 4, theists since the seventeenth century have 
widely believed that God set the laws of nature in place and continues to 
uphold them. Noninterventionists and nonviolationists argue that it would 
be inconsistent for God to intervene in nature and thereby violate the same 
laws he had previously ordained:
The very notion of God as the faithful source of rationality and regular-
ity in the created order appears to be undermined if one simultaneously 
wishes to depict his action as both sustaining the “laws of nature” that 
express his divine will for creation and at the same time intervening 
to act in ways abrogating these very laws – almost as if he had second 
thoughts about whether he can achieve his purposes in what he has 
created.
(Peacocke 1993, 142)
If God had wanted some event to happen, he could have structured the 
laws to bring it about – à la Leibniz – or changed the initial conditions at 
creation. To implement and then break his5 own laws would involve a kind 
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of divine schizophrenia. Hence, God does not violate the decrees that we 
recognize as the laws of nature.
2.1.3 God-of-the-gaps
Newton’s theory of gravitation is “universal” in the sense that it applies to 
every mass in the universe. Why then, Newton wondered, don’t we observe 
stars colliding over long periods of time? After all, they attract each other. 
Why don’t they move? His answer was that God acts in such a way to 
keep the stars in place (Opticks, Query 28). In time, of course, a naturalis-
tic explanation was found and there was no need to posit divine action to 
account for the fixed stars or, as I mentioned earlier, to keep the solar system 
stable.6
Newton’s explanation is an example of what is now called “God-of-
the-gaps reasoning”: When a given phenomenon does not seem possible 
according to our best theories, one infers that God is responsible, thus filling 
the gap in our understanding. The problem is that when science eventually 
closes the same gap with a naturalistic explanation, God is pushed out. Each 
time that God is eliminated in this way strengthens the atheistic conclusion 
that divine action is never needed to explain anything. “Science,” the athe-
ist assures us, “will plug all of the gaps in time.” Nonviolationists believe 
this argument can best be undermined by avoiding gap-reasoning in the first 
place:
Contemporary theologians, therefore, have been understandably reluc-
tant to adopt an account of God’s relation to the world that appeals to 
the incompleteness of scientific explanations. Any theological reliance 
upon gaps in our understanding of the natural order may look like a 
return to [a] discredited apologetic strategy.
(Tracy 1995, 290)
In short, theists should not appeal to divine intervention to explain phenom-
ena that they find surprising. Avoiding gap-arguments is one motivation 
behind both noninterventionism and nonviolationism.
2.1.4 Science
It is widely believed that, with the possible exception of quantum mechanics, 
science takes nature to be an unbroken chain of causes. Physical effects are 
always produced by physical causes. In other words, many believe that sci-
ence has proved the causal closure of the physical: Physical events can only 
be caused by earlier physical events in conjunction with the laws of nature.7 
Divine intervention is problematic because it breaks the chain of causation.8 
This is not a new idea. German scholar David Friedrich Strauss in his Life of 
Jesus wrote, “All things are linked together by a chain of causes and effects, 
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which suffer no interruption” (Brooke 1991, 270–71). Philip Clayton incor-
porates the God-of-the-gaps in his version of this objection:
Physical science, it appears, leaves no place for divine action. To do 
science is generally to presuppose that the universe is a closed physical 
system, that interactions are regular and lawlike, that all causal histories 
can be traced, and that anomalies will ultimately have physical expla-
nations. Unfortunately, the traditional way of asserting that God acts 
in the world conflicts with all four of these conditions. It presupposes 
that the universe is open, that God acts from time to time according to 
particular purposes, that the ultimate source and explanation of these 
actions is the divine will, and that no earthly account would ever suffice 
to explain God’s intentions.
(2008, 186)
Remaining in harmony with science is a key desideratum for most schol-
ars working on divine action, and so science tacitly dictates the boundaries 
within which the discussion takes place. The models discussed in the fol-
lowing sections therefore take pains to avoid running afoul of science in 
any way.9
2.1.5 The problem of evil
If the arguments against intervention seem weightier the further we have 
gone, that is no mistake. We now arrive at the central concern. Many believe 
that if there are no limits to divine action, the problem of evil becomes an 
insurmountable objection to theism. If God simply chooses to intervene and 
stop some tragedies from occurring, why not more? Why not all? Here is 
theologian Thomas Oord:
[Interventionists] typically believe God permits or allows evil because 
God has the kind of controlling power to prevent such evil. . . [But the] 
God who can violate the lawlike regularities of the universe ought to 
violate those regularities more often to make our lives better [italics 
added].
(2015, 142)
It is common to say that God has the ability to prevent evil and yet has over-
arching reasons not to intervene. But once the door is opened to interven-
tions, every case where God does not to prevent an identical evil becomes a 
challenge to God’s goodness. Oord chooses instead to accept constraints on 
direct divine action within the course of history in order to explain human 
suffering.
There are similarities here to the standard free will defense. It begins with 
the premise that creatures with libertarian freedom have greater intrinsic 
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value than automata or creatures with some lesser variety of free will. If so, 
God ordaining free will both adds to the intrinsic value of the universe and 
inevitably leads to those creatures choosing evil from time to time. While 
God has the ability to intervene and stop such choices, doing so would mean 
that the agent is no longer free. There is therefore an important reason for 
God not to do so. The value of libertarian freedom thereby becomes a kind 
of constraint on divine intervention. A well-known reply to this argument 
is that it only pertains to moral evil – the kind brought about by rational 
beings – but has nothing to say about natural evil: disease, disasters, and 
the like.
What if God likewise has principled reasons for not stepping in to prevent 
natural evil? Polkinghorne advances this line:
I think the only possible solution lies in a variation of the free-will 
defense, applied to the whole created world. One might call it “the free-
process defense.” In his great act of creation I believe that God allows 
the physical world to be itself. . . . in that independence which is Love’s 
gift of freedom to the one beloved . . . The cosmos is given the opportu-
nity to be itself. . . . It is from that precariousness that natural evil arises.
(2005, 77–78)
It is not the case that God chooses to aid some and withhold from others. 
God instead has overarching reasons for not intervening in order to prevent 
natural evil. The autonomy of nature has value analogous to libertarian 
freedom in persons. Some noninterventionists go so far as to claim that this 
solves the problem of evil.
These, then, are the main reasons given for rejecting interventionist divine 
action. None of them are decisive, in my view. Nonetheless, I would like 
to examine the current terrain before making any positive proposals of my 
own. Let’s begin with the two main types of noninterventionism before 
moving on to nonviolationism.10
2.2 Thomism
While its roots are premodern, Thomism of some variety or other is still a 
live option. This is especially true of Catholic thinkers but not exclusively 
so. Like most noninterventionist models of divine action, this one begins 
with the relationship between God and nature (God–world).
The Thomist view of divine action rests on two categories of causation: 
primary and secondary. God is the primary cause in the sense that God is 
a necessary being, the sole uncaused cause. Everything else is secondary 
and contingent, depending on God for its existence. More precisely, God 
is not merely the first cause in the sense of, say, initiating the Big Bang, as 
the cosmological argument for the existence of God is so often presented in 
introductory philosophy courses. Rather, secondary causes depend on the 
16 Mapping the terrain
primary cause synchronically. As Aquinas taught (Summa Contra Gentiles, 
1.44), God could have created a physical reality with a temporally infinite 
past with no first sequential event, yet the entire timeline would still be con-
tingent and dependent on God for its existence. God is “continually creat-
ing” in the upholding of all other contingent beings.
Nothing thus far is distinctively Thomistic. Most theists would agree up 
to this point. Under Thomism, secondary causes are properly thought of 
as the way in which God is acting in the world. God acts in and through 
secondary causes:
[Consider] God’s continuing creative action in the universe, conceived 
now more richly than simply as just divine existential conservancy. It 
is that a principal mode of God’s activity in the world at the level of 
inanimate and nonpersonal beings is precisely through the underly-
ing regularities, constraints, and relationships he/she has established in 
nature, and which we sometimes refer to as “the laws of nature.” . . . 
The regularities, constraints, and relationships are as they are by God’s 
allowance or choice – he/she works through the secondary causes of 
our world.
(Stoeger 1995, 248)
The key to this account is that God does not intervene to act in nature. 
God instead works through the causal powers of natural entities.11 For any 
given event in nature, there is both a primary and a secondary cause. While 
the natural sciences will only ever observe secondary causes, all events are 
nonetheless acts of God qua primary cause:
When a primary and secondary cause act together, however, the effect 
belongs entirely to both. The influence of the primary cause does not 
diminish the action of the secondary cause, but enables it.
When God acts as primary cause in a creature, the effect is not divided 
between them, but belongs wholly to both.
(Dodds 2016,192)
For any physical event, the question is never whether the cause was natural 
or supernatural. In virtually every case, the Thomistic view is that both are 
at work. While some will cite miracles as exceptions, others believe that 
even then God is working through secondary causes.12
Thomism has several virtues from a noninterventionist point of view. 
First, unlike Intelligent Design Theory, it does not contradict science. The 
natural sciences are the study of secondary causes. Since God works through 
the causal powers of contingent beings rather than overriding them, no 
observable events will be out-of-bounds from a scientific perspective. Sec-
ond, there is no temptation for a God-of-the-gaps since only secondary 
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causes are candidates to explain a scientific anomaly. Third, the problem 
of evil is diminished as compared to interventionism. God’s action within 
nature is limited to the causal powers found in nature. God could therefore 
create new islands by working in and through the capacities of a volcano, 
but God could not directly intervene to stop a lava flow from destroying a 
house.
All theists should agree with Thomism that God is continuously involved 
with natural events in some way or other. This, again, is what distinguishes 
theism from deism. The question remains, however, as to what exactly God 
is doing. God acts “in and through” secondary causes, but what does that 
mean? In what sense does God make any sort of causal contribution?
There are two answers to this question, grounded in different understand-
ings of the relation between primary and secondary causes. The first looks 
back to Aquinas’s cosmological argument for the existence of God, specifi-
cally his “third way” (Aquinas 2006, Summa Theologica I, q.2, a.3). It is 
premised on the idea that each being relies on other contingent beings and 
conditions for its existence. The notion of reliance here is synchronic, rather 
than some sort of causal dependency backward in time. While it is true that 
I am a contingent being dependent on the prior existence of my parents, that 
diachronic dependence is a different matter. What we are talking about here 
is closer to the dependence of my desk on the existence of atoms: Take away 
the atoms and the desk ceases to be. Note that the atoms are likewise con-
tingent beings, depending on their parts and other states of affairs, such as 
the cooling of the universe since the since the Big Bang. Aquinas rejected the 
idea that this sort of appeal to yet another level of contingent beings could 
go on forever. It cannot be turtles all the way down. Hence the need at some 
point for a noncontingent, necessary being at the ground floor of reality. All 
things continually depend on God.
This picture can then be extended to events. When contingent creatures 
act (secondary causes), they serve as intermediaries between whatever effect 
is brought about and God (primary cause):
On this view, the changes of state from moment to moment that make 
up the history of the universe have as their proximate causes the inter-
actions of creatures within the order of nature. These events can be 
regarded as acts of God, however, insofar as they result from a series of 
causal intermediaries that God has established.
(Tracy 2009, 236)
Secondary causes in this view have an instrumental role in divine action. 
Primary causation is mediated by secondary causes:
Divine Providence works through intermediaries. For God governs the 
lower through the higher, not from any impotence on his part, but from 
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the abundance of his goodness imparting to creatures also the dignity 
of causing.
(Aquinas 2006, Summa Theologica I, q.22, a.3)
And so God works by way of contingent creatures and does not act within 
nature apart from them. Some then emphasize the autonomy given to crea-
tion in that it has causal powers apart from God. As Edwards writes, “[At] 
the heart of this approach is the idea that God gives creatures independence 
and integrity, including the capacity to act as real causes. In this view, God 
consistently respects the proper autonomy of creation” (2010, 62).
The second approach denies that primary causation is in any way medi-
ated by secondary causes. Freddoso stresses that primary causation is imme-
diate and that every action in nature is due to both primary and secondary 
causes (1988, 77). The previous view, he says, takes primary causation to be 
little more than the “mere conservation” of secondary causes. Not surpris-
ingly, Freddoso also cites Aquinas:
Therefore God is the cause or the action of all things inasmuch as he 
gives them power to act and preserves them and applies them to action 
and inasmuch as by his power every other power acts. And when we 
add that God is his own power and that he is within each thing, not as 
a part of its essence, but as holding the thing in being, it follows that he 
operates immediately in every operation, without excluding the opera-
tion of the will and nature.
(Aquinas 2011, De Potentia, q.3 q.7)
I do not know how to square this passage from De Potentia with the previ-
ous one from the Summa. One speaks of divine action as immediate; the 
other, as mediated. Under the former, it is difficult to understand what the 
causal contribution of God amounts to. If every event involves both primary 
and secondary causation, yet it appears that secondary causes are fully capa-
ble of bringing about effects on their own, what does primary causation do? 
As Ritchie suggests, it may be best to simply appeal to mystery (2017, 369). 
The primary/secondary relation is a metaphysical question that is beyond 
our grasp.
Well, perhaps. Ideally, though, an appeal to mystery occurs after a great 
deal of progress has been made on an issue. Whole books have been written 
on the problem of evil giving a variety of answers. If there is some remaining 
instance of evil left unaccounted for, one might say that there is a good rea-
son for God allowing such events, but one can only know that reason from a 
God’s-eye perspective. Fair enough. In this case, however, the mystery seems 
to be at the very heart of the matter. While primary causation is supposed 
to be an account of special divine action, the model rests squarely on the 
mystery. What does it mean to say that God acts in and through secondary 
causes? We don’t know.
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This approach to divine action is attractive to two groups. The first is 
made up of Catholic scholars who take a broadly Thomistic approach to 
metaphysics overall. They have theological reasons for preferring Thom-
ism (or something in the neighborhood) and are simply applying it here to 
the question of divine action. This is not uncommon in philosophy. Take 
physicalism, the metaphysical view that everything that exists can ultimately 
be reduced to the entities of fundamental physics. If one believes that the 
arguments for physicalism are compelling, that person will reject mind-body 
dualism in the philosophy of mind, reject realism in ethics, reject theism 
in the philosophy of religion, and so on. One’s metaphysical views ramify 
across the philosophical landscape. The same with Thomism.
A second group that might favor this approach are those who believe in 
causal powers, dispositions, and capacities to explain natural regularities.13 
These are the philosophical descendants of Aquinas’s secondary causes. 
Many dispositionalists reject Thomism, but they believe that his overall 
approach regarding causation is better than the alternatives. For theistic 
metaphysicians of this stripe, then, the primary/secondary distinction among 
causes fits nicely with their program.14
In short, there are two main doors to a Thomist view of divine action, one 
theological (Thomism writ large) and one philosophical (causal powers and 
dispositions). But what if you don’t find either attractive – no metaphysical 
inclination toward causal powers and no theological motivation to embrace 
Thomism?15 Then you will likely be looking elsewhere for a model of special 
divine action. As I will argue in Chapters 4 and 5, medieval Aristotelianism 
was deliberately set aside to make room for more modern ideas, such as the 
laws of nature. That ship has sailed and there is no pressing need to call it 
back to port. This is not an argument that Thomists should stop what they 
are doing and get on board with a less antiquated view. Perhaps Thomism 
will yield something sufficiently powerful and explanatory to justify it. But 
that day has not yet come.
2.3 Panentheism
Panentheism leads to a second type of noninterventionism, one that denies 
the strict creation-creator demarcation between nature and God. The cen-
tral metaphor used by most – but not all (Culp 2017, sec. 4) – panentheists 
is that the relation is like body to soul. God and nature are far more inter-
related and less independent of each other than in classical theism.16 Many 
deny creation ex nihilo. Others closer to classical theism would want to 
qualify these claims in various ways, all of which is to say that “panenthe-
ism” is not a precise term (Gregersen 2004).17
The main panentheist contribution to special divine action is that inter-
vention is not a choice; it is a metaphysical impossibility. God and nature 
do not have the sort of relation whereby God could intervene. To push the 
metaphor, one’s soul cannot intervene in one’s body. Intervention becomes 
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a category mistake. God cannot act on the universe “from the outside.” 
The world is already “in” God, although cashing out this second metaphor 
is no easier than the first (Meister 2017, 8). In any case, the point is that 
interventionism is ruled out as a metaphysical constraint, not because it is 
wise or morally better not to do so. God cannot intervene any more than a 
necessary being can choose to no longer exist.
A closely related view is Oord’s essential kenosis (2015). Here the meta-
physical constraint is not due to the relation between God and nature (soul 
and body), but rather part of God’s essence: It is God’s nature to be in 
relation.18 A crucial part of this relation is not controlling either persons 
or natural processes.19 There is some similarity here to Polkinghorne’s free- 
process thesis mentioned in section 2.1. The difference for Oord is that 
God’s noninterference is not a matter of choice. Like other panentheists, 
Oord holds that God cannot intervene (2015, 94–5).
Panentheism avoids all the concerns theologians have about intervention-
ism. There is no danger of running counter to science or positing God-of-
the-gaps explanations since interventions are ruled out. There is no mystery 
for why God does not prevent evil. It is simply not possible for the panen-
theistic God to do so. God cannot override the free will of persons and God 
cannot intervene to prevent natural disasters.
For better or worse, panentheism has far more support within main-
stream academic theology than elsewhere. If the medievals believed in 
the God-of-the-philosophers, panentheism is the God-of-the-theologians. 
While the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead is part of the recent 
history of philosophy, it had little lasting influence among analytic phi-
losophers or the more recent movement toward analytic theology. For 
that matter, analytics have a similar lack of interest in Hegel and German 
Idealism.
Many contemporary Thomists and panentheists approach the question 
of divine action by way of the God–world relation. In other words, once 
we get the metaphysics straight, noninterventionism becomes the obvious 
right answer regarding divine action. This approach contrasts the search 
for a specific “causal-joint” between God and nature – the place where 
divine action first registers a difference in physical events. Many theologians 
now believe that focusing on the God–world relation is preferred and that 
the search for a causal-joint was the wrong way to address the question of 
divine action (Ritchie 2017, 361–2).
While I acknowledge the difficulty of the causal-joint question, this shift 
is not so much a different approach to divine action but rather a refusal of 
the question and a change in subject. There is a lot about what divine action 
isn’t among these authors: It’s not intervention. And their schemas employ 
a lot of suggestive metaphors and analogies: “in and through,” “body to 
soul.” But the how, the mechanics of divine action, is never addressed. Con-
sider this passage from Oord: “For this reason, miracles are neither coercive 
interventions nor the result of natural causes alone. Miracles occur when 
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creatures, organisms or entities of various size and complexity cooperate 
with God’s initiating and empowering love” (2015, 200). While the princi-
ple of charity should be extended to authors (assuming the more informed 
and favorable reading over a lesser one) and all the more so to friends like 
Tom, I must confess that I have no idea what that means. What would it be 
for a brain tumor to cooperate? What does God initiating and empowering 
love do?
Evolution would seem to be an excellent test case. Panentheists and 
Thomists overwhelmingly favor some variety of theistic evolution. And 
many theistic evolutionists believe that God has somehow or other guided 
the evolutionary process. So, again, guided in what sense? Not like guiding 
a golf ball into the hole by nudging it from time to time. That would be an 
intervention. God’s upholding the process is a necessary condition, but so 
is the existence of atoms. One would not want to say, however, that atoms 
guide evolution, photosynthesis, or other biological processes. If there is 
more to God’s guidance, what is it?
One perfectly understandable answer is the deistic one: nothing. God 
doesn’t do anything more. God creates the universe and that exhausts the 
degree to which God interacts with nature. Perhaps there is more in terms 
of God’s guidance and motivating of persons. Nature, on the other hand, is 
left to its laws.
Few noninterventionists today are willing to bite that particular bullet. 
But instead of providing a different answer to the question, many simply 
change the subject to the God–world relation. That’s fine, but unless one 
can say what God does on his side of the God–world relation that makes 
a difference on the other side, the question of special divine action has not 
been addressed.
While some accept this challenge and supplement the God–world relation 
with something more (see section 2.4), others believe that any direct answer 
would be an unhelpful retreat. “You are missing the point,” I can imagine 
my interlocutor replying, “the only way to answer your question is to posit 
a causal-joint at which such guidance can take place. Noninterventionists 
are instead giving reasons for why God cannot be more involved in the 
natural order. Anything more opens the door to a hands-on, interventionist 
deity making the problem of evil insurmountable.”
Let’s say a bit more about the problem of evil, then, since it appears to be 
a key motivator in the turn away from causal-joint models. The core idea is 
that an active God makes the problem worse:
If it is supposed that God has adequate reason to restrict divine action 
to a combination of ordinary action (in and through natural processes) 
and revelation (such as the Resurrection of Christ) then the problem of 
evil does not take on the same dimensions as it does when it is assumed 
that God might freely intervene in any sort of process at any time.
(Russell 1995, 31)
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One of the proposed strengths of God–world models is that they include prin-
cipled limits on what God will do and that these limits help explain why God 
does not intervene to prevent evil. Some believe this self-limiting is rational and 
voluntary: God could intervene but has stronger, countervailing reasons not to. 
Panentheists take the self-limiting to be involuntary. The inconsistency between 
omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and the existence of evil is broken 
by proposed metaphysical limitations on what God can do. Oord is explicit on 
this point: “[Why] doesn’t a loving and powerful God prevent genuine evil? The 
essential kenosis model of providence offers one principal answer. . . . Let me state 
this answer simply: God cannot unilaterally prevent genuine evil” (2015, 110). 
It is God’s metaphysical relation to nature that makes intervention impossible.
So why am I not a noninterventionist? Two reasons. First, it does not solve 
the problem of evil. While any universe with laws of nature will have natural 
evil (i.e., people will inevitably get in the way of nature’s most powerful forces), 
it seems as if God could have arranged things so that the world had less. God 
could have made a universe without tobacco or with mosquitos that do not like 
human blood. God could have made us more genetically predisposed toward 
virtue without taking away free will. To be a solution to the problem of evil, 
noninterventionists would also have to argue that this is the best of all possible 
worlds – a doctrine that has few defenders these days.
The second reason is that I do not see this limiting of God as a strength of 
these models. Putting theological distance between God and nature is the failed 
philosophical strategy of Gnosticism. Let’s be clear: No theologian mentioned 
here is a Gnostic. The Gnostics were not concerned with the problem of evil. 
For them, it was the “problem of matter.” They did not believe that a spiritu-
ally perfect God would get his hands dirty through direct involvement with a 
material world. Yet Hebrew and Christian scriptures both seem to portray an 
interactive God, one who is undeniably the Creator. What to do? The solution 
was to place a buffer between God and nature, a lesser deity responsible for 
the world of matter. The Gnostic God did not create the material world and is 
therefore off the hook regarding the problem of matter. The theological price 
is a god who is removed from our physical reality.
This is both the general strategy and the price to be paid by panentheism 
and other God–world models in which the problem of evil is the central 
concern. God is not responsible for evil, they say, because there are meta-
physical restrictions on what God can do in nature. The price is an attenu-
ated view of omnipotence, where God is unable to respond to many of our 
prayers. In my view – and this may reflect a disciplinary bias different from 
that in (nonanalytic) theology – the price is too high. The models discussed 
thus far allow God far too little freedom to act.20
2.4 Pneumatological naturalism
The next proposal, which Ritchie calls pneumatological naturalism (2017, 
374), comes from theologian Amos Yong and philosopher James K. A. 
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Smith. It is pneumatological insofar as the account focuses on God’s Spirit, 
which is immanent throughout creation. Why Ritchie considers it a type of 
naturalism needs some explanation. Naturalism in philosophy is a descend-
ant of materialism: Everything that exists is made of matter. This gave way 
in the twentieth century to physicalism: Everything that exists can ultimately 
be reduced to the entities of fundamental physics.21 Naturalism expands this 
to include all the entities recognized by the natural sciences, not just phys-
ics. Hence, “theistic naturalism” sounds like an oxymoron to philosophers. 
Theism and naturalism have incompatible ontologies.
Theologians use the term somewhat differently, typically when the focus 
is on a holistic theology of nature with the God–world relation at its core 
(Ritchie 2017, 367). Theistic naturalists emphasize the unity of all reality, 
including God.22
To make things clear, “metaphysical naturalism” will refer here to the 
way philosophers use the term; “theological naturalism,” to the theologian’s 
version. Pneumatological naturalism is one type of theological naturalism.
Let’s approach pneumatological naturalism via negativa. It rejects 
deism in that nature is not an autonomous “self-sufficient ‘world’ that 
runs on its own steam” (Smith 2010, 97). It is not an interventionist 
model, what Smith calls “naïve supernaturalism” (2010, 89), as inter-
vention makes sense only given the false natural/supernatural bifurcation 
posited by deism (Smith 2008, 880). Pneumatological naturalism makes 
no appeal to secondary causes as intermediaries through which God acts. 
It is not panentheistic insofar as a strict creator-creation distinction is 
maintained.23
The central metaphor of pneumatological naturalism is that nature is 
infused with the Spirit. The very distinction between natural and supernatu-
ral wrongly implies that creation has a kind of autonomy. Instead, nature 
has no capacity to act apart from the Spirit working:
The shape of this theological or participatory ontology is nonreductive 
and incarnational. It affirms that matter as created exceeds itself and 
is only insofar as it participates in or is suspended from the transcend-
ent Creator, and it affirms that there is a significant sense in which the 
transcendent inheres in immanence.
(Smith 2008, 889)
The unique aspect of this “participatory ontology” is that the Spirit some-
times changes nature’s capacities.
Let’s continue with Smith’s version since his is the clearer of the two. One 
reason he rejects intervention is that he takes all natural events to be divine 
action. It just happens that most of these fall within the regularities we 
identify as laws of nature. At other times, the action of the Spirit produces 
unusual events – what we think of as miracles. Strictly speaking, there are 
no laws or independent powers “out there” in reality responsible for the 
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regularity of events. Both the regularities and the miracles are part of God 
continuously acting:
Because nature is always already inhabited by the Spirit, it is also 
primed for (not merely “open to”) special or unique singularities; these 
will not be “antinature,” because nature is not a discrete, autonomous 
entity. Rather, we can think of these “special” miraculous manifesta-
tions of the Spirit’s presence in creation as more intense instances of the 
Spirit in creation – or as “sped-up” modes of the Spirit’s more “regular” 
presences.
(Smith 2010, 104)
From a God’s-eye perspective, there is no difference between providence 
and special divine action – an idea that goes back at least as far as Newton 
(Davis 1996, 85). Our readiness to ascribe miracles to God’s intervention 
is due to a tacit metaphysical naturalism on our part, seeing nature as fully 
autonomous.
Yong’s view is harder to pin down. He speaks favorably of top-down 
causation and the input of information into nature (2011, 95), which will 
be discussed in the next section, but these do not seem to be central to his 
account. Like Smith, he rejects the uniformity of nature and the universality 
of law. The laws at work now need not be the same as those in the past or 
the future: “[The] laws of nature are amenable to the basic actions of God 
and sufficiently flexible so that they can be miraculously redeemed to usher 
in new patterns and habits of the coming world” (Yong 2011, 131).24 Else-
where, Yong embraces physicist George Ellis’s idea that the laws of nature 
contain seldom-tapped ranges of freedom. Given the right conditions, 
“miraculous” events can unfold in a perfectly lawlike way. As Ellis suggests, 
perhaps some initial conditions involve “God-centered minds” to such a 
degree that these conditions are seldom met (1995, 386). While the vari-
ous ideas mentioned are interesting, it isn’t clear whether Yong is endorsing 
them or merely sketching proposals in the same conceptual neighborhood 
as his own. 
In the end, Yong claims to opt for a view of law championed by C. S.  Peirce, 
bringing the hope of greater clarity (2011, 120). Peirce scholars know this 
to be a false hope, however, given the notorious difficultly of interpreting 
his work on this topic. Many take Peircean laws to be nothing more than 
habits of our own minds projected onto reality (Burch 2017). That would 
make Peirce’s view a type of Humeanism regarding law (see section 5.1) and 
would be similar to Smith’s in the sense that the laws do not have their own 
ontology (Smith 2008, 891). While Yong’s metaphysics never become clear, 
there is one idea he shares with Peirce: The laws of nature are not fixed but 
evolve over time. The eschatological laws of the kingdom of God are not the 
same as the current laws of nature. It is this lack of fixedness that allows for 
miracles. Miraculous events are governed by new laws that are temporarily 
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active in the present age (Yong 2011, 128–30). Such laws will become the 
norm in the eschatological future.
Pneumatological naturalism has two advantages over the other accounts 
discussed thus far. First, it envisions a far more active God. Answers to 
prayer, miraculous healing, and more are accepted at face value rather than 
being written off or reinterpreted in some way. As Plantinga has correctly 
diagnosed, it is not natural science that mitigates against such things but 
rather metaphysical naturalism that is smuggled in under the supposed 
imprimatur of science (2011, ix–x). Smith likewise argues that the science 
and religion literature typically cedes too much to naturalism from the start 
(2008, 884–5).
Second, while other types of theological naturalism fail to say what 
exactly God does with respect to divine action, Yong and Smith have an 
answer: From time to time, God changes those regularities that we take to 
be laws of nature. Every causal regularity is due to God’s manifest presence. 
When the particulars of that presence change, God brings about different 
events than what would have otherwise occurred.
While this is a step in the right direction in my view, it has not garnered 
much support. Before we get to the theological objections, philosophers of 
science would question whether one should take the laws of nature to be 
quite so plastic. The uniformity of nature, which says that the laws are 
invariant with respect to both time and space, is a metaphysical principle 
that has served science well for several centuries. Without it, astronomy 
and cosmology would be impossible. While astronomers could make obser-
vations, no calculations based on the behavior of distant objects could be 
trusted if those objects obey different laws. Cosmology itself would never 
have become a science, since all its models presuppose the uniformity of 
nature. Of course, Smith and Yong are probably not envisioning global 
changes in the laws, so perhaps the problem can be mitigated. If the changes 
are limited to a specific place for a short period, they would not interfere 
with science.
Another issue is that while their view is technically a type of nonviolation-
ism, I doubt that others will find it to be a welcome addition. When nonvio-
lationists discuss the value of not violating the laws of nature, they tacitly 
mean “the actual laws of nature as they stand.” The idea that God might 
change the laws temporarily is not what they had in mind.
In addition, Yong and Smith seem to be committed to a form of occasion-
alism, whereby God is causally responsible for all physical events.25 In their 
view, all events in nature, whether lawlike or miraculous, are the result of 
immediate divine action. It isn’t clear whether they would consider that a 
defect, but they do not allude to this sort of meticulous control elsewhere. 
In any case, another objection comes close on its heels.
The flexibility in the laws because of God’s mutable will that Smith and 
Yong describe makes the problem of evil worse. If every event in nature, 
both the commonplace and the miraculous, is a consequence of God’s will, 
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God is responsible for all natural evils. The regularities that brought about 
the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean were literally acts of God. And since, 
in their view, God changes the laws from time to time, God chose not to do 
so in this case.
This is a good place to point out the Scylla and Charybdis of special 
divine action. Scylla is deism, the ultimate hands-off theology. Charybdis 
is theological determinism, in which God directly causes all events. Both 
are distinctly enticing. The attractions of deism are first as a type of perfec-
tion, à la the Leibnizian clockmaker, and second as a diminishment of the 
problem of evil. The less involved God is or can be with physical reality, the 
less responsible God is. Moral evils are the choices of persons with free will. 
Natural evil is the outworking of the laws of nature. The deistic Creator is 
not involved. The attraction of a highly interactive, hands-on theology is 
that it fits more naturally with a biblical God who hears and responds to 
prayer. The strength of one is the weakness of the other. In my view, none of 
the proposals discussed thus far successfully navigate the dilemma. Thom-
ism and panentheism introduce metaphysical constraints on divine action 
but run too close to deism in my view. There isn’t much that God can do 
under these models. Pneumatological naturalism skirts the other extreme 
but must then accept the baggage that comes with occasionalism.
While the next two models are initially more promising, they also are 
devoured by Scylla for reasons that will require a deeper dive into the phi-
losophy of science.
2.5 Emergence
Questions about reduction and emergence might seem like a change of sub-
ject here. Let’s consider the underlying ideas before making the connection 
to divine action.
As different as they are, no one doubts that solids, liquids, and gases 
are composed of atoms. Even the relative warmth of the air in my office is 
explained in terms of the behavior of particles. This and many more suc-
cessful explanations of macroscopic phenomena in terms of the microscopic 
have fueled reductionism in science – the principle that more fundamental 
explanations are almost always available at some lower level of physical 
reality. But like any good idea, this one can only be pushed so far. Many phi-
losophers of science now doubt reductionism as an overarching approach 
to science.
Reductionism holds that everything is simpler in the small. Whether we 
are talking about a watch or the circulatory system, in order to understand 
the whole one must first discover the properties of its component parts. 
Examples can be drawn from each of the sciences. The closer one exam-
ines those success stories, however, the less compelling they become. While 
the temperature of the air can be explained in terms of the average kinetic 
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energy of its molecules, thermodynamics has never been fully reduced to 
statistical mechanics. The direction of time, the role of probability, and 
some ineliminable idealizations remain controversial more than a century 
after this reduction was thought to have taken place. Instead of a consistent 
march showing how every entity is “really nothing but” its constituents, the 
sciences are more fragmented than ever. Greater knowledge of the micro 
does not always help in the macro, as Nobel Laureate Philip Anderson notes:
The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not 
imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. 
In fact, the more the elementary particle physicists tell us about the 
nature of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have 
to the very real problems of the rest of science, much less to those of 
society.
(2008, 222)
Like all broad methodological approaches, reductionism has limits.
Emergentism is a direct challenge to reductionism. It says that the reason 
for the increasingly long list of failed reductions is that new entities, laws, 
properties, or causes can emerge from a base level. An exhaustive under-
standing of the base will inevitably be incomplete. “[At] each level of com-
plexity entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new 
behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature 
as any other” (Anderson 2008, 222). There is a corollary. Research in the 
sciences often takes place along different scales or levels: particle physics 
at one, organic chemistry at another, on through genetics, psychology, eco-
nomics, etc.26 Why does this division of labor work so well? Emergentists 
believe it is due to nature organizing itself along these levels. They are part 
of the structure of reality. Emergent higher levels bring into being novel, 
irreducible entities and processes that go beyond the capacities of the lower 
level base.
Consider some examples: 1) While chemistry emerges from quantum 
mechanics, it cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics. Not even the shape 
of molecules can be derived from physics alone. 2) Chaos theory, which 
will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, not only cannot be derived 
from quantum mechanics but also seems to be forbidden by quantum phys-
ics. Yet chaos is detectable in many observable systems. 3) The most widely 
used example is consciousness. A brain and a body are necessary for con-
sciousness, but it is still a mystery how consciousness emerges from a work-
ing brain.27 We might also put purposeful behavior here. One example that 
Polkinghorne has often used is the explanation for why a tea pot is boiling. 
A partial explanation can be given in terms of chemistry and phase changes, 
but the full explanation must include my intention to make some tea. Chem-
istry alone will never explain why there is water in the pot.
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There are some general principles that can be derived from these exam-
ples. According to philosopher of physics Robert Batterman, emergence 
typically includes three things (2009). The first, as we have seen, is antire-
ductionism: “The behavior of the emergent whole does not reduce to some 
function of the behavior of its components.” The second is unpredictability: 
“The behavior of the emergent whole is unpredictable given knowledge of 
the nature of its parts.” A modified Laplacian demon, with an exhaustive 
understanding of physics, would not thereby know biology.28 The third is 
novelty: “The behavior of the emergent whole is completely different, new, 
and unexpected, given knowledge of the nature of its parts. In addition, 
there is often a demand that the emergent feature is not explainable by a 
theory of the nature of its parts.”
Now things start getting more controversial. Most scientists and philos-
ophers of science are willing to accept an epistemic version of emergence. 
They agree that, as a matter of scientific knowledge, the many branches of 
science will remain fragmented. Nature is too complex to fit all research 
into a neatly integrated, reductive hierarchy. Nonetheless, they believe that 
the limits of reduction are merely epistemic. If we were smarter as a spe-
cies and able to apprehend how it all fits together, we would not need 
higher-level laws and nonfundamental science. Metaphysically speaking, 
they are physicalists: The only things that ultimately exist are matters of 
fundamental physics. They are emergentists insofar as they do not believe 
that the full reduction of any one branch of science to another will come 
to pass.
Some accept a stronger, ontological form of emergence. In this view, 
upper-level properties, causes, and laws are not merely irreplaceable tools 
for dealing with a complex world. They are irreducible and real. The emer-
gent brings something metaphysically new to the fore.
Strong emergence is a far more contentious position, in which it is 
asserted that the micro-level principles are quite simply inadequate to 
account for the system’s behaviour as a whole. Strong emergence can-
not succeed in systems that are causally closed at the microscopic level, 
because there is no room for additional principles to operate that are 
not already implicit in the lower-level rules. Thus a closed system of 
Newtonian particles cannot exhibit strongly emergent properties, as 
everything that can be said about the system is already contained in the 
micro-level dynamics (including the initial conditions).
(Davies 2008, xii)
Under ontological emergence, the lower levels provide necessary conditions 
for the upper, but the lower does not determine the upper. As Davies says, 
this is a minority position. Why are scientists and philosophers of science 
less willing to take this step?
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One reason is that both tend to be metaphysically squeamish, preferring 
to hedge when it comes to the ontological implications of science. Another 
is that ontological emergence is often paired with a still more controversial 
belief in downward causation, starting with the idea that natural causes are 
not restricted to their own level. Some have effects at higher levels; some 
have effects at lower levels. The first part is unproblematic. Some of the 
noise found in electronics (higher level) is ultimately due to energy changes 
in its constituent electrons (lower level). The expression of various genes 
(lower) causes changes that affect the entire circulatory system (higher). 
What about downward causation?
Consciousness is again a common example. Consider the causal chain 
starting with my intention to drink from a mug and ending with my hand, 
the mug, and its contents moving toward by mouth. My mental states 
(higher) are a key part of the sequence and are causally responsible for 
physical changes (lower). This is enough for many emergentists to embrace 
the idea of downward causation.
It is now a short step to a model of divine action. If both ontological 
emergence and downward causation are real, higher levels influence lower 
ones without violating the laws at either level. God might therefore influ-
ence nature at the highest level, bringing about change in a top-down fash-
ion, all without breaking the laws of nature.
If God interacts with the “world” at this supervenient level of totality, 
then he could be causatively effective in a “top-down” manner without 
abrogating the laws and regularities . . . that operate at the myriad sub-
levels of existence that constitute that “world.” Particular events could 
occur in the world and be what they are because God intends them to 
be so, without at any point any contravention of the laws of physics, 
biology, psychology, sociology, or whatever is the pertinent science for 
the level of description in question.
(Peacocke 1993, 159)29
Peacocke tends to see downward causation in terms of the whole determin-
ing the behavior of its parts, but whole–part mereology is not the only way 
to think of the relation between levels. In any case, this proposal is nonvio-
lationist insofar as God can bring about change in nature without breaking 
any laws.
The case for this model of divine action depends on the plausibility of 
ontological emergence and downward causation. Critics are not hard to 
find. Polkinghorne argues that what downward causation is remains unclear 
(1995, 151). Appealing to mental causation is no help given other vexing 
questions about free will and agency.
The main philosophical hurdle to emergence comes from philosopher 
Jaegwon Kim (2003). Consider a two-level diagram (Figure 2.1) for the 
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Emergentists generally affirm three claims:
(i) Causal efficacy. B1 causes B2 and M1 causes M2. Causation along 
levels is real. This is represented by the horizontal arrows.
(ii) Supervenience. The emergent level depends on its base.30 This is repre-
sented by the vertical arrows. Supervenience is a relatively weak type 
of dependence. In various places Kim says that the base level deter-
mines, necessitates, and “is (at least) nomologically sufficient” for the 
upper level (2003, 155–57).
(iii) Irreducibility. Supervenient properties are neither reducible to nor 
identical with their bases.
Since mental causation is such a prominent example, let M1 and M2 be 
mental states that supervene on brain states B1 and B2. Now consider a per-
son in state M2 – say, the desire to take a drink. Why is this person in M2 
at time t2? There seem to be two equally good answers. The first is that the 
person was in M1 at t1, which in turn caused M2. M1 could be the feeling 
of thirst. The feeling prompts the desire to take a drink. The second answer 
is that the person is in brain state B2 at t2. Since B2 necessitates M2, if the 
person is in B2 at t2, he or she will be in M2 at t2 no matter what happened 
previously. The problem is that both answers seem to be sufficient for bring-
ing about M2. One makes the other superfluous.
Moreover, the causal connection between B1 and B2 makes the upper-level 
one between M1 and M2 redundant. Since B1 causes B2 and B2 is sufficient 
for M2, there is no work left for M1 to do. “There is a tension between verti-
cal determination and horizontal causation. In fact, vertical determination 
excludes horizontal causation” (Kim 2003, 153). In our example, this means 
that thirst in no way causes the desire to take a drink. Mental states do not 
bring about other mental states. If that doesn’t seem too important in the case 
of thirst and desire, move the sequence forward a couple of steps. Typically, 
the desire to take a drink would bring about M3 the intention to get one, per-
haps to move one’s hand to lift a glass of water. But the causal link between 
Figure 2.1 Levels diagram.
relation between an emergent level and its base. Each of the four nodes rep-
resents the state of a system at its given level:
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M2 and M3 is as redundant as any other at this level. One’s intentions are 
causally inert. Again, all the real causal work is done one level down.
The problem does not stop there, however. There is nothing unique about 
mind–body supervenience. If biological properties supervene on chemical 
ones, biological causes are undermined in like fashion. Biological causes 
are redundant given the more fundamental chemical causes on which they 
depend. Having now set foot on the slippery slope, there doesn’t seem to be 
anywhere to stop this “causal drainage” until it reaches the most fundamen-
tal level of physics. In other words, the only real causation in nature is at the 
lowest level, precisely as the reductionist had always claimed. This means 
that virtually every causal assertion ever made is strictly speaking false, since 
the only true causes are on the ground floor of physical reality. This is not 
the conclusion that emergentists were hoping for.
The upshot is that the metaphysics of ontological emergence has well-
known problems, and anyone wanting to use emergence as part of a model 
of divine action inherits them all. Several proposals have been floated to 
avoid causal drainage. None of them are easy fixes.31 Those wanting to 
employ emergence for divine action need to address this challenge. In my 
view, once the idea of levels has been reified, causal drainage is inevitable.
2.6 Quantum indeterminism
The most prominent type of nonviolationism is God working through quan-
tum randomness. Chapter 3 is devoted to this model so this will be brief. 
The main idea is that quantum mechanics allows for indeterministic gaps 
through which God can act without violating the laws of nature. Its main 
proponents are Robert J. Russell, George Ellis, Thomas Tracy, and Nancey 
Murphy, although none hold exclusively to this model.32 (Tracy also favors 
Thomistic primary/secondary causation (Tracy 2009, 235). Murphy appeals 
to downward causation and chaos theory.)
Why does this one warrant an entire chapter, especially when some see 
its popularity as being on the wane?33 First, it remains the best-known non-
violationist approach. Few outside professional theology are attracted to 
panentheism. Interest in Thomism tends to be concentrated among Catho-
lic scholars. Emergence has far wider support, but not as a type of divine 
action. In contrast, any acquaintance with the divine action literature 
includes the idea of God working through quantum randomness, even if the 
details remain murky.
Second, even though quantum mechanics does not play a central role for 
every science-and-religion scholar, many take it to be a necessary condition for 
nonviolationism.34 Consider downward causation once again. Tracy argues 
that it requires indeterministic gaps in nature to be effective (1995, 305–6). 
Without such gaps, no sort of holistic influence exerted by God could make 
a difference at lower levels. The thinking here is similar to that in arguments 
for free will. Few libertarians have quantum mechanics as a centerpiece of 
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their proposals, but they routinely point to the need for quantum random-
ness to have broken the hold of determinism. Both arguments take some 
amount of indeterminism to be necessary for nature to have room for agent 
causation. On its standard interpretation, quantum mechanics fits the bill.
Third, the criticisms aimed at this model to date are almost entirely theo-
logical. I believe that the more serious problems arise from physics and phi-
losophy of science. These will require a bit more space to explain (Chapter 3).
The debate about special divine action is puzzling at first. Why all the 
fuss over whether the Creator of the laws of nature can also set them aside? 
The short answer is that naïve interventionism has significant theological 
baggage. Once made clear, we can see why noninterventionist and nonvio-
lationist models have proliferated.
Unfortunately, the proposals presented here fail to strike a balance between 
competing desiderata. They want to avoid both the impersonal God of deism 
and the capricious miracle worker of interventionism, all without running 
afoul of science or too quickly appealing to mystery. That is a tall order. 
Intuitions vary about how to weight these goals. No matter where one plants 
a flag, there will be a bevy of critics who lean the other way. The model that 
will unfold over the course of this book is no different. Nonetheless, there is 
a place on the conceptual map that no one has yet fully explored. After the 
next chapter, it will be clear why further exploration is needed.
Notes
 1 Framing the issue of divine action in terms of the laws of nature begs some 
important questions, which will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5.
 2 Which isn’t to say that I agree with them. For the most part, I believe these argu-
ments are weaker than they are often assumed to be. See (Koperski 2017) for 
more.
 3 “But it is difficult to conceive, on the one side, how omnipotence is shown to 
be greater in the suspension of the interdependence of nature than its original 
immutable course which was no less divinely ordered. For, indeed, capacity to 
make a change in what has been ordained is only a merit in the ordainer, if a 
change is necessary, which again can only be the result of some imperfection in 
him or his work” (Schleiermacher [1830] 1928, 179).
 4 See (Pollard 1958, 28–29).
 5 I choose to use the traditional male pronoun throughout for God rather than 
creating a new one or using the inelegant s/he. Its use does not imply that God is 
male any more than the use of “calorie” entails the existence of caloric fluid.
 6 By the final edition of his Principia Mathematica, however, Newton had himself 
rejected the need for this explanation. It was instead the vast distances between 
the stars that kept them from colliding.
 7 This is a false assumption that will be taken up in section 6.5.
 8 William Stoeger is one example:
[The] laws of nature [do] not easily allow for divine intervention – at least 
not direct divine intervention – because that would involve an immaterial 
agent acting on or within a material context as a cause or a relationship like 
other material causes and relationships. This is not possible; if it were, either 
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energy and information would be added to a system spontaneously and mys-
teriously, contravening the conservation of energy (and we just do not have 
substantiated cases of that happening).
(1995, 244)
 9 Philosopher James K. A. Smith, is an exception. For much of the theology/sci-
ence dialogue, he says that
“science” is the primary authority and is the first to stipulate what could be 
theoretically acceptable. Theology then looks for places that remain “open” 
to theological intervention. After science has made first and preeminent claim 
to the territory, theology can then look for remaining corners of the realm 
where it can set up shop. The natural sciences, then, are taken to be “objec-
tive” arbiters of “the way things really are,” and theology (and religious 
communities) is expected to modify and conform (“correlate”) its beliefs and 
practices to the dispensations of the scientific magisterium. Failure to accede 
to these conditions of engagement entails refusal of admission to the “par-
lor,” and being written off as a “fundamentalist.”
(2010, 94)
 10 The rest of the chapter follows the helpful taxonomy provided by Sarah Lane 
Ritchie (2017).
 11 Causal powers is a technical term. See section 5.2 for more.
 12 Stoeger believes that even miracles will involve the secondary causation:
“[An] apparent divine intervention on our behalf – a miracle – in answer to 
our prayers, for instance, a healing of a disease of paralysis which cannot be 
explained by contemporary medical science, does not of itself manifest the 
direct action of God, though it does manifest God’s personal loving and life-
giving action towards us. We always experience it through some intermediary 
datum or agent.
(1995, 251)
 13 See section 5.2 for more.
 14 Edwards is one example:
Why, then opt for the approach to divine action in which the Creator is 
thought of as acting through secondary causes? Fundamentally, I embrace 
this approach because it represents a foundational metaphysical understand-
ing of the God-world relationship which is at the heart of the Christian tradi-
tion and which I find intellectually coherent and religiously meaningful. At 
its center is the idea that the Creator is present to all creatures, closer to them 
than they are to themselves, conferring existence and the capacity to act on 
every entity and every process.
(2010, 62)
 15 As Russell puts it far more diplomatically, “In response, I would start by ques-
tioning the degree of authority which one needs to grant the Thomist framework 
which Dodds presupposes – and which I do not” (2019, 154).
 16 Some would even say that God and nature are essentially interdependent 
(Gregersen 2004, 22).
 17 More recently, the term is used by those merely denying traditional doctrines 
such as atemporality and impassibility (Meister 2017, 4–5), but that seems far 
too loose. Although the rejection of these two doctrines means that one cannot 
be an Augustinian or a Thomistic theist, panentheism is not the only alternative.
 18 “According to essential kenosis, God is present throughout all creation, to every 
creature and entity, no matter how small or large. God is also always influential 
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in creation. To use philosophical language, essential kenosis says God is a neces-
sary cause in all things” (Oord 2016). See also (Oord 2015, 130).
 19 “Essential kenosis says that from the big bang, in the emergence of life, through 
evolutionary history, and ongoing today, God creates through uncontrolling 
love. This direct but uncontrolling divine action both gives to creatures and 
receives from them. Our loving God is personal and relational but never control-
ling” (Oord 2016).
 20 Emergentism (section 2.5) is a middle ground insofar as several prominent 
panentheists also hold that view (Clayton 2006, 319; Peacocke 1993, 158–59).
 21 These terms can also be used more narrowly. Theists who deny mind-body dual-
ism describe their position as “physicalism,” but only with respect to this issue.
 22 Most also give science unquestioned authority in the science-religion dialogue, as 
they believe that theology ought never conflict with science, which is somehow 
or other allied to naturalism. Amos and Smith are exceptions to this.
 23 Metaphysically, Smith does take panentheism to be a “close cousin” (2008, 
882), although it isn’t clear whether panentheists themselves would embrace the 
family resemblance.
 24 Yong also quotes Steven D. Crain favorably in this passage:
[Miracles] do not constitute an adjustment to creation, but an aspect of what 
the Apostle Paul calls the new creation. Indeed, that a miracle violates natural 
law is itself a sign indicating the depths to which sin spoils the integrity of 
the created order, for in the wake of sin, God re-creates that order to its very 
roots, all the way down to the natural laws that for so long had operated 
without interference.
(Yong 2011, 90–91)
Yong concludes, “In sum, the resurrection gives us good reason to question 
nomological universality, at least in the far-off future, and grants us insights 
into God’s intentions to restructure (re-create) the laws of nature infected by 
sin” (91).
 25 As we will see in Chapter 8, others have tried to paint me with that same brush 
(Larmer 2017).
 26 While this is an intuitive way to introduce the topic, it is also oversimplified. 
Physics deals with phenomena at many different scales from quantum field the-
ory through condensed matter physics and cosmology.
 27 That way of putting it reflects a materialist view of mind and body, but some 
dualists agree that minds are emergent entities (Hasker 2001, 48:195). Even 
more traditional Christian dualists admit that the human person was created 
both mind and body and that the orthodox understanding of the afterlife is res-
urrection of the body, rather than Plato’s immortality of the soul.
 28 A Laplacian demon is a thought experiment in which an extreme intelligence 
knows both the laws of nature and the exact state of every particle in the uni-
verse at a given time. In a Newtonian world, such a being could predict the state 
of those particles arbitrarily far into the future. Since no event escapes the laws 
of nature and Laplacian demons do not suffer from our lack of information, 
they would have no trouble solving the relevant equations and thereby know the 
outcome of any future event.
 29 See also Peacocke (2006), Gregersen (2006), and Clayton (2006).
 30 Technically this is strong supervenience. This means that whatever correlations 
exist between the base properties and supervening properties also exist in every 
possible world where those properties could be found. In other words, the super-
venience relation is modal. It is not something peculiar to our universe.
 31 Many think the culprit lies in the horizontal arrows of Figure 2.1. In other 
words, perhaps a more sophisticated understanding of causation can break the 
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redundancy (Loewer 2002, Rueger 2004). Others point to the vertical arrows, 
arguing that it is the relation between levels that needs to be revised (Humphreys 
1997). In my view, the problem begins with the notion that nature has strict 
levels (Koperski 2015, sec. 6.6).
 32 Some will be surprised that John Polkinghorne is not on this list, but that is inten-
tional. Polkinghorne does not hold this view. He instead believes that quantum 
mechanics and chaos theory are indicators of greater, undiscovered openness in 
nature through which God might continually act (Polkinghorne 1995, 154).
 33 This is one of Ritchie’s main points (2017), and it was also stressed by an anony-
mous reviewer of this manuscript for Routledge.
 34 See (Polkinghorne 1995, 151). Russell also makes this clear:
NIODA requires the possibility that the world of natural processes, at some 
or many levels of complexity, is causally incomplete: Here God may act non-
miraculously to produce an event in nature which nature on its own would 
not have produced. In this way, the principle of sufficient reason (that for 
every effect there is a sufficient cause) is satisfied in some cases by the direct 
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3  Nonviolation, quantum 
mechanics, and chaos
If you have heard of only one nonviolationist proposal, it will likely be 
the idea of God working through quantum mechanics. While its popular-
ity seems to have peaked, critics of this model focus almost exclusively on 
theological matters.1 Less well-known are challenges posed by physics and 
the philosophy of science. In the end, what I call divine quantum determina-
tion suffers the same fate as most of the proposals discussed in Chapter 2, 
leaving far too little room in which God can act.2 There is not much daylight 
between this type of hands-on nonviolationism and the hands-off noninter-
ventionism it tries to avoid.
As a note to the reader, this is the most technical chapter in the book. It 
can be skipped if the idea of God working through quantum indeterminism 
holds no interest.
3.1 Divine quantum determination
3.1.1 Indeterminism and randomness
Quantum mechanics forced physicists to reconsider the role of randomness 
in nature. To see why, let’s distinguish two types of randomness.3 Epistemic 
randomness is what we (typically) find in classical mechanics. Games of 
chance use dice because only the probability of a given roll can be known 
in advance. But that isn’t entirely true. A physicist with enough informa-
tion about the linear and angular momentum of the dice, the coefficient of 
friction of the table, and a handful of other variables could predict the out-
come with certainty. However, the dice end up, they had to have that result 
given the conditions and the laws of nature. To say this is a random event 
is merely a reflection of our ignorance. We don’t have the relevant informa-
tion and could not solve the equations quickly enough even if we did. In a 
practical sense then, one cannot predict the outcome of this “random” event 
even though it is just as determined by the laws of nature as the motion of 
a clock.
The physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace extended this idea to the entire uni-
verse. As a thought experiment, he considered a superintelligence that knew 
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the laws of nature and the precise state of all the particles in the universe 
at a particular instant. A so-called Laplacian demon could then calculate 
the state of the universe at any future time. Solving this set of equations is 
beyond the means of any computer, but there is nothing about the math-
ematics to prevent it in principle. To a Laplacian demon in a Newtonian 
world, there would be no such thing as epistemic randomness and no need 
to resort to probabilities. Any given event would happen (or not) with abso-
lute certainty.4
What about a Laplacian demon in a quantum world? That’s an entirely 
different matter. Some events are indeterministic under the standard interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics.5 Indeterminism produces a type of random-
ness that is not merely due to a lack of knowledge. Consider the radioactive 
decay of a specific uranium-232 atom. Such events are not physically deter-
mined by any prior cause. As far as nature is concerned, there is only a prob-
ability that a decay event will occur at any given time. A uranium atom has 
a 50 percent chance of decaying any time in the next 70 years. There is no 
hidden physics that triggers radioactive decay – no tiny fuse that determines 
when this event will happen. A Laplacian demon could only calculate the 
chance of such a decay at any point in time.
This ontological randomness is not the most important and not nearly the 
most bizarre feature of the quantum world. Nor is quantum mechanics com-
pletely random. Schrödinger’s equation is deterministic and in some ways 
more restrictive than classical mechanics. Ontological randomness is found 
in one set of quantum events, what are misleadingly called “measurements.”
Schrödinger’s cat remains one of the best thought experiments to illus-
trate. In one version, a cat is in a small, opaque room with a flask of poison 
gas. The flask is rigged to a device that will smash the glass if a photon 
detector is triggered. There is also a precision light source aimed toward a 
partially silvered mirror. Half the light will be reflected and half will pass 
through, like mirrored sunglasses. The mirror is angled toward the detec-
tor. When the test begins, a single photon is fired from the light source. 
There seem to be two options. The photon will either pass through the half- 
silvered mirror, the experiment is over, and the cat lives, or the photon will 
be reflected, thus triggering the detector, releasing the gas, and killing the 
cat. That’s all clear enough. Whence the controversy?
The problem is that according to Schrödinger’s equation, the photon does 
not take one path or the other. In some sense the photon takes both paths – 
the one allowing the cat to live and the one releasing the poison. Both final 
states, cat-dead and cat-alive, happily coexist in the quantum state described 
by the wavefunction, the mathematical entity that evolves over time accord-
ing to Schrödinger’s equation. However, we never observe the quantum 
state that captures both cat-dead and cat-alive. As soon as a measurement is 
taken, the wavefunction collapses and we are left with a live cat or a dead 
one. The state prior to collapse, where two or more definite possibilities are 
held suspended at the same time, is unobservable. Nonetheless there are 
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good theoretical and experimental reasons to believe that this superposition 
state exists prior to measurement.
The outcomes in this particular scenario are intentionally limited, and if 
things are prepared correctly, there is a 50 percent chance of observing a 
dead cat and a 50 percent chance of observing a live one. Under the stand-
ard interpretation of quantum mechanics, the outcome is ontologically ran-
dom. Not even a Laplacian demon could predict which result would occur.
A longstanding question is, What counts as a measurement? The term 
itself connotes something that humans do. We measure all sorts of things to 
gain information. In that sense, there is no measurement in the Schröding-
er’s cat scenario until a person looks inside to see the result. In principle the 
cat could remain in a superposition state indefinitely if no one looks inside.
Others have thought that measurement is a conscious act, one that ani-
mals could engage in as well. If so, the cat would be sufficient. The wave-
function would collapse at the instant the cat might hear the breaking of the 
glass flask.
The majority view today is that any sort of irreversible process is suf-
ficient for a quantum measurement.6 In the cat example, the point at which 
the photon either triggers the detector or impacts the wall constitutes a col-
lapse of the wavefunction. Consciousness is not required. Hence, superposi-
tion states emerge and collapse continually throughout the universe, each 
time constituting an ontologically random event.
We can now complete the picture. Under divine quantum determination, 
God can influence the collapsing wavefunction in such a way as to get the 
outcome that he wants from among the ontologically random possibilities. 
If God wants Schrödinger’s cat to live, he can bring about that outcome 
without violating any laws, since there is some objective probability that it 
would happen. God merely chooses from among the ontologically random, 
physically possible outcomes, making one of them actual. And since nature 
is, at its root, quantum mechanical, God can influence the physical world 
without breaking the laws of nature:
Nature may provide the necessary conditions for a specific quantum 
event to occur, but the actual quantum event happens without nature 
providing a sufficient cause. . . . That means that if quantum physics is 
correct [we can interpret it as implying that] there can never be a com-
plete scientific explanation of just why specific quantum events happen 
as they do. . . . When a quantum event occurs it occurs by God’s direct 
action.
(Russell 2008, 157)
By “quantum event” Russell means a collapse of the wavefunction under 
the standard von Neumann–Dirac axioms.
Note that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics – now mis-
leadingly called the “Copenhagen interpretation” – is not the only one with 
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ontologically random events. One that is popular among philosophers of 
science is the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) or “spontaneous collapse” 
view (Lewis 2016, 50–55). For our purposes, the only important difference 
is that wavefunction collapse does not require measurements of any kind 
under GRW. Instead, each wavefunction is overwhelming likely to quickly 
and spontaneously collapse within every macroscopic object.
Other interpretations are deterministic and do not support ontological 
randomness. We will discuss those at the end of this chapter. Such interpre-
tations are incompatible with divine quantum determination. Some might 
think it unwise for a theological program to take a stand on an unresolved 
scientific question. I agree with Del Ratzsch (2001), however, that it is a 
virtue to put one’s view “in empirical harm’s way” (98). Too much of meta-
physics and theology is insulated from any sort of disconfirmation.
The limitations of divine quantum determination explained in the follow-
ing section are matters of physics and the philosophy of science, not theol-
ogy. What they show is that quantum mechanics provides too little freedom 
in which God can act. It does not support the hands-on theology that its 
proponents had hoped for.
3.1.2 The amplification problem
The rest of the chapter explores different facets of one idea: What goes on 
at the quantum level stays at the quantum level, at least when we are talk-
ing about those random collapse-events through which God is supposed to 
act. Unless those events can be amplified into the macroscopic realm, there 
isn’t much that God can do with them. This is not news to proponents of 
quantum determination:
[I]ndeterministic chance at the quantum level would need to make a dif-
ference in the way events unfold in the world. Chance will be irrelevant 
to history if its effects, when taken together in probabilistic patterns, 
disappear altogether into wider deterministic regularities. It is com-
monly said that this is the case with quantum indeterminacies, since the 
statistical patterns of these events give rise to the deterministic struc-
tures of macroscopic processes.
(Tracy 1995, 317)
While there are many indeterministic quantum events, they rarely have any-
thing to do with the realm of our experience. For God to effectively influ-
ence nature by way of quantum mechanics, these events must be amplified.
There are two good examples of the kind of mechanisms that are needed. 
One involves the electrochemical nature of the mammalian eye:
In some species the eye can detect individual photons falling on the 
retina. The photon is absorbed by a molecule of rhodopsin, eventually 
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resulting in a nervous impulse coming out of the opposite end of the 
cell with an energy at least a million times that contained in the original 
photon.
(Ellis 2001, 260)
There is also the case of genetic mutation and evolution:
A second example has been presented by Ian Percival, who states that 
“DNA responds to quantum events, as when mutations are produced 
by single photons, with consequences that may be macroscopic – leuke-
mia for example.” In this case the amplifier is the developmental process 
by which the information in DNA is read out in the course of the organ-
ism’s developmental history. . . . Indeed, mutations caused by cosmic 
rays may well have played a significant role in evolutionary history.
(Ellis 2001, 260)
This is a type of theistic evolution, albeit one with critics (Clayton 1998, 
18). Quantum events can cause genetic mutations, which in turn affect the 
evolution of a species.7
While these are legitimate cases of amplification, they exhaust the store 
of good examples. I agree that eyesight and point mutations in DNA-based 
organisms are significant, and perhaps some nonviolationists might be con-
tent with this. In my view, more is needed. There is a large gap between 
a mechanism-for-theistic-evolution on one hand and a robust-model-of-
divine-action on the other. Advocates of quantum determination hope that 
the program can be broadened, although most agree that the amplification 
problem remains largely unsolved.
With that in mind, I am going to argue for a surprisingly strong thesis: 
In light of current physics, the amplification problem cannot be solved. Not 
only are amplification mechanisms hard to find but the physics between 
scales also puts obstacles in the way. In other words, nature is predisposed 
to block the amplification of indeterministic quantum events.
To see why, recall a central idea from section 2.5: the notion of levels. 
Reductionists claim that high-level laws and phenomena can be reduced 
to lower-level ones, at least in principle. Emergentists are betting that this 
reduction will fail. Both sides agree that natural causes tend to run along 
their own level. The level of causes and laws that biochemists study, for 
example, is distinct from the level of those that botanists study.
Something that was not discussed earlier is that there are many lev-
els at which phenomena are blind to perturbations at smaller scales. 
Changes of state at the more fundamental level have an undetectable 
effect at higher levels. There are firebreaks between some levels of reality 
such that small changes, including quantum changes, cannot influence 
the goings-on at the next level up. Higher level phenomena with this sort 
of insulation from quantum effects are what Nobel Laureate physicist 
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Robert Laughlin refers to as “protectorates.” A quantum protectorate is 
“a stable state of matter whose generic low-energy properties are deter-
mined by a higher organizing principle and nothing else” (Laughlin and 
Pines 2000, 29). More generally, a protectorate is a domain of phys-
ics whose behavior is independent of the microdetails found at smaller 
scales (Batterman 2010, 1034).
Let’s be clear that no one is challenging the fact that nature is quantum 
mechanical at its foundation. The argument of this chapter is not some 
sort of antirealist rejection of quantum theory. The entire structure of the 
periodic table depends to one degree or another on quantum mechanics. 
But quantum mechanics is far more than those random collapse events that 
divine quantum determination requires. Many physicists who surely believe 
in quantum mechanics don’t believe in the collapse of the wavefunction. 
The issue here is whether those peculiar and somewhat questionable events 
can make their way into the realm of our experience. For the most part, the 
answer is that they cannot.
3.1.3 Two quick solutions
Perhaps this is not such a difficult problem to overcome after all. While 
quantum events are surely small and undetectable, so are individual atoms. 
But of course when enough atoms are put together, they form macroscopic 
wholes. Doesn’t this same principle apply to quantum events? This is Mur-
phy’s solution, here in the context of Schrödinger’s cat:
[Russell] would argue that the important fact that has been overlooked 
here is the extent to which the general character of the entire macro-
scopic world is a function of the character of quantum events. Putting 
it playfully, he points out that the whole cat is constituted by quantum 
events!
We can imagine in a straightforward way God’s effect on the quan-
tum event that the experimental apparatus is designed to isolate; we 
cannot so easily imagine the cumulative effect of God’s action on the 
innumerable quantum events that constitute the cat’s existence. Yet this 
latter is equally the realm of divine action. . . . The picture presented is 
straightforward: the behavior of the parts (quantum events) determines 
the behavior of the whole (macroscopic events). Every material object is 
therefore subject to quantum determination. Just as a sufficient accumu-
lation of snowflakes can eventually produce an avalanche, God’s deter-
mination of a massive number of quantum events can have observable 
effects.
(Murphy 1995, 356–7)
This sort of part-whole inference is completely intuitive. Why isn’t this a 
solution to the amplification problem?
Nonviolation, quantum mechanics, and chaos 45
Let’s consider a better analogy. Say that you are standing on a bluff look-
ing out over Lake Michigan. A teenager on the beach far below is trying 
to throw rocks onto the observation deck where you are. He can throw as 
many rocks as he wants, but unless he can impart sufficient kinetic energy, 
none of the rocks will reach the deck. How many attempts the boy makes is 
irrelevant. There is no sense in which the sheer number of throws cumula-
tively allows one of the rocks to reach the bluff.
This is why Murphy’s mereological intuitions fail here. Events need not 
accumulate like atoms. To solve the amplification problem, one must intro-
duce mechanisms that allow quantum events to cross an energetic threshold. 
The number of events is irrelevant.
Let’s consider a second solution. Many point to the ways in which quan-
tum mechanics is important for macroscopic physics.
[Besides] the fictional “Schrodinger’s cat,” other examples of macro-
scopic quantum effects (suitable for divine exploitation) are Bose-
Einstein condensates, lasers, SQUIDs (superconducting quantum 
interference devices) and the millions of field-effect transistors in 
your nearby computer. Quantum effects are far from impotent in the 
macro-world.
(McDermid 2008a, 163–4)
There are without question examples of macroscopic quantum mechanical 
phenomena. There are two reasons why they do not constitute an answer to 
the amplification problem.
First, like Schrödinger’s cat, these examples involve a high degree of engi-
neering. They are not phenomena one finds in everyday experience; hence, 
they will be limited in terms of divine action. Perhaps there are examples 
in nature. Photosynthesis might be one. Let’s assume that it is, even though 
it remains controversial (Ball 2018). If photosynthesis involves quantum 
superposition, clearly quantum effects are all around us.
There is an important ambiguity to note here about “quantum effects.” 
No one is denying that modern physics is thoroughly quantum mechani-
cal. The very stability of atoms – and thereby every macroscopic entity – 
depends on it. But that is not the issue. Recall the only source of ontological 
randomness in quantum mechanics that matters here: the collapse of the 
wavefunction.8 Those are the only quantum events that are relevant for this 
model of divine action. Do these examples involve wavefunction collapse? 
There is an easy test to find out. Ask whether the deterministic interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics deny any of these phenomena. If not – i.e., if 
those interpretations also allow for lasers, SQUIDS, etc. – these examples 
do not involve collapse events or ontological randomness. The answer is 
that Bohmian mechanics, the Everettian interpretation, and more can all 
account for these phenomena. If they could not, there would be no contro-
versy involving the interpretation of quantum mechanics. This means that 
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these examples do not require a collapse of the wavefunction and so do not 
count as counterexamples to the amplification problem. We will have to 
look elsewhere.
One area that initially seemed promising was chaos theory.
3.2 Chaos as amplifier
Chaos theory has been called the third great theory of the twentieth cen-
tury, along with quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity. If 
that seems like naïve enthusiasm, consider a quote from a physics textbook: 
“Arguably the most broad based revolution in the worldview of science in 
the twentieth century will be associated with chaotic dynamics” (Rasband 
1990, 1). While things have not turned out quite so grandly, chaos has been 
a fruitful area of research in physics and elsewhere.
3.2.1 A brief tutorial on chaos
Chaos theory isn’t a theory of anything in particular the way, say, fluid 
mechanics has a clear subject matter. Chaos is instead part of a large area 
of mathematical science known as dynamical systems theory. A “system” in 
this context could be a simple pendulum, chemicals in a mixing chamber, or 
a dripping faucet. When the system can be described by means of a differen-
tial equation, the state of the system is given by the values of the variables in 
the equation at a given time.
Until the 1970s, most of the work done in dynamical systems theory had 
dealt with linear equations, which are both extremely useful and relatively 
well-behaved. Nonlinear models, on the other hand, are often intractable. 
Engineers often had no choice but to replace nonlinear equations with linear 
ones that closely mimic their behavior. Things began to change in the com-
puter age. Many nonlinear equations whose solutions were analytically out 
of reach could now be simulated on a computer.
The most important property of chaotic systems is sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions (SDIC). If a system displays SDIC, the future states of 
the system change dramatically given an arbitrarily small change in initial 
conditions. This notion of small changes having large consequences is what 
is often called “the butterfly effect.” The idea is that if the earth’s atmos-
phere is subject to SDIC, a butterfly flapping its wings in Japan today might 
be sufficient to change the weather in Miami sometime next year from what 
would have been a sunny day into a hurricane.
A useful way of understanding this starts with a phase space, a geometri-
cal representation of the state and evolution of a system. Each point in the 
space represents a possible state of the entire system, no matter how many 
particles or parts are involved. As the system evolves over time, the state 
point changes, carving a trajectory through the phase space. Trajectories 
in the space represent a system’s possible evolution from different initial 
Nonviolation, quantum mechanics, and chaos 47
conditions. Most real-world systems are dissipative, meaning they have 
some amount of friction, electrical resistance, or other sort of loss. In those 
systems, attractors will develop in their phase spaces.9 An attractor is a set 
of points toward which neighboring trajectories flow. Once a system state 
enters the basin of attraction, it inevitably moves to the attractor and remains 
there unless the system is perturbed. Figure 3.1 is the simplest example, 
a point attractor. The system evolves to one particular state regardless of 
the initial conditions (within the basin of attraction). This would represent 
something like the coin funnels often found at shopping malls. Figure 3.2 is 
a limit cycle, an attractor for systems such as a clock pendulum. No matter 
how the pendulum starts, the clock’s mechanism ensures a regular, periodic 
motion will ensue.
The presence of a strange attractor, such as Figure 3.3, entails that the 
system is chaotic and displays SDIC, which means that minute changes of 
state can dramatically change the way that system will evolve in the future. 
The slightest perturbation, even a single flap of a butterfly’s wings, moves 
Figure 3.1 Nonchaotic point attractor.
Figure 3.2 Nonchaotic limit cycle.
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the system from one state trajectory to another. Once on a neighboring tra-
jectory within a strange attraction, the new time evolution of the system will 
diverge exponentially fast from what it would have been.
How might this help solve the amplification problem? Consider the but-
terfly effect again, but this time at the quantum level. Jason Colwell gives a 
good example. God, he says, can choose
the position of an electron at one time while preserving its probability 
density function through His pattern of choices over all time. The elec-
tron’s position at that moment could influence the motion of one, then 
several air molecules. This would soon affect the flow of a tiny region of 
air. Amplified through chaos, this could cause a significant meteorologi-
cal event after more time had elapsed. God, being omniscient, sees all 
the intricate workings of chaotic systems. He knows where tiny changes 
would have huge effects later on. This enables Him to act providentially 
in many situations to produce a desired result.
(Colwell 2000, 135; quoted in Saunders 2002, 186)
Divine quantum determination causes a state change at the quantum 
level. In a chaotic system, such a change produces a shift in the system’s 
state trajectory, dramatically altering its evolution. Since chaos is found 
in many macroscopic systems, God can effectively govern their evolution 
through quantum events, all within the dictates of nonviolationism. And 
so it seemed that the amplification problem had been solved, at least for 
chaotic systems.
The story, however, does not end there. Polkinghorne calls this wedding of 
chaos to quantum determination “the hybrid scheme” (1996, 37).10 There 
are reasons why he and other physicist-theologians do not use it to solve the 
amplification problem.
Figure 3.3 Lorenz Mask.
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3.2.2 Not enough chaos
First, there is not as much dynamical chaos in the world as popular accounts 
imply. It’s true that chaos has been discovered throughout the natural sci-
ences – moons, convection cells, predator-prey models, etc. The scientific 
journals in the 1980s and 90s had no end of new examples. In a sense, 
then, chaos is all around us, which is good news for advocates of the hybrid 
scheme. The bad news is that chaos is far less prevalent than it might appear.
3.2.2.1 The math
Optimism about the ubiquity of chaos in nature was grounded in part by 
a simple mathematical argument. As we have seen, chaos lives in the realm 
of nonlinear differential equations. Without question, nonlinear models far 
outnumber linear ones.11 While the latter are more tractable, they are often 
based on idealizations that do not hold in reality. (Recall those frictionless 
planes in freshman physics.) Hence a realistic model of a given system in 
nature is far more likely to be nonlinear and chaotic than linear. As Karl 
Popper observed, the world is filled with clouds, not clocks (1973, 213–15). 
Linearity is the exception.
As simple as this argument is, there is an equally simple flaw. Nonlinearity 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for chaos. Most nonlinear models 
do not exhibit chaos.12 The prevalence of nonlinear systems in the space 
of differential equations does not by itself indicate that nature is mostly 
chaotic.
3.2.2.2 Signal and noise
As David Ruelle, one of the fathers of modern chaos theory, has noted, 
chaos is a lot like noise: There can be a little or there can be a lot (1994). 
To say that a system is chaotic does not entail that the overall behavior of 
the system is completely unpredictable. Healthy heartbeats are chaotic. But 
what does that mean? Heartbeats are mostly regular and predictable.
In most real-world examples, the chaotic part of a system’s dynamics is 
negligible on most scales. Often the effect of chaos is so small that it requires 
precise equipment and lots of data to detect. So yes, there is chaos in nature, 
but not that much of it, relatively speaking.
3.2.2.3 Stable boundary conditions
Philosopher Peter Smith points out another restriction on SDIC in nature. 
He argues that the presence of chaos in dynamical systems presupposes other 
sorts of stability to get off the ground. Consider the first published example 
of chaos in nature. In 1963 meteorologist Edward Lorenz proposed a rough 
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mathematical model for the behavior of convection cells in the atmosphere. 
Computer simulations of this model unexpectedly revealed SDIC. This is the 
basis of the claim that our weather is chaotic. Smith quotes a typical conclu-
sion based on this research:
Lorenz realized that his equations weren’t behaving the way a traditionally- 
minded mathematician would expect. Lorenz coined his famous phrase: 
“butterfly effect.” The flapping of a single butterfly’s wing today pro-
duces a tiny change in the state of the atmosphere. Over a period of 
time, what the atmosphere actually does diverges from what it would 
have done. So, in a month’s time, a tornado that would have devastated 
the Indonesian coast doesn’t happen. Or maybe one that wasn’t going 
to happen, does.
(Stewart 1989, 141)
Smith then points to a crucial oversight in the exposition of Lorenz’s discov-
ery, one that is common in the popular literature:
Even if we ignore for the moment the empirical short-comings of the 
Lorenz model, how on earth are tornadoes supposed to get into the 
story? The model was intended to describe the behaviour inside one of 
a series of parallel horizontal convection rolls: and it actually counts 
against butterfly-sized causes producing tornado-like effects. For the 
model assumes that the large-scale pattern of rolls, laid side by side 
like so many felled logs, remains entirely stable: the chaotic behaviour 
is local, as the rolls change their rotation-speeds in never repeating pat-
terns. . . . [S]o long as we are still working within the Lorenz paradigm, 
there is no destructive break-up of the rolls, no wildly accelerating con-
vection, and hence certainly no tornadoes!
(1998, 67)
The presence of chaos in a given atmospheric phenomenon does not imply 
SDIC in global weather patterns. Lorenz’s model presupposes a stable layer 
of convection cells. A butterfly’s wings would perturb the random-looking 
rotation within a cell, but this limited effect is a far cry from stormfronts 
and tornadoes. Assuming the model is realistic,13 there is some meteorologi-
cal phenomenon that displays SDIC. However, this fact does not support the 
kind of broad extrapolation one generally sees in discussions about chaos 
and the weather.
The upshot for the amplification problem is that the mere presence of 
chaos in a physical system might not amount to much. The Lorenz model 
provides no justification for the claim that a butterfly outside my window – 
let alone quantum effects – can change the weather in Asia. Chaos at the 
level of Lorenzian convection is restricted and has little effect on global 
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weather patterns. The moral is the same as with the heartbeat example: The 
presence of chaos may have no effect on the global evolution of the system 
in which it is found.
3.2.2.4 Models and modeling
Let’s now consider what it means to say that chaos has been “discovered” in 
some phenomenon. To do so, we need to be a bit more precise. Let dynami-
cal systems refer to real world objects with identifiable states that change 
over time. Dynamical models, usually sets of differential equations, are used 
to describe their behavior. Phase spaces, like those containing attractors in 
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, are geometrical representations of the possible 
evolutions of those equations.
With that distinction in mind, Ruelle raises a new objection:
Many published papers give the superficial impression that they deal 
with real physical, biological or economic systems, while in reality they 
present only computer studies of models. By “real system” I mean a sys-
tem in, say, astronomy, mechanics, physics, geophysics, chemistry, biol-
ogy or economics with a time evolution that one wants to investigate. 
Computer study of a model is an important method of investigation, 
but the results can only be as good as the model.
(1994, 26)
If a poor model behaves chaotically, there is little reason to expect chaos 
in the subject of the model. Nonetheless, when casual readers see a title 
such as “Chaotic Behaviour in the Solar System” (Wisdom 1987), they 
would likely infer that chaos has been detected in the motion of nearby 
celestial bodies. That is not the case. Instead, the paper describes a dynam-
ical model for one such body, namely, Hyperion, one of Saturn’s moons. 
When the equations are solved with the help a computer, the output indi-
cates chaos. However, this does not seem to be a discovery in the ordinary 
sense of the word; rather, it is the prediction of a computer simulation. 
Exploring the behavior of the mathematics is different from discovering a 
new species of moth. The existence of chaotic behavior in the solar system 
still seems to be an open question. Smith’s summation of the problem is 
correct:
Why should I accept that, because a mathematical model has a cer-
tain feature, then the physical world has a corresponding feature? 
Discussions of chaos typically blur over the issue here by sliding in an 
indisciplined way between talking of dynamical systems qua physical 
phenomena and talking of systems qua mathematical constructs.
(1990, 255)
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One must bridge the gap from the dynamical equations to the dynamical 
system they are intended to model.14 Smith has argued that this cannot be 
done for the models of interest here (1998, 39).
3.2.2.5 The quantum suppression of chaos
Perhaps the best-known reason not to rely on chaos as a solution to the 
amplification problem is the so-called problem of quantum chaos. It starts 
with the fact that one cannot predict the onset of classical chaos using quan-
tum mechanics alone. This is not surprising. As we saw in section 2.5, one of 
the arguments for emergentism is the impossibility of deriving the properties 
of macroscopic objects simply by looking at their microscopic constituents. 
However, one does expect the laws governing the constituents to permit what 
is observed at the macroscopic level. Not being able to predict phenomenon 
P from textbook theory T is one thing. That P appears to be impossible 
given the truth of T is another. Geneticists may not be able to tell that a DNA 
sample came from a specific albatross, but we would expect genetic analysis 
to show that the sample could possibly have come from a bird. If DNA test-
ing is trustworthy, it ought not disallow the possibility that the sample came 
from an albatross when we know that it did. If that were the case, it would 
present a clear challenge to the theory and procedures used in genetic testing.
This scenario has a close analogue in the relation between quantum 
mechanics and classical chaos. The more fundamental, microscopic theory 
disallows what is observed in larger, classical systems, an effect physicist 
Michael Berry calls “the quantum suppression of classical chaos” (1987). 
One way to understand it starts with the idea that strange attractors have 
a fractal structure. Under classical mechanics, this infinite structure within 
a phase space is merely unusual. Matters are different in quantum mechan-
ics, as mathematician Ian Stewart explains: “Classical chaos involves fractal 
attractors, that is, structure on all scales. But in quantum mechanics . . . 
structure does not exist on a scale smaller than Planck’s constant. So quan-
tum effects smooth out the fine detail so necessary of true chaos” (1989, 
295).15 True fractals have structure at all scales. Intuitively, no matter how 
closely one “zoomed in” on Figure 3.3, there would still be trajectories 
running through every region of phase space on the attractor. But from a 
quantum mechanical point of view, perfectly precise phase space trajectories 
are idealizations. At some scale, state points and trajectories are no longer 
physically meaningful. If fractal structure is a necessary condition for chaos, 
quantum mechanics makes classical chaos impossible.16
Direct answers to the problem have largely been abandoned, although 
work continues on finding correlations between the quantum and the classi-
cal realms in the presence of chaos. With no clear resolution to the quantum 
suppression of chaos, the so-called hybrid project between chaos and quan-
tum mechanics was dropped by the main proponents of divine quantum 
determination.17
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These then are the reasons why chaos theory did not solve the amplifica-
tion problem. But things get worse. Not only does nature contain less SDIC 
than the popular literature implies but in many ways there is also extreme 
insensitivity to small changes. Examples like gene mutation and the mam-
malian eye (section 3.1.2) are the exceptions, not the rule. Even within phys-
ics alone, systems more often block the influence of lower levels, rather than 
amplifying them.
3.3 Dynamical systems theory
Section 3.2.1 follows an unfortunate tendency in explanations of chaos, 
rushing through the less interesting parts of dynamical systems theory to 
get to SDIC and strange attractors. We now need to consider the rest of the 
terrain more closely. As we saw, strange attractors are only one member of 
a family of attracting sets in dissipative systems. Among the simplest are 
point attractors (Figure 3.1) and limit cycles (Figure 3.2). There are also 
torus-shaped attractors and many more at higher dimensions. The techni-
cal literature contains a menagerie of attracting and repelling sets, most of 
which have nothing to do with chaos. There are also nondissipative systems, 
which do not have attractors of any kind.
In the vast family of systems described by ordinary differential equations 
and represented by phase spaces, strange attractors are relatively rare. Even 
those dynamical models that produce chaos must have their parameters 
tuned to the “chaotic regime.” The models that produce chaos can just as 
readily display nonchaotic behavior. But with nonchaotic attractors, there 
is no SDIC. No matter what the initial conditions are within the basin of 
attraction, the system will inevitably fall into the attractor, producing the 
same evolution as any other starting point.
Consider three pendulum-clocks hung on a wall, all at rest. Now start 
the pendulums swinging one by one. Most likely, the three will be out of 
phase with one another: One pendulum will reach its highest point when 
the others are somewhere else in their arcs. As Dutch physicist Christiaan 
Huygens noted in the seventeenth century, the three clocks will become syn-
chronized with one another, a phenomenon now known as entrainment. So 
long as each pendulum is lifted far enough to get the mechanism started, the 
clocks will either come to have the same phase or be exactly 180 degrees 
out of phase with the others. A phase space used to describe this evolution 
contains a limit cycle. Every set of initial conditions – the starting angles of 
the pendulums – eventually produces the same periodic behavior. Notice 
that this is the opposite of SDIC. Small changes in the initial conditions of 
this system have no effect on its long-term behavior. Regardless of how the 
clocks are started, entrainment ensures that they will become synchronized. 
This is the characteristic behavior of nonchaotic attractors. Small changes 
matter only in the transient of most dissipative systems, not in their steady 
state evolution.
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From the point of view of divine quantum determination, this is disap-
pointing news. Not only did chaos not solve the amplification problem but 
dynamical systems theory also made it worse. Nonchaotic attractors erase 
microfluctuations. Small-scale changes of state make no difference to the 
long-term evolution of the system. Since nonchaotic models are more preva-
lent than their chaotic cousins, for most dissipative dynamical systems, any 
change of state that God might make at the quantum level will have no 
measurable effect on the final state of the system.
3.4 Continuum mechanics
Terms like “chaos theory” and “strange attractors” were perfectly suited for 
popular science writers. Not so for the physics of bending beams and fluids. 
It’s sometimes difficult to even know where continuum mechanics fits as a 
field of study. Taking matter to be a continuum is contrary to treating it as 
discrete and atomic. As philosopher Bertrand Russell (reportedly) once put 
it, the difference is between thinking of nature deep down as a pail of sand 
as opposed to a bucket of molasses. The molasses camp believed that mat-
ter at the most fundamental level is smooshed out and continuous. But why 
consider the continuum view at all? Everyone since Newton has believed in 
atoms, right?
Actually, atomism was still in doubt until the twentieth century. Ernst 
Mach argued that the idea was nothing but a useful fiction. Ostwald and the 
energeticist movement hoped to reduce molecules to energy (Harman 1982, 
146–7). Still others, like Lorentz, believed that electromagnetism might 
form the ground floor of physical reality (Harman 1982, 151). Classical 
physics developed along various fronts with conflicting and sometimes false 
views about the nature of matter. Happily, both the continuum and the atom 
approaches were equally useful, as Poincaré observed:
In most questions the analyst assumes, at the beginning of his calcula-
tions, either that matter is continuous, or the reverse, that it is formed 
of atoms. In either case, his results would have been the same. On the 
atomic supposition he has a little more difficulty in obtaining them – 
that is all.
([1905] 1952, 152)
At a certain level, it doesn’t matter whether nature is atomic or continuous.
Now, how can that be? It doesn’t matter! How can the right answer not 
matter? Answering that question reveals another example where small-scale 
changes fail to influence the behavior of a system, thereby compounding the 
amplification problem.
Poincaré was referring to two ways to derive the Navier-Stokes equations, 
which are the central laws of classical fluid mechanics.18 One of these treats 
matter as either atoms or a collection of point particles.19 The other takes 
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matter to be a true continuum, like a field. On the continuum view, there are 
no atoms. Many nineteenth-century physicists believed that the continuum 
approach would prove to be the more realistic one. The surprise is that both 
approaches yield the same equations for the behavior of macroscopic fluids. 
Truesdell explains what Poincaré had in mind:
Continuum physics stands in no contradiction with structural [i.e., 
molecular] theories, since the equations expressing its general principles 
may be identified with equations of exactly the same form in sufficiently 
general statistical mechanics. . . . Long experience with molecular 
theories shows that quantities such as stress and heat flux are quite 
insensitive to molecular structure: Very different, apparently almost 
contradictory hypotheses of structure and definitions of gross variables 
based upon them, lead to the same equations for continua.
(1984, 55)
The true microscopic nature of a fluid is irrelevant. This is one of many exam-
ples where physics employs – to borrow a phrase from Mark  Wilson – the 
“effacement of the small.” Engineers could as easily work with molecules, 
continua, point particles, or Leibnizian monads. The same macroequations 
can be derived from either a particle or true continuum base.
Let’s get into the weeds a bit to see how continuum mechanics relates 
micro- to macroscales. Start with a tiny volume element within a solid (Fig-
ure 3.4). If the element experiences a contact force on one side, the force 
will stretch it away from equilibrium. This stretching (strain) produces a 
force (stress) that tries to bring the element back into equilibrium. This new 
force impinges on the next volume element, which induces a strain, and so 
on down the line.20
The stresses and strains on the volume elements encode all the causally 
relevant information about small-scale interactions in the body. But volume 
elements are still far above the scale of atoms. This is the effacement of the 
small. The physics of stress and strain relations is indifferent to whether the 
microlevel is a composition of atoms or a true continuum. Yes, atoms exist, 
but their interactions are irrelevant at the smallest scale recognized by con-
tinuum models. This means that the observable behavior of such a system is 
largely independent of events at the level of its microconstituents.
In other words, the macrosolid is an emergent protectorate (section 3.1.2). 
Atomic-scale events are absorbed within the volume element and pre-
vented from having any causal influence on the whole. Nothing in quantum 
mechanics changes this fact.
Let’s consider two objections. One might say, “Well, we don’t believe in 
classical continuum mechanics anymore. We now know that the world is 
atomic and quantum mechanical, so we can safely ignore these examples.”
Several things should be noted. Continuum mechanics describes observ-
able systems like beams and fluids. It offers not false models of subatomic 
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physics but rather accurate descriptions of the behavior of gross matter. As 
Truesdell puts it, “Molecular hypotheses have come and gone, but the phe-
nomenological equations of D’Alembert, Euler, and Cauchy remain exact as 
at the day of their discovery, exempt from fashion” (Truesdell 1984, 55n5). 
Computer simulations now confirm this (Bishop 2008). Again, while such 
systems depend on unobservable stresses and volume elements, those are 
far above the scale of fundamental physics. From both a theoretical and 
an experimental point of view, smaller scales are irrelevant, including the 
goings-on in quantum mechanics.
Second, the complaint might be that continuum mechanics idealizes 
microcausal relations and ought not be treated as a guide. The question of 
atomic composition versus continuum has been resolved. Hence, any realis-
tic treatment of these systems must involve atoms, not the stress on homo-
geneous volume elements.
If the problem here is the use of idealizations, this criticism reaches into all 
areas of physics, not just continuum mechanics. Idealizations are employed 
no matter how far one drills down. Even quantum field theory suffers “the 
same kind of flaw exhibited by continuum hydrodynamics.” Rather than 
dismissing quantum field theory, one should hold that “if our foundational 
theories can provide answers to questions about what there is in the world 
Figure 3.4 Stress on a volume element.
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and what it is like, then non-foundational theories can do likewise, notwith-
standing their having similar flaws” (Teller 2004, 440). The use of idealiza-
tions is not itself a problem, but the failure to spot artifacts generated by 
those idealizations is. If continuum mechanics asserted that matter were 
truly a continuum all the way down, that would be an error. As we have 
seen, however, “continuum physics presumes nothing regarding the [funda-
mental] structure of matter” (Truesdell 1984, 54).
Because of the effacement of the small, events at the microlevel make no 
observable difference to the behavior of a flexible body or fluid – the exact 
opposite of what one would hope in trying to solve the amplification prob-
lem. Proponents of divine quantum determination are looking for ways in 
which microchanges can influence the macro. In continuum mechanics, that 
typically cannot happen.
The common theme running through the last sections of this chapter is 
that physics blocks small-scale changes from having macroscopic effects. 
Let’s consider one last example from the fastest-growing area of research 
today.
3.5 Condensed matter
The extraordinary scope of condensed matter physics makes it hard to char-
acterize. It includes exotic creations such as superfluids and graphene, as 
well as the mathematics of phase transitions. One defining feature is that 
condensed matter involves many interacting degrees of freedom, which is 
the very thing that makes these systems difficult to study. There are too 
many moving parts to know which are causally relevant.
One intriguing discovery is the degree to which unrelated systems exhibit 
the same properties. Many fluids with completely different chemical compo-
sitions behave identically. More surprising is that phase transitions in liquids 
work according to the same mathematics as magnets. The transition from 
liquid to vapor mirrors changes found in electromagnetic materials.21 Fluids 
are obviously quite different from magnets. How is it that the two, which 
seem to have no relation whatsoever, obey the same sorts of mathematics? 
Physicists want to know.
One set of mathematical tools in particular has helped tame the com-
plexity of condensed matter systems: renormalization group theory. The 
details are technical, but we need at least a minimal description to draw 
any conclusions. Recall that strange attractors are creatures of phase space 
rather than physical space. Physics relies on all sorts of abstract mathe-
matical spaces to bridge the equations to the phenomena. Renormalization 
group theory uses a space of Hamiltonians. A Hamiltonian is a mathemati-
cal description of a system’s degrees of freedom and the influence of external 
fields. In many areas of physics, finding a Hamiltonian is the key to describ-
ing a system’s behavior. Historically, this is what made condensed matter 
research too difficult to pursue. Such systems involve so many parts that 
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a realistic Hamiltonian quickly becomes mathematically intractable. The 
trick of renormalization is to move from a Hamiltonian of the actual system 
of interest to a Hamiltonian that behaves in the same way but with fewer 
degrees of freedom (Batterman 2002, 39–41). While not a perfect analogy, 
the idea is somewhat similar to engineering textbooks in which a three-
dimensional wheel is restricted to two dimensions. Engineering students can 
effectively deal with the simplified model, but allowing the wheel to wobble 
a bit along a third dimension would be far more difficult. Renormalization 
group analysis likewise boils the physics down to the properties that caus-
ally dominate the behavior of a system, stripping away the noise.
With a renormalized Hamiltonian in hand, the causally relevant proper-
ties of a system become clear. What we find is that systems in condensed 
matter physics also exhibit the effacement of the small. The interactions 
among the constituents of these systems are not responsible for how the 
system behaves. What matters are mid-scale properties like dimension and 
symmetry, as Morrison explains:
[T]he framework provided by [renormalization group theory] . . . has 
shown that while emergent phenomena, especially the “universal” phe-
nomena in condensed matter physics are certainly composed of micro 
constituents [like atoms], they are nevertheless largely insensitive to 
changes in their microphysical base.
(2012, 142)
This is similar to philosopher Batterman’s assessment:
[Renormalization analysis reveals] a class of macrostates of various sys-
tems at the scale of everyday objects (fluids) that are essentially decou-
pled or independent of their microdetails. The renormalization group 
explanation provides principled physical reasons (reasons grounded in 
the physics and mathematics of systems in the thermodynamic limit) 
for ignoring details about the microstructure of the constituents of the 
fluids.
(2010, 1037)
It’s that decoupling from microstructure and the autonomy of the macro-
scale that Laughlin and Pines had in mind when they coined the term “quan-
tum protectorate.” A quantum protectorate is a stable state of matter whose 
behavior is independent of events at the quantum scale.22 They are found 
throughout condensed matter research.23
3.6 Application: what it means
The research discussed in the previous three sections covers a vast range 
of applied physics. What the examples have in common is macroscale 
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insensitivity to changes at lower levels. In terms of divine action, this insen-
sitivity and autonomy make the amplification problem considerably worse. 
In the presence of a protectorate, the state of the macrosystem is largely 
immune to changes of state in its components at the quantum level. Pro-
tectorates prevent changes at the quantum scale from bubbling up into the 
macro. This means that the amplification problem is not merely something 
that the quantum determination program will solve in the fullness of time. 
Nature has firewalls in place that keep random events at the quantum level 
from influencing the realm of our everyday experience. In light of current 
physics, the amplification problem cannot be solved in a system with a pro-
tectorate. Given the prevalence of systems mentioned in this chapter, the 
unhappy consequence is that if God governs the universe by way of quan-
tum randomness alone, we are left with something close to deism.
Perhaps this is overstated. As one referee objected, I have already acknowl-
edged that amplifications occur. Photons in the mammalian eye are ampli-
fied. Gene mutation is another possible mechanism. When discussing fluid 
mechanics, I might also have mentioned turbulence, the fluid counterpart to 
chaos. A fluid in a state of turbulence does exhibit sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions. All told, the more balanced conclusion may be that divine 
quantum determination faces more obstacles than those that have been rec-
ognized, but it is not physically impossible.
While my argument would be stronger if I had shown that amplifica-
tion of quantum events were impossible, that objection misses the point. 
The amplification problem cannot be solved by way of exceptions. Divine 
quantum determination becomes less plausible as a model of divine action 
if one must resort to special cases to keep it alive. Consider an analogy. Say 
that your favorite football team has a weak offense. Ultimately, they need to 
find a way to score more points. It does not solve the problem to point out 
that they do, in fact, score now and then. Similarly, nonviolationists who 
look to quantum mechanics realize that they need to find still more ways in 
which quantum events can be amplified in order for quantum determination 
to serve as a robust mechanism for divine action. That is the amplification 
problem briefly stated. What we have seen is that nature imposes barriers 
that make it extremely difficult for random quantum events to influence 
the world of our experience. To solve the problem, nonviolationists must 
find more avenues for this to occur in. It is not enough merely to say that, 
despite the barriers posed by protectorates, amplification might happen on 
occasion.
Divine quantum determination is most plausible when the focus is on 
quantum mechanics alone. In my view, it is no longer viable given every-
thing we know in physics. Protectorates constitute a major challenge for 
anyone looking to quantum events as a significant mechanism for divine 
action.
One might look to future developments in physics to offer a solution, 
but current trends do not offer much hope. If anything, physics and the 
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philosophy of science point toward the eventual rejection of ontological 
randomness in quantum mechanics.
3.7 Contra ontological randomness
A necessary condition for divine quantum determination is the collapse of 
the wavefunction. While collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics 
remain the majority view, deterministic noncollapse alternatives continue 
to gain popularity among both physicists and philosophers of physics. If 
current trends continue, one of these will likely become the majority view 
among experts in the second half of this century.
3.7.1 Bohmian mechanics
My prediction does not refer to Bohmian mechanics, but since this is the 
best-known deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, let’s start 
there. A more accurate name is de Broglie–Bohm theory, since Bohm in 
essence rediscovered what de Broglie had pioneered in 1927 (Goldstein 
2017, sec. 3). In Bohm’s view, particles do not sometimes appear particle-
like and other times wavelike. Particles instead always have a precise posi-
tion in space. In the two-slit experiment, for example, the particle goes 
through one or the other slit, but never both. That doesn’t mean that we can 
discover which slit or the precise position of the particle, since Heisenberg 
uncertainty still applies. But in this interpretation the uncertainty principle 
is merely epistemic – a limitation on knowledge.
If fundamental physics is particle-based, how can we account for wave-
like phenomena, including the two-slit experiment just mentioned? The 
answer is that Bohm posits a new, unobservable entity: the pilot wave.24 
This is the entity that is governed by Schrödinger’s equation and described 
by a mathematical wavefunction. It is this wave that goes through both slits 
in the two-slit experiment, constructively and destructively interferes with 
itself, and, ultimately, directs the motion of particles.
With this dual ontology, there is no sense in which particles take on wave-
like properties and then collapse back into particles. Both pilot waves and 
particles are always present. This means that there is no collapse of the 
wavefunction and therefore no introduction of ontologically random quan-
tum events. Determinism is restored. A Laplacian demon with direct access 
to both the state of the particles and the pilot wave at an instant in time 
could calculate the future with precision.
From the point of view of the bench scientist, however, nothing has 
changed. We are still able to make only probabilistic predictions about 
where the particle will strike in the two-slit experiment, about the prospects 
for Schrödinger’s cat, etc.25 It is widely agreed that the orthodox and Bohm-
ian interpretations are empirically equivalent. No experiment can be run 
that confirms one and disconfirms the other.
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That is not to say, as Russell emphasizes (2009, 366), that an intuitive 
Newtonian world is thereby reinstated. Bohmian mechanics is highly nonlo-
cal, meaning that causes in one place produce effects at a distance without 
intermediate steps in between. Bohmian mechanics still contains a lot of odd 
quantum phenomena, just not as many as the standard interpretation.
Why then has Bohm’s view failed to attract many advocates? To physi-
cists, the theory seems ad hoc – in Polkinghorne’s words, “too clever by 
half” (personal communication). It looks as if someone had started with 
orthodox quantum mechanics and then added an equation and some bits 
of ontology to make the theory seem more classical, all of which is more 
or less correct. As a bit of counterfactual history, one wonders what would 
have happened if Bohmian mechanics had somehow been presented in 
1924. Would a pilot wave theory now be “orthodox quantum mechanics” 
and our textbook view be the odd, empirically equivalent formulation that 
physicists know about but widely reject? (“It rejects determinism! It requires 
the wavefunction to in some sense collapse!”) In that possible world, divine 
quantum determination would never have been considered a viable option.
The fact remains that indeterministic collapse interpretations remain 
far more popular than Bohmian mechanics. The more serious challenge to 
orthodoxy is next.
3.7.2 The many-worlds interpretation
To introduce the Everettian many-worlds view, let’s first go back to 
Schrödinger’s cat. In the standard example, there is a superposition state 
in which the cat is in some sense both alive and dead prior to “measure-
ment.” Superposition is entailed by the mathematics, although we never 
observe these states, only their effects. Measurement triggers the collapse of 
the wavefunction, destroying superposition, and the cat becomes either fully 
dead or fully alive.
Wavefunction reduction has always been something of an embarrass-
ment to physics. Schrödinger’s equation does all the heavy lifting, only to be 
replaced by this mysterious collapse during measurements. Many interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics aim to remove collapse events from the pic-
ture, including Hugh Everett’s relative state approach (1957). While it isn’t 
clear whether Everett himself thought that his view had metaphysical rami-
fications, it is clear that Bryce DeWitt did. The name “many-worlds” traces 
back to DeWitt’s way of making sense of Everett’s PhD thesis. According 
to DeWitt, if a collapse had occurred under the standard interpretation, 
separate universes would have come into existence (1970). Each possible 
outcome of a measurement happens in its own universe. An individual uni-
verse or “world” has definite classical-looking outcomes. For Schrödinger’s 
cat, there is one world with a live cat and another world with a dead cat. 
The key is that the wavefunction never collapses. All the possible outcomes 
it encodes become actual in their own worlds.
62 Nonviolation, quantum mechanics, and chaos
DeWitt’s many-worlds was never a popular option among physicists or 
philosophers. It eliminates the mystery of measurement and collapse but 
does so only by a massive expansion of ontology. Even in terms of conser-
vation of energy, many questioned how an imperceivable quantum event 
brings about the creation of whole universes. This seemed to be one of those 
proposals that, had a philosopher brought it to the table rather than a physi-
cist, would have been wholly derided in the science community.
In recent years, all this has changed. A group of Oxford University physi-
cists and philosophers has remade the Everettian program (Deutsch 1997; 
Saunders 2010; Wallace 2012). In their view, there is only one universe, and 
there is only one wavefunction for that universe, which evolves according 
to Schrödinger’s equation. Within this one complex wavefunction, there are 
“branches” that do not interact. The “many-worlds” are in reality many 
branches of the single global wavefunction which never collapses. From the 
point of view of people within each branch, the world looks quasiclassical 
(e.g., cat dead in one branch, cat alive in another).26
While moving from literal universes to branches might seem like a slight 
conceptual change, there is another advantage to this approach. Those 
mysterious measurements are also eliminated. Wallace instead appeals to 
chaos and decoherence (2012, 69–74). First consider the standard explana-
tion of why our experience is so classical rather than quantum mechanical: 
In a macro-object composed of many atoms, the wavefunction “bunches 
up” and becomes concentrated in “wavepackets.” Mathematically, these 
wavepackets behave much like their classical counterparts: trajectories 
through phase spaces. As long as wavepackets remain compact, the macro-
realm looks mostly classical.
Chaos makes that story untenable. In a chaotic system, a wavepacket will 
disperse exponentially fast. Among other things, this means that superposi-
tion states, like Schrödinger’s cat being both dead and alive, should have 
observable effects. If this breakdown of the wavepacket started today for an 
object the size of Hyperion, Saturn’s chaotically tumbling moon, Hyperion 
would no longer have a precise position in space after four years (Wallace 
2012, 74).
The standard (von Neumann–Dirac) approach appeals to measurements 
to solve this problem. When we observe Hyperion through a telescope, a 
measurement is made and the wavefunction collapses. More recently, physi-
cists have come to believe that neither a consciousness nor a detector is 
needed to trigger a collapse. They start with the idea that no system is ever 
completely isolated from its environment. Gravity, photons, and more inter-
act with nearly everything. The interaction of a quantum system with its 
environment in itself counts as a type of measurement. This continual inter-
action suppresses nonclassical states, what is technically known as decoher-
ence. This, Wallace argues, is the reason we do not observe the effects of 
superposition in chaotic systems. Oddly, Schrödinger’s cat situations occur 
only in idealized, isolated systems.
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There is one last step in the Oxford-style Everettian story. Decoherence 
helps explain why quantum weirdness is generally so well hidden, but it does 
not determine which classical state one will observe. Decoherence explains 
why we never see the cat-dead-and-cat-alive state, but it does not say which 
of the two possibilities one will observe.
Everett’s many-worlds is the last piece of the puzzle. Once decoherence has 
suppressed the nonclassical parts of the universal wavefunction, it branches, 
with each branch containing one of the possible classical outcomes – again, 
cat-dead in one, cat-alive in another, all within the single, universal wave-
function. From each observer’s standpoint within a given branch, virtually 
all phenomena have determinate outcomes. Thus, Oxford-style Everettian-
ism accounts for our classical-looking experience, all without either a col-
lapse of the wavefunction or ontologically random events. The many-worlds 
interpretation is deterministic.
For decades, Bohmian mechanics and many-worlds were little more than 
abstract alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation. Proponents of divine 
quantum determination have never taken them as serious threats to onto-
logical randomness. That is still true for Bohmian mechanics, which never 
gained many adherents. The Oxford many-worlds approach is a different 
beast. If its current popularity continues to grow, it will be the majority view 
in decades to come. Such a change would undermine any model of divine 
action that presupposes ontological randomness at the quantum level.
In so many ways then, the future does not bode well for divine quantum 
determination. A new model of divine action is needed, one that will survive 
if physics reestablishes determinism. Rather than jump into the mix of views 
described in Chapter 2, I intend to start with the foundations. If the key 
nonviolationist worry is that divine action cannot involve breaking the laws 
of nature, we need to consider the notion of law more carefully.
Notes
 1 Nicholas Saunders’s (2002) was especially influential. It remains one of the best 
books written from a noninterventionist perspective regarding nonviolationism.
 2 Divine quantum determination is essentially the same as Russell’s quantum 
mechanical noninterventionist objective divine action (QM-NIODA) and Plant-
inga’s divine collapse-causation (2008, 393). While QM-NIODA is Russell’s 
primary model of divine action, he believes that other approaches will likely be 
needed in order to form a complete account.
 3 Most philosophers of science do not like this terminology, even though it is 
now common. The real issue is not randomness per se but rather indeterminism. 
Randomness is an epistemic notion found in many areas of science. Determin-
ism and indeterminism are matters of physics and metaphysics. I have chosen to 
acquiesce and use “randomness” here rather than trying to force a terminologi-
cal change.
 4 As we will see in Chapter 6, this is an oversimplified view of classical mechanics.
 5 While the “standard” or “orthodox” interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
often called the “Copenhagen interpretation,” that is not quite correct. The 
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Copenhagen approach is properly that of Niels Bohr, who for the most part 
was an antirealist about the quantum realm. He believed that quantum mechan-
ics provides the correct probabilities for macroscopic observations but does not 
describe the nature of the microworld. The realist approach to uniquely quan-
tum phenomena such as superposition, entanglement, and the collapse of the 
wavefunction traces back to the von Neumann–Dirac formulation of quantum 
mechanics. For an excellent history of quantum theory that makes this clear, see 
(Becker 2018).
 6 Russell explicitly endorses this understanding of measurements (2008, 166). 
Such a definition also captures vacuum fluctuations – e.g., when an excited atom 
spontaneously transitions into a lower energy state and emits a photon. See 
(Svozil 2018, sec. 14).
 7 Russell takes this to be highly significant insofar as it refutes the idea that evolu-
tion is in conflict with theism and intrinsically atheistic (2008, chap. 6). Others 
argue that directed evolution is not compatible with neo-Darwinism, whether 
there is a violation of natural law or not. Darwinian mutations are random 
precisely in that “they do not occur according to the needs of their possessors” 
(Ruse 2012, 623). If God caused mutations to ensure that humans evolve, it 
would be nonrandom and hence non-Darwinian. As Ruse points out, when Dar-
win’s friend and supporter Asa Gray first proposed a version of theistic evolu-
tion, Darwin argued that it was incompatible with his theory. Contrary to this, 
Russell believes that as long as mutations continue to appear random from a 
biologist’s point of view, God could still arrange them to bring about a particular 
outcome.
 8 Quantum vacuum fluctuations are also ontologically random but extraordinar-
ily brief. Those fluctuations related to radiation were discussed in the previous 
subsection.
 9 Chaos can also be defined for conservative (nondissipative) systems (Tabor 1989, 
chap. 4). I choose the more familiar dissipative systems for ease of exposition.
 10 For more, see (Clayton 1997, 196), (Murphy 1995, 349–49), (Tracy 1995, 
317–18).
 11 In essence, the idea is similar to the set-theoretic truth that there are far more real 
numbers than there are whole numbers. If the cardinality of whole numbers is , 
the cardinality of reals is .
 12 Many nonlinear models are one- or two-dimensional, which are mathematically 
incapable of instantiating chaotic dynamics. Even for possibly chaotic systems 
governed by ordinary differential equations, there are param eters that can put 
the system into either a chaotic or a nonchaotic regime. Experimentalists often 
have to “tune” these parameters in order for a given system to exhibit chaos. For 
more on the relation of parameter space to the so-called “routes to chaos,” see 
(Ott 1993, chaps. 2, 8).
 13 Which it almost certainly is not. The mathematical simplifications used in order 
to derive the Lorenz model are extreme. In fact, the partial differential equations 
Lorenz started with are not themselves chaotic! See (Lichtenberg and Lieberman 
1983, 446).
 14 Engineering professor Francis Moon, an influential voice in the development of 
chaos theory, put it this way:
In the rush to explain chaotic dynamics in physical systems, there is a temp-
tation to propose mathematical models that emulate the classic chaos para-
digms more than the actual physics of the system. This could be forgiven in 
the early days of discovery and exploration in the subject. But, as the field of 
nonlinear dynamics matures, more accountability for both the mathemati-
cal and physical principles underlying the phenomena must be required. The 
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connection between physical laws (e.g., Newton’s laws and Maxwell’s equa-
tions) and mathematical models should eventually become transparent if the 
new explanations of chaotic phenomena are to be accepted.
(1987, 106)
 15 See also (Hobbs 1991, 159).
 16 A second, more precise way to understand the problem starts with quasiperio-
dicity, a distinct category of dynamical behavior from chaos. If a system displays 
quasiperiodic behavior, it cannot, at the same time, be chaotic. Chaos is a full 
step beyond quasiperiodicity vis-à-vis complexity of motion. Unlike the ordi-
nary differential equations that govern the behavior of classical chaotic systems, 
Schrödinger’s equation can only evolve periodically or quasiperiodically. Quan-
tum systems cannot reach higher levels of dynamic complexity (Jensen 1992).
 17 Nancey Murphy (1995) is a notable exception, although Russell takes her use 
of chaos as merely a suggestion rather than a firm solution to the amplification 
problem (private discussion). While John Polkinghorne coined the term “hybrid 
project,” he never held such a view, nor did he endorse divine quantum deter-
mination itself. He believes instead that chaos and quantum mechanics point to 
some undiscovered openness in nature through which God might continually 
input information. See (Silva 2012) for more. Kirk McDermid appeals to chaos 
in his discussion of special divine action, but for different reasons (2008b). In 
his view, the presence of chaos would provide God more options in a fully deter-
ministic universe since the precise initial conditions God might choose become 
crucial to the evolution of the entire system. The problems raised in the next 
section apply to this sort of chaos-based proposal.
 18 Technically, these are nonlinear, partial differential equations, which means they 
are beyond our ability to solve in most instances. It isn’t yet known whether 
unique solutions for the equations exist except for some special cases.
 19 Other than Boscovich, few thought that matter consisted of point particles – true 
mathematical points, not atoms.
 20 In solids, the mathematics of stress and strain are captured by constitutive rela-
tions – more precisely, how the stress tensor σ is related to the strain ε. In under-
graduate texts, these are reduced to simple vectors or scalar quantities.
 21 They share the same critical exponents, which describe a shift in phase  (Batterman 
2010, 1035). The phase transition is between ferromagnetic (below the criti-
cal point temperature when dipoles align) and paramagnetic (above the critical 
point temperature when they are naturally disordered but will line up under the 
influence of a magnetic field).
 22 Laughlin earned the Nobel Prize in 1998 for his research on the fractional quan-
tum Hall effect, which exhibits this sort of independence.
 23 Independence and autonomy are important themes in the emergence literature. 
As we discussed in section 2.5, emergent phenomena often behave in ways that 
are largely independent of their subvenient base. This independence blocks the 
reduction of higher-level entities and laws to their small-scale constituents. For 
our purposes, the thing to notice is that this same autonomy insulates many mac-
roscopic systems from changes at smaller scales. Examples of emergence expand 
the family of protectorates.
 24 This is an interesting claim in itself. The pilot wave is a perfectly legitimate physi-
cal entity that is fundamentally undetectable, and not merely because it is too 
small to be seen.
 25 The Born rule for converting a mathematical wavefunction into probabilities still 
holds (Lewis 2016, 56).
 26 How do Oxford-style many-worlds avoid the conservation of energy problem 
mentioned in the previous paragraph? The difference is ontological. All that 
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exists in this account is one wavefunction, which is taken to be an actually exist-
ing entity, not merely a mathematical description of something. That single, 
universal wavefunction never collapses and never literally splits into different 
worlds, thus avoiding any problem with conservation of energy.
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4  A brief history of the laws  
of nature
That nature works in predictable ways is not a new discovery. Prescientific 
folk knew perfectly well about the phases of the moon, the change of sea-
sons, and the behavior of tides. But why are these events stable and recur-
ring while others seem so random?
The gods were one answer. It was more or less in their job description to 
keep nature running on schedule. For Plato, it was instead the forms. On 
his view, a triangle drawn on the board, as well as every triangle anyone has 
seen, in only an imperfect instantiation of triangularity itself. The limited 
justice found in a Greek city-state was likewise a rough copy of the form of 
justice. Plato taught that justice, goodness, mathematical objects, and more 
have their own kind of perfect, abstract existence – more “real” in a sense 
than the realm of our own experience.
Plato explains how the forms come to be instantiated in the material world 
in the Timaeus. Like many other ancient creation stories, it involves a divine 
person of sorts, although one who is far more limited than a monotheistic 
Creator. Plato’s Demiurge is a divine craftsman. As such, he is unable to 
create matter any more than a sculptor is able to create a piece of marble. 
Fortunately, matter itself already exists in Plato’s story, albeit in a state of 
disordered chaos. Once the Demiurge wishes to mold the chaos into an 
orderly cosmos, his choices are limited. He is not an omnipotent designer 
able to do whatever he wants; instead, he is limited to the unchanging prin-
ciples of order found in the forms. They alone contain the blueprints the 
Craftsman can use. Euclidean geometry was not one option among many, 
for example. There is only one set of mathematical truths. While Plato 
seemed to consider this no more than a “likely story” (Zeyl 2014, sec. 4), 
the Timaeus gives one explanation for how the immutable forms bring order 
to the realm of our experience.
Aristotle rejected Plato’s timeless realm of abstract objects. That meta-
physical niche, he taught, was occupied instead by essences / substantial 
forms. Aristotle believed that every substance, like a given horse, is a com-
bination of essence and matter. Essences provide structure and uniformity 
to nature. No horses will be reptiles. No triangles will ever have more than 
three sides. Unless impeded, rocks always fall. Fire always rises. But there 
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is no platonic realm in which essences exist that is in some sense more real 
than the material world. Essences are present within physical substances. 
This was the metaphysical system developed by Thomas Aquinas and others 
in the thirteenth century.
The early modern era introduced a rival explanation for this orderliness: 
laws of nature. While a longstanding “natural law” tradition in ethics goes 
back to the Stoics, it took Descartes to unambiguously apply the idea to 
physics (Garber 2013, n. 7).1 This was no incremental change, as philoso-
pher Eric Watkins notes:
By placing laws at the foundation of scientific inquiry (in the broader 
context of the Scientific Revolution), modern thinkers redefined the 
order of nature, which had previously been conceived of (by medieval 
thinkers such as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Maimonides) as based 
on the natures and causal powers of finite substances.
(2013, xxvi)
This fundamental shift from essences and substantial forms to laws of 
nature is sometimes obscured since both approaches are still live options in 
metaphysics. (More on that in Chapter 5.) In terms of the history and the 
philosophy of science, however, the change was dramatic, having ramifica-
tions for divine freedom, empiricism, and divine action. These are the issues 
considered in this chapter, beginning with the turn from medieval Aristote-
lianism. The appendix discusses the surprising relevance of this material to 
the controversy over the theory of intelligent design.
4.1 From essences to laws of nature
There were three principal reasons for the rejection of Aristotelian meta-
physics. First, essences came to be seen as hopelessly obscure. Robert Boyle 
went as far as to call them unintelligible (Anstey 2002, 23–24), and Pierre 
Gassendi argued that even if substantial forms existed, they would be use-
less in science since we do not have epistemic access to them (Fisher 2014). 
Newton agreed:
Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of natural Philoso-
phy, and therefore of late Years have been rejected. To tell us that every 
Species of Things is endow’d with an occult specifick Quality by which 
it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing.
(Opticks, Query 31)
While Newton is sometimes credited – or in some circles vilified – for over-
throwing Aristotelian-Thomism, that debate had long since been decided 
in Britain. Newton’s starting point was the mechanical philosophy of 
Descartes, not Aquinas.
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A second anti-Aristotelian argument goes back to the thirteenth century. 
Many Muslim, Jewish, and Christian thinkers argued that such a metaphysic 
would limit God in unacceptable ways (Oakley 1961, 438). If a thing’s 
essence were immutable, not even an omnipotent being would be able to 
change it. This worry reached a high-water mark with the Condemnation of 
1277, in which the bishop of Paris restricted the teaching of, among other 
things, Aristotelian doctrines about divine freedom.
A final argument is the most important of the three in understanding 
the move to laws. If substantial forms were responsible for the order and 
stability of nature, they would be the proximate governors of the cosmos 
and God would be a step removed. But why would an omnipotent crea-
tor need the help of intermediaries to govern nature? One of the pillars of 
seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy was that God needs no such 
help. This argument will be discussed more fully in section 4.2.
In my view, the dramatic nature of this change is unappreciated because of 
our anachronistic use of “laws.” Many resist the claim that Greco-Roman 
philosophers did not believe that there were laws of nature. “Aristotle clearly 
believed in an orderly cosmos and the regularities of nature,” I hear in reply, 
“how can you say that he didn’t believe in the laws of nature?” The answer 
has already been discussed. Aristotle believed in substantial forms, not laws. 
The notion of a law of nature is an early modern innovation that is now so 
familiar that we use it as a placeholder for any form of universal order. As 
such, it obscures the metaphysical shift at work in the 1600s. The change is 
not lost on philosophers still working within the Aristotelian-Thomist tradi-
tion, however. For them, the abandonment of essences in favor of laws is the 
source of a great many evils in the centuries that follow.
Let’s now consider how theology influenced this change.
4.2  Theological voluntarism and the rejection  
of intermediaries
One of the great debates in late medieval philosophy was between volunta-
rism and intellectualism. The former says that God can freely do whatever 
he wants and is not restricted by his own essence; the latter, that God makes 
choices based on reason and his essential goodness.2
As a matter of moral philosophy, the voluntarist grabs the second horn 
of the Euthyphro dilemma: x is good because God has commanded it, and 
how God chooses is primarily a matter of will. The intellectualist believes 
instead that God commands what he does because God is perfectly good 
and rational. Brian Leftow contrasts Aquinas, the intellectualist, with Duns 
Scotus, the voluntarist:
For Aquinas, all ten Commandments are necessary moral truths, which 
God sees and proclaims. For Scotus, necessarily, loving God is right and 
hating him wrong. . . . All other acts, though naturally good or bad 
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(perfecting or destroying our nature), are right or wrong contingently, 
because God commands or prohibits them.
(1998)
Under intellectualism, God’s commands can give insight into his nature 
since he will direct us to do only what is in accord with divine goodness 
and perfect rationality. For the voluntarist, in contrast, no such inference 
is possible. There is no such thing as ethical right or wrong until God com-
mands it. Voluntarism thus rejects any link between ethics and God’s nature. 
Moreover, it is impossible to infer what God would command in this or that 
circumstance since those choices are in no way constrained or dictated by 
God’s essential goodness. Ethical truth must be revealed.
These ideas reemerged in the seventeenth century, but as a matter of natu-
ral philosophy rather than ethics, specifically regarding laws. The laws of 
nature, the new voluntarists believed, need not be what they are: “[The] 
laws of motion . . . did not necessarily spring from the nature of matter, but 
depended upon the will of the divine author of things” (Boyle 1725, 2:245). 
God had many options from which to choose, and the actual choice of 
laws was arbitrary – a matter of will rather than reason or goodness. This 
presents an epistemic problem, however. Whatever decisions God has made 
by fiat alone cannot be inferred from theological first principles. In the next 
section, we will consider how this motivated an empirical approach to the 
question of laws. Let’s first consider another important theme that emerged 
from voluntarism: the rejection of intermediaries between God and nature.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the standard arguments for the early mod-
ern shift away from Aristotle was the obscurity and the unobservability 
of substantial forms. A less-appreciated point is that they constituted an 
unnecessary intermediary between God and nature. Consider philosopher 
John Milton’s take on Descartes:
God governs the world, not by means of intermediaries of any kind, 
but directly, by regulating the motion of every single body, however tiny 
and unimportant. In physics, God not only gives an impulse to matter 
at the beginning but also conserves this impulse by means of exactly the 
same action as that which first created it. Indeed, according to Descartes 
the difference between creation and conservation is nothing more than 
a difference of reason, made by our minds but not found in reality. 
Because God acts directly on matter everywhere, all the intermediar-
ies proposed by the various schools of Greek philosophy and absorbed 
into the world-picture of the Middle Ages and Renaissance are to be 
discarded without exception.
(1981, 193)
In short, God needs no occult entities to govern nature for him, whether 
Aristotelian essences or Neoplatonic alternatives, such as a world-soul or 
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Nature itself (Henry 2009, 93). In the latter case, the Cambridge Platonists 
often used locutions such as “the spirit of nature” for a reification that is 
responsible for physical events. Historian Peter Harrison describes Ralph 
Cudworth as believing that
since inanimate matter cannot literally “obey” laws of nature prom-
ulgated by God, there must be some intermediate agent that can, and 
that is the efficient cause for every effect of the laws: “Wherefore the 
Divine Law and Command, by which the things of Nature are adminis-
tred, must be conceived to be the Real Appointment of some Energetick 
Effectual and Operative Cause for the Production of every Effect.” And 
that agent is nothing other than a spiritual, plastic nature.
(2013, 140)
Boyle would have none of it, rejecting both the Aristotelianism still 
entrenched in much of Europe and this homegrown Neoplatonism. Both 
metaphysical systems stood in the way of God’s direct and unmediated 
governance:
[N]ature is not to be looked on, as a distinct or separate agent, but as 
a rule, or rather a system of rules, according to which these agents and 
the bodies they work on, are, by the great Author of things, determined 
to act and suffer.
(Boyle [1686] 1996, 106)
The same ideas are echoed by those natural philosophers associated with 
Newton:
Isaac Barrow: “God uses no other means, instruments or applications in 
these productions, than his bare word or command.”
(1885, 303; quoted in Harrison 2002, 68).
Samuel Clarke: “The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is 
nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a contin-
ued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of 
acting, being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered 
at any time as to be preserved.”
(1738, 2:698)
William Whiston:3 Gravity is simply God’s “general, immechanical, 
immediate power.”
(1717, 111)
Arguments for the rejection of intermediaries even worked their way into 
the teaching of influential ministers.4
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Rather than Nature itself or the intrinsic teleology of substances, the 
orderliness of the cosmos was thought to be imposed by its Creator God 
as “a system of rules” (Boyle) or as Newton put it, principia (principles). 
The more common term was “law of nature.” Here we see Richard Bentley 
bringing together divine will, immediate divine action, and law in the first 
Boyle Lecture:
all the powers of mechanism are entirely dependent on the Deity. . . . 
Gravity, the great basis of all mechanism, is not itself mechanical, but 
the immediate fiat and finger of God, and the execution of divine law.
(Harrison 2013, 141)
Similar language can be found in an earlier letter from Newton to Bentley 
(25 Feb 1693).
The rejection of medieval occult entities in favor of laws had two impor-
tant consequences: First, it removed the main reason for avoiding experi-
ments. From an Aristotelian point of view, to understand the essence of a 
thing meant to understand its natural, unhindered behavior. The natural 
motion of rocks and other bits of matter, they held, is toward the center of 
the earth. This is confirmed by every rock lifted off the ground and then 
released. I can force a rock on my desk to slide across the top by pushing 
it with my hand, but as soon as my hand is removed, it stops. This, it was 
thought, proves that horizontal motion is contrary to its nature. Violent 
motion can be imposed on a substance, but such behavior is contrary to 
its nature and so was thought to have limited value. Only natural motion 
could reveal internal, teleological dispositions.5 But that is not the sort of 
motion thought to be involved in experiments. Dropping a ball allowed 
it to behave naturally, but rolling that same ball down an inclined plane 
interfered with what, in a sense, it wants to do. Experiments with moving 
parts always involved some measure of violent motion, but forcing a sub-
stance to behave contrary to its nature could shed no light on its essential 
properties.
The conceptual shift from substantial forms to laws removed the distinc-
tion between violent and natural motion. The early moderns believed that 
all physical events are matters of law, whether they are observed in the wild 
or they are produced by artificial experiments.
That is often considered the end of the story of how the new experimental 
philosophy began. But there was a second, less well-known motivation – 
one that is more controversial.
4.3 From voluntarism to empiricism
Intellectualists believed that we know God’s nature, at least in part, which 
allows us to make inferences about how God would act. An infinitely pow-
erful, wise, and good deity would tend to do some things and refrain from 
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others. This doesn’t mean that one could deduce every decision that God has 
made. But when it came to the necessary truths of logic and mathematics, 
God could not have done anything differently. It made sense, then, to talk 
about thinking God’s thoughts after him, at least in these cases.
The early modern voluntarists believed instead that the first principles of 
natural philosophy were contingent on God’s choices, or at least far more so 
than intellectualists believed. Descartes argued that not even logic and math-
ematics were necessary truths. While nearly everyone thought Descartes’s 
voluntarism was too extreme, voluntarists agreed there was one choice that 
was wholly contingent: the laws of nature.
This presents a problem, however. While reason might lead from Euclid’s 
axioms to the theorems of geometry, there would be no comparable way to 
determine the laws of nature that God had chosen. No amount of theology 
or philosophy could bridge this inferential gap. God’s choices were free, 
and reason alone cannot discern them. As Boyle emphasized, the problem is 
made even worse given the wide range of means available to God to produce 
a given outcome:
For as an artificer can set all the wheels of a clock a going, as well with 
springs as with weights; and may with violence discharge a bullet out of 
the barrel of a gun, not only by means of gunpowder, but of compressed 
air, and even of a spring: so the same effects may be produced by diverse 
causes different from one another; and it will oftentimes be very dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for our dim reasons to discern surely, which of 
these several ways, whereby it is possible for nature to produce the same 
phaenomena, she has really made use of to exhibit them.
([1772], II, 45; quoted in Davis 1984, 171–2)
With such a range of options available, none of which logical or metaphysi-
cal necessities, the actual choices God had made could not be known a 
priori.
How then could science proceed? There were laws, but God had not 
revealed their content. (Descartes was an exception to this, as we will see.) 
One answer was made clear by mathematician Roger Cotes in his preface 
of Newton’s Principia:
Surely, this World – so beautifully diversified in all its forms and 
motions – could not have arisen except from the perfectly free will of 
God, who provides and governs all things. From this source, then, have 
all the laws that are called laws of nature come, in which many traces of 
the highest wisdom and counsel certainly appear, but no traces of neces-
sity. Accordingly we should not seek these laws by using untrustworthy 
conjectures, but learn them by observing and experimenting [emphasis 
added].
([1687] 1962)
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Only empirical data could provide knowledge of the laws, and then only 
imperfectly. For Cotes and others, voluntarism provided a second theologi-
cal motivation for empiricism.6 Armchair philosophy cannot determine the 
laws of nature, but observation and experiments can – an argument with 
roots at least as far back as Ockham.7
For Boyle, Newton, Barrow, Whiston, Cotes, Bentley, and Newton’s sur-
rogate in the debate with Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, the underlying argument 
is a dilemma: (i) the laws of nature are either necessary or contingent, (ii) if 
they are necessary truths, they can be known a priori, at least in part, (iii) 
if they are contingent upon God’s free choice, then they can only be known 
a posteriori, (iv) the laws are not necessary, therefore, (v) observations and 
experiments are our only recourse. Voluntarism was thus one motivation for 
empiricism – another case in which theology positively influenced science.8 
Watkins sums up what is now the standard view:
[Newton’s] followers, such as Clarke, were more forthcoming, express-
ing skepticism that Newton’s laws could be directly deduced from the 
divine order, since they held that human experience and especially the 
distinctive kind of experience gained through experimentation is essen-
tial to their discovery and justification.
(2013, xxvii)
One prominent scholar who disputes the voluntarism-to-empiricism thesis 
is Peter Harrison. He makes his case by first reaching further back, to the 
Augustinian-Platonism of Kepler:
Geometry, which before the origin of things was coeternal with the 
divine mind and is God himself (for what could there be in God which 
would not be God himself?), supplied God with patterns for the crea-
tion of the world, and passed over to Man along with the image of God.
([1619] 1997, 304)
[As one might ask,] you do not hope to be able to give the reason for 
the number of planets, do you? This worry has been resolved, with the 
help of God, not badly. Geometrical reasons are co-eternal with God.
([1621] 1952, 863)
The “co-eternality” of geometry means that Kepler was not a voluntarist. 
He believed that mathematics was fixed, necessary, and beyond God’s con-
trol (Henry 2009, n. 46). Kepler’s Platonism famously led him to model the 
Copernican orbits of the planets by nesting them within the five perfect sol-
ids: the cube, tetrahedron, octahedron, icosahedron, and dodecahedron. He 
was forced to abandon this a priori approach in the face of Tycho Brahe’s 
detailed observations (Di Liscia 2017, sec. 3), but the idea was completely 
reasonable given his assumptions about the nature of geometry.
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Galileo also believed that if one could see things from a God’s-eye per-
spective, we would understand that scientific truths are just as necessary as 
mathematical ones and “that it would be impossible for them to take place 
in any other manner. For such is the property and condition of things which 
are natural and true” ([1632] 1953, 424). If the fundamental mathematical 
truths of science were discovered, their implications would be derived with 
all the certainty of a Euclidean theorem. That, however, would remain an 
unreachable ideal (Davis 1984, 47). While Descartes trusted in clear and 
distinct ideas as indicators of truth, Galileo was more pessimistic, believing 
that God had given us only a limited ability to comprehend mathematics 
and to see how it applied to nature.9
This gap was clearest in cases of underdetermination, where different 
mathematical models fit the data equally well. For example, the systems of 
Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe all “save the appearances,” i.e., they 
yield correct predictions. They could not, of course, all be true. Matthew 
Hale argued that reason alone could not resolve the underdetermination in 
astronomy and that more would be needed (Harrison 2013, 135).10
Here, then, is the key to Harrison’s argument. It was not voluntarism that 
motivated the demand for more data, he says, but our own limited rational 
abilities, which resulted from the fallenness of humanity (2007, 43). Galileo 
was an experimentalist, but voluntarism had no part to play. Experiments 
were instead a forced necessity to find the correct mathematical relations 
behind the phenomena.
Harrison also rightly argues that voluntarism did not inevitably lead 
to empiricism. Unlike Kepler, Descartes did not believe that the principles 
of logic and mathematics were necessary truths; rather, he believed they 
were dependent on God’s choice in the matter. Such hypervoluntarism was 
rare. Few would agree that the “mathematical truths . . . were established 
by God and totally depend on him just like all the other creatures” (“Let-
ter to Mersenne,” quoted in Harrison 2002, 65). Descartes did not worry 
that God would change his mind, however, given divine perfection and 
immutability.11
Descartes was famously a continental rationalist, not an empiricist. How 
then does that fit with his voluntarism about mathematics and laws? If such 
things were not necessary truths, how would they be discovered? His answer 
was that some laws – principally the laws of motion – could be known a 
priori by way of noting the clear and distinct ideas that God had placed into 
our minds. A perfect God would not deceive us (Meditations III.38). Writing 
about the laws of nature, Descartes says, “The knowledge of these truths 
is so natural to our souls that we cannot but judge them infallible when we 
conceive them distinctly.” ([1667] 1985, 97). And so voluntarism, even of 
this extreme type, did not lead to empiricism about fundamental laws and 
first principles.
Harrison’s conclusion, then, is that empiricism has no logical relation to 
voluntarism. There were empiricists who were not voluntarists, voluntarists 
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who were rationalists, and some early modern natural philosophers who 
were neither empiricists nor voluntarists. One is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for the other. While there was indeed a theological motivation for 
empiricism on Harrison’s view, it was lapsarianism – the fall of  humankind – 
rather than voluntarism.
While philosophers and scientists should be wary of disagreeing with 
Peter Harrison on matters of history, I believe that John Henry is correct: 
One can accept all of Harrison’s counterexamples and still conclude that the 
new experimental philosophy was motivated in part by voluntarism (2009). 
Rather than rejecting the voluntarism-to-empiricism thesis, we should see 
their relation as something other than logical entailment.
Descartes himself provides evidence for both sides. While Harrison 
focuses on his a priori approach, notice what Descartes says about other 
physical truths, such as the size of particles in the universe:
Since there are countless different configurations which God might have 
instituted here, experience alone must teach us which configurations he 
actually selected in preference to the rest. We are thus free to make any 
assumption on these matters with the sole proviso that all the conse-
quences of our assumption must agree with our experience.
([1644] 1988, 256)
So, while there is only one set of fundamental laws governing the motion 
of all particles, which, according to Descartes, can be known a priori, there 
are many different systems in which those laws can be implemented. Only 
observation can reveal which one God has chosen.
The motivation behind empiricism is not an either-or prospect – either 
voluntarism or postlapsarian limitations. We can agree with Harrison that 
(i) there is more to the story of the rise of empiricism than voluntarism 
and that (ii) voluntarism is neither necessary nor sufficient for its rise. The 
link was nonetheless an increasingly important idea through the seventeenth 
century, especially in British natural philosophy (Davis 1984, 32–33).
4.4 Laws, voluntarism, and special divine action
Let’s briefly consider how these matters relate to the question of divine 
action. Noninterventionism can trace its roots directly through Descartes and 
Leibniz. Descartes’ God created and sustained the universe. More precisely, 
God conserved the same quantity of motion in the universe at all times. His 
absolute immutability ensured that whatever laws God had ordained would 
never be changed. Beyond that, Descartes had little use for divine action. 
Even in terms of creation, he thought that the world could have arisen from 
Chaos by way of the laws of nature and nothing else (Descartes [1667] 
1985, chap. 6). He further believed that miracles performed in the course of 
history could impede the progress of science (Davis 1984, 90).
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Many objected that the Cartesian system was far too self-contained. 
Newton was concerned that it would lead to atheism (Davis 1996, 79–80), 
and indeed it was soon exploited by atheists and later by the deist movement 
(Brooke 1991, 140).
Leibniz’s system was at the same time intellectualist and non-Aristotelian. 
Rather than the free choices envisioned by the British voluntarists, Leibniz 
held that all divine decisions were made in accordance with the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Any sort of intervention in history, he argued, would be 
the mark of an imperfect God:
If active force should diminish in the universe by the natural laws which 
God has established, so that there should be need for him to give a 
new impression in order to restore that force, like an artist’s mending 
the imperfections of his machine, the disorder would not only be with 
respect to us but also with respect to God himself. He might have pre-
vented it.
(Leibniz and Clarke [1717] 1956, 29)
If things weren’t going the way God wanted, instead of having to inter-
vene and redirect events, God could have “taken better measures to avoid 
such an inconvenience, and therefore, indeed, he has actually done it” 
([1717] 1956, 29). As we saw in Chapter 1, this intuition still motivates 
noninterventionism.
Clarke defended the Newtonian position that an active God is in no way 
a defective one (Leibniz and Clarke [1717] 1956, 34, 113, 117–18). Having 
rejected both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic intermediaries in favor of God’s 
direct governance, Clarke argued that the laws are nothing more than pat-
terns within the events dictated by divine will:
With regard to God. . . [there are] no powers of nature at all, that can 
do any thing of themselves, (as weights and springs work of themselves 
with regard to men); but the wisdom and foresight of God, consist . . . 
in contriving at once, what his power and government is continually 
putting in actual execution.
(Leibniz and Clarke [1717] 1956, 23)
What men commonly call the course of nature . . . is nothing else but 
the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, constant, and 
uniform manner.
(Clarke [1750] 1998, 149)
This was a common view at the time. It is not the case that God (i) set the 
laws in place at creation and then (ii) decided to intervene at some lat-
ter point in time. Instead, miracles, which are by definition outside readily 
observed regularities, are no different in terms of God’s mode of activity 
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(Harrison 2013, 144). When unusual events occur, especially those with reli-
gious implications, we call it a “miracle,” but from a God’s-eye perspective 
there is nothing sui generis about such an event. For Clarke, the distinction 
between law and miracle is a matter of our ignorance, not metaphysics.12 
Both the observed regularities and the miraculous are matters of divine will.
For better or worse, the view that the laws of nature were simply God’s 
decrees soon gave way to the reified version more common today (Brooke 
1992). If a phenomenon is explained by way of natural law, many infer that 
there will be no need to appeal to God, thus setting the two in opposition to 
each other. Such a dichotomy would have been quite puzzling to those who 
first used the notion of laws to describe nature.
Scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the seventeenth century, 
and for good reason. The beginning of the modern era brought about 
changes that are underappreciated except by specialists in the field. And it 
is only within the most recent generation of scholars that the role of theism 
has been fully understood. Theological beliefs were not merely artifacts of 
a more religious climate; they were instead deeply integrated into the meta-
physics and the epistemology of the early moderns, including those whom 
we anachronistically call “scientists.”
4.5 Appendix: voluntarism and intelligent design theory
Let’s return now to the present day. The issues discussed in this chapter 
are surprisingly helpful in understanding the controversy over intelligent 
design (ID) theory. To see why, consider what philosophers of science call 
the “explanatory virtues,” those desiderata that make for a good scientific 
theory. These include empirical adequacy and fitting within what is already 
known. The two virtues of interest here are successful predictions and 
fruitfulness. The first is clear enough. We expect good theories to not only 
explain what we already know but also to yield predictions that, if success-
ful, will further confirm the theory. Fruitfulness is the capacity of a theory 
to open new avenues of scientific research. Einstein’s theory of general rela-
tivity was a fantastic achievement in and of itself. But once coupled with 
Edwin Hubble’s observations, it soon led to Georges Lemaître’s expanding 
universe and what we now call Big Bang cosmology. Contrast this with the 
rival steady-state model, of which few have heard because it was essentially 
a dead-end, the opposite of fruitfulness.
While there are books filled with criticisms of ID, some fair and some not, 
two longstanding problems are a lack of predictive success and fruitfulness. 
The ID “movement” had hundreds of scientists at one time and has, in fact, 
produced a small number of peer-reviewed papers. But with so much sup-
port and effort, why haven’t ID advocates been able to produce more? One 
possible answer is that the theory is false. But let’s grant for the moment 
ID’s main hypothesis: The evolution of sentient creatures was overwhelming 
unlikely without the intervention of an intelligence. Most supporters have 
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their money on God but acknowledge that the evidence cannot point to the 
specific designer in question. One would think that if such a proposal is true, 
it will lead to successful research.
From what we have discussed in this chapter, I think it is safe to say 
that while Descartes and Leibniz would have opposed ID on noninterven-
tionist grounds, Newton and Clarke would have been friendlier toward it. 
Descartes’ God was deemed so passive that he was charged with atheism in 
his own lifetime. And Leibniz would surely invoke his infinite clockmaker as 
an argument against the need for special divine action postcreation. Newton 
thought otherwise. As Clarke articulates his position, Newton saw no rea-
son why Leibniz would want
to exclude God’s actual government of the world, and to allow his 
providence to act no further than . . . to let all things do only what they 
would do of themselves by mere mechanism.
(Leibniz and Clarke [1717] 1956, 117–18)
In other words, the action of an intelligent designer in the course of history 
was not beyond the pale.
Nonetheless, Newtonians would also have pointed to some significant 
hurdles for ID to become a thriving research program. The issue, once 
again, is voluntarism. There was no sense in which God had to choose any 
set of laws of nature or the mechanisms that would obey those laws. With 
so many options and no direct revelation about what God had ordained, 
the only way to discover the laws and physical mechanisms involved was 
observation and experiments. Consider the quote from Roger Cotes again:
Surely, this World . . . could not have arisen except from the perfectly 
free will of God. . . . From this source, then, have all the laws . . . come, 
in which many traces of the highest wisdom and counsel certainly 
appear, but no traces of necessity. Accordingly we should not seek these 
laws by using untrustworthy conjectures, but learn them by observing 
and experimenting.
([1687] 1962)
Natural philosophers could not predict how an omnipotent, omniscience 
being would create the world unless God had in some way revealed it. (The 
Cartesians believed that God had done so, but that part of their program 
quickly came under fire.) With the rejection of a priori knowledge of regard-
ing physics, the only alternative was empiricism.
Consider what this means for ID. To make successful predictions, its theo-
rists would have to do what many early moderns thought was impossible: 
rationally infer how God chooses to act in nature. Our inability to do so was 
one of the main arguments against intellectualism. Given God’s freedom to 
choose and the array of options from which to choose, there was no getting 
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around experimental science to discover the selections that were made. This 
is presumably why theistic scientists through 1800s tended to point to the 
elegance of the laws themselves as the best evidence of a Designer.
We could imagine, then, what a modern-day Cotes or Clarke would have 
to say about ID. While clearly God might intervene to produce irreducibly 
complex systems, there was no way to predict whether this would actually 
be the case or how prevalent such systems would be. The fact that God has 
so many options available makes it nearly impossible to know in advance 
how divine interventions – if there are any – might manifest themselves. If 
the success of a research program hinges on such knowledge, it will be no 
surprise that progress is limited.
So, while the British voluntarists would be sympathetic to the basic ideas, 
they would cite philosophical and theological reasons for why ID research 
will prove to be difficult if not impossible. Nothing prevents discoveries that 
might point back to design, such as cosmological fine-tuning, but these will 
tend to be surprises rather than successful predictions. As such, it is hard to 
imagine a fruitful research program based on the detection of design.
Notes
 1 Some argue that Roger Bacon and Robert Grosseteste deserve more credit for 
the initial movement in the direction of laws (Kedar and Hon 2017). For other 
premodern uses of law, see (Van Dyck 2018).
 2 For more on the contrasts between the two, see (Henry 2009, 79–82).
 3 Barrow and Whiston were the holders of the Lucasian Chair at Cambridge 
immediately before (Barrow) and after (Whiston) Newton.
 4 For example, the Puritan Cotton Mather:
[There] is no such thing as an universal Soul, animating the vast system of the 
World, [as] according to Plato; nor any substantial Forms [as] according to 
Aristotle. . . . These unintelligent Beings are derogatory from the Wisdom and 
Power of the great God, who can easily govern the Machine He could create, 
by more direct Methods than employing such subservient divinities. . . . It is 
now plain from the most evident principles, that the great God . . . has the 
springs of this immense machine, and all the several parts of it, in his own 
Hand.
(Mather 1721, 87–88)
 5 In other words, only natural motion could reveal Aristotelian final causes, which 
could then help reveal a formal cause.
 6 The first, as we noted earlier, was the rejection Aristotelian intermediaries and 
the distinction between natural and violent motion.
 7 Historian Francis Oakley makes this point:
[We] can in no way deduce the order of the world by any a priori reason-
ing, for, being completely dependent upon the divine choice, it corresponds 
to no necessity and can be discovered only by an examination of what is de 
facto. Thus, from Ockham’s fundamental insistence upon the omnipotence 
and freedom of God follows, not only his ethical and legal voluntarism, but 
also his empiricism.
(1961, 442)
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 8 For others arguing for this conclusion, see, Oakley (1961), Davis (1999), and 
Henry (2009). Many look back to Foster (1934) as one of the first articulators of 
this view, although most believe that Foster too quickly drew apologetic conclu-
sions from the historical record.
 9 Interestingly, Galileo did not call these mathematical principles “laws,”
[but] spoke of them as theorems or propositions or rules. It is significant that 
the only reference to physical laws in all of Galileo’s writings comes in a letter 
to his pupil Benedetto Castelli, the most important parts of which were later 
incorporated almost without change in the more well-known Letter to the 
Grand Duchess Christina. . . . In both letters he described nature as “the most 
observant executrix of the orders of God, obeying the laws (leggi) imposed 
on her” (34). The theological context and lack of scientific content of these 
phrases is significant. The idea of laws of nature was a theological inheritance 
quite foreign to the Archimedean paradigms Galileo followed in the formal 
exposition of his mechanics.
(Milton 1981, 181)
 10 Galileo also recognized many such cases of underdetermination but thought that 
one could create new data by way of experiments. As Davis notes, however, 
Galileo sometimes relied on reason when an experiment would have been the 
wiser choice (1984, 61–62).
 11 The reasoning here is similar to that of the medieval distinction between what 
God might ordain potentia absoluta as opposed to potentia ordinata. In God’s 
absolute power, mathematics and law could have been different. But hav-
ing ordained such laws, an immutable God will not change them. Note that 
 Harrison disputes whether these doctrines had any direct influence on the early 
moderns (2002, 13).
 12 A point emphasized by Yenter and Vailati (2014, sec. 4.4).
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5  Philosophy of science  
and the laws of nature
Chapter 4 dealt with the history of law as a concept in science. We now 
turn to its place in the modern philosophical landscape. In one sense, the 
laws of nature are so familiar that further analysis seems unnecessary. Every 
freshman knows about Newton’s laws and has at least heard of a few more. 
While there is consensus about the content of many laws of nature, there is 
much less agreement about the nature of the laws themselves.
There are four main approaches in the philosophy of science literature to 
understanding laws: First, there are those who deflate laws down to either 
mere regularities between events or statements about those events. These are 
called “Humean” laws, after David Hume, insofar as they avoid metaphys-
ics as much as possible. Second, there are those who take the causal powers, 
dispositions, or capacities of things as fundamental and laws as derivative 
descriptions of their effects. Laws are not responsible for the regularities 
in nature, they say, the causal powers of substances are. The third is the 
least familiar as it relies on counterfactuals and possible worlds. Laws in 
this view are grounded in the stability of particular counterfactual claims. 
Finally, there are those who take laws themselves to be a fundamental cat-
egory within metaphysics.
While critiquing these approaches is a useful exercise, that is not the sole 
purpose here. Noninterventionists and nonviolationists argue that God does 
not violate the laws of nature, but what a “violation” amounts to crucially 
depends on what the laws are. The problem of divine action looks different 
and in some cases dissolves completely under a given interpretation of law. 
In the end, I will side with the non-Humeans and argue for a metaphysi-
cally robust view, although one that does not rely on causal powers and 
dispositions. In fact, I believe that British early moderns, such as Boyle and 
Newton, largely had it right: The laws are regularities within the decrees of 
God for nature.
5.1 Humean laws
Most philosophers of science prefer metaphysically lean options when it 
comes to laws. Humeans believe in occurrent events, such as when a system 
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evolves from one state to another, but they reject the idea that either causes 
or laws in some sense govern reality. Unlike the other positions discussed in 
this chapter, the Humean takes laws to be special types of statements. Cou-
lomb’s law, for example, is itself a law of nature, not merely our attempt to 
describe some sort of mind-independent power that exists in nature. This 
will become clearer as we go.
5.1.1 Regularity theory
An older Humean view is regularity theory. It says that while events some-
times occur in perfectly regular ways, there are no laws or causes over and 
above those events. For Hume, causation was a psychological projection. 
We see a regularity in nature – two states of affairs, one consistently fol-
lowed by the other – and then impose a connection between the two. But 
our projection of causation has no more reality to it than that of the attempt 
to see Orion among a group of stars. Regularity theorists further argue that 
empirical science does not need anything more than occurrent events. Sci-
entists do not care about metaphysics. They discover useful regularities and 
refer to some of them as laws. End of story.
Well, perhaps, but what about uninstantiated regularities? Look at the 
largest elements on the periodic table. Those at the bottom are unstable and 
cannot be found outside highly engineered physics labs. Was there no fact-
of-the-matter, no physical truth, about the behavior of livermorium before 
it was created? This sort of Humean must say “no” since there had been no 
regularity of actually occurring events to ground any law covering livermo-
rium. That element was outside the laws of nature during its first instant 
after being created. While not a reductio, this is an unwelcome implication 
for an interpretation of laws. Presumably those physicists in the lab were 
looking to discover the laws of livermorium, not create them.
Moreover, most laws in physics cover a range of parameter values, many 
of which never occur in the real world. Take a common distinction in cos-
mology. It could be that our universe is closed, meaning that eventually 
space-time will recollapse into a singularity – a Big Crunch. The more likely 
scenario is that the universe is open and will continue expanding forever. 
The reason physicists can talk coherently about open versus closed universes 
is that both are governed by one set of laws, Einstein’s equation for general 
relativity.1 The difference between the two has to do with the amount of 
mass-energy in the universe.
For regularity theorists, this literally makes no sense since the laws are 
just the regularities in this universe. There are no events that ground the 
truth of regularities in other possible universes. There are no laws that tran-
scend events. According to regularity theory, then, much of what physicists 
have to say about cosmology is, strictly speaking, false. It seems to me that if 
a philosophical view is being promoted as the one that best fits science, that 
view ought not entail that most physicists are wrong.
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Another well-known criticism of regularity theory is that it cannot dis-
tinguish those regularities that are actual laws from mere accidental gen-
eralizations. We want to be able to say that “all particles with mass have 
gravitational attraction” is a law but that “all of my children are male” is 
not. The problem is that both claims have the same logical structure. Call 
the first claim L for law and the second G for mere generalization. Why is L 
a law but not G? The regularity theorist says that there must be something 
that sets L apart, a special feature of those generalizations that count as 
laws. And whatever that something is, it must be free of untoward meta-
physics. Fred Dretske considers five candidates (1977, 251–52):
(1) High degree of confirmation;
(2) Wide acceptance (well-established in the relevant community);
(3) Explanatory potential (can be used to explain its instances);
(4) Deductive integration (within a larger system of statements);
(5) Predictive success.
Each of these has been invoked as a characteristic that mere universal gen-
eralizations lack but that laws have. (4) is associated with a second Humean 
proposal, so let’s ignore that one for now.
The rest are problematic. (3) confuses logical entailment with explana-
tion. Both G and L entail their instances, but neither explains anything. L 
provides no insight into the relation between mass and gravity. That sort 
of work will be done by a related theory, not by the law itself. There is no 
doubt that (1) and (2) apply to L and not to G, but as Dretske points out, 
they are both epistemic notions having to do with what we or some group 
of experts believes. If (1) or (2) is a necessary condition for laws, we will 
not be able to say that the laws of nature are the same now as they were a 
millennium ago, since what astronomers believed then is not what they cur-
rently believe. If we define laws in a way that depends on our knowledge, 
the laws of nature will obviously change over time. Instead, we think of laws 
as being stable and independent of what we believe. The laws of nature are 
not a function of the sometimes-fickle state of scientific knowledge, which 
depends on what has and has not been discovered.
What about (5), then? Laws allow for successful predictions, but mere 
generalizations can easily fail to hold in the future. While it is true that every 
person to walk on the moon has been male, that generalization will be false 
once a female astronaut lands there, and so it cannot be a law. But why think 
that L will remain true, come what may? This is one instance of the famous 
problem of induction. Just because all bits of matter that we have examined 
gravitationally attract one another, how can we be sure that all unexamined 
future bits of matter will continue to do so? More generally, why do we 
think the pattern of (i) observations to (ii) inductive generalization to (iii) 
successful prediction will continue to be useful? Of course, it has worked 
well so far, but the appeal to past success is a well-known circular answer to 
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the question. If what one is worried about is that the future might not con-
tinue to resemble the past, appealing to the previous successes of induction 
will not help. Why think that this past success will continue into the future? 
Why think, in other words, that nature will continue to be uniform?
The rival accounts of laws yet to be discussed have their own answers to 
this question, but they involve more robust metaphysics than the Humean 
empiricist will allow. The regularity theorist, again, believes that laws are 
merely descriptions of actual events. There is no necessary connection 
between those events that makes one follow the other, no sense in which 
masses must attract. It simply is the case that L. Non-Humeans argue that 
uniformity of nature as more than a happy coincidence requires some meta-
physical principle that ensures nature will not go off the rails in the future. 
They disagree, however, about what sort of metaphysics plays this role.
5.1.2 Best systems
These problems explain why most Humeans today are not regularity theo-
rists. A second approach looks to plane geometry and Euclid’s axioms as a 
model. Say that we had a complete index of scientific truths – what Helen 
Beebee calls “God’s Big Book of Facts” (2004, 253). That’s an unattain-
able goal, but let’s accept it as an idealization. Such an unwieldy compila-
tion could presumably be organized so that detailed, narrow facts might be 
derived from more general ones. Say we organize these truths into a deduc-
tive system that would allow us to derive as many facts as possible from a 
set of axioms. In a best systems or Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) approach, the 
laws of nature are those generalizations that would appear either as axioms 
or as theorems in the systems with the best combination of content and 
simplicity (Lewis 1973b, 73). Run-of-the-mill occurrent facts would then be 
derivable from the laws plus a description of the context, in much the way 
physics students apply Newton’s laws to different circumstances. This is (4) 
on Dretske’s list. The something more that sets laws apart from mere uni-
versal generalizations is that only the former serve as axioms for the body 
of scientific knowledge.
Consider some points in favor of MRL. It allows that today’s textbook 
laws might be wrong since they may not survive in the best deductive system 
in the future. MRL also supports the idea of undiscovered laws since the 
best system might be something other than what we currently have in hand. 
At the same time, textbook laws can provisionally be considered laws since 
they might be retained as axioms or theorems. These virtues explain why 
some version of the best systems approach seems to be favored by philoso-
phers of science.
This appreciation is not shared by philosophers of religion or meta-
physicians. To see why, consider a distinction that’s been at the periphery 
throughout this section: laws and law-statements. Law-statements are what 
one finds in physics and chemistry classrooms – something one could point 
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to on a whiteboard, like the ideal gas law. The laws themselves, if there are 
any, are the actual laws of nature that scientists are trying to discover. Laws 
cannot be wrong; they are whatever they happen to be. Law-statements, 
on the other hand, are descriptions of laws. If a law-statement is true, it is 
a law of nature that is its truth-maker. So, while gravity has been at work 
since before Earth existed, Newton’s equation that describes it has only been 
around a few hundred years. Humeans will argue that this way of putting 
things begs the question since it assumes there are laws of nature over and 
above natural events themselves. Even so, there is still a distinction between 
laws and law-statements. Humeans do not believe that the former exist.
Here, then, is a key point: When Lewis says that laws are theorems in a 
deductive system, he really means law-statements. They can be written on a 
piece of paper. The best systems approach, like all Humean accounts of law, 
is not a theory about the laws of nature. It is a theory about law-statements, 
specifically which generalizations should be given the honorific “law.” This 
comports with Humean assumptions since they do not believe there are such 
things as laws themselves. Critics, on the other hand, reject the deflation of 
laws to mere law-statements. They point again to the problem of induction 
and the need to explain the uniformity of nature. Law-statements cannot 
ensure that nature will not deviate in nonlawlike ways in the future.2
5.1.3 Humean laws and divine action
It is mildly surprisingly, then, that there are theologians and theistic philoso-
phers who hold a Humean view of laws. This is unusual insofar as Humeans 
tend to be empiricists who favor a small ontology, typically one without 
God.3 Nonetheless, there is a certain appeal to this approach when it comes 
to divine action.
The regularity theorist’s laws are merely observed correlations between 
events. No further metaphysical commitment is required. If correct, nonvio-
lationist worries about God possibly violating the laws of nature will simply 
be misplaced. No one needs to be concerned that disease might kill all the 
unicorns because there are no unicorns. Likewise, God cannot break the 
laws since there literally is no thing to be broken. The arguments in favor of 
nonviolationism discussed in Chapter 2 are largely nullified. There can be 
no tension within God’s will since there was no point at which God brought 
the laws into existence and so no later time at which God chose to contra-
vene them. At most, special divine action amounts to God doing something 
contrary to our expectations.
Much the same can be said under the best-systems/MRL approach. For 
there to be MRL laws, there would first have to be a set of true sentences 
that could be formed into a deductive system. Without knowledge of sci-
entific facts in hand, there can be no laws for MRL. Hence, there literally 
were no laws in this view before life evolved, just as there was no such thing 
as grammar or rules of etiquette. Nor are there any necessary connections 
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or causal relations between events that God could even possibly override. 
“Breaking a law of nature” under MRL just means that God does some-
thing contrary to what we would have expected based on what we know 
(i.e., based on the best deductive system of scientific knowledge). But that 
doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing that nonviolationists are worried about. 
Terms such as “violation” and “breaking” indicate something more signifi-
cant than God acting in a way contrary to our fallible expectations.
Humean laws have some appeal to theists trying to address challenges to 
special divine action. The question is whether one is willing to accept the 
other problems that come along with such a view. For those who cannot 
abide by Hume’s impoverished metaphysic, the next option proves to be far 
more popular.
5.2 Dispositions and causal powers
The question that all non-Humeans are trying to answer is this: If laws 
govern events, how do they do so? What is the nature of this guidance? 
Dispositionalists do not believe that the stripped-down ontology of Humean 
laws provides an answer. They argue that something must account for the 
uniformity of nature, rather than accepting it as a matter of experience. But 
dispositionalists reject the nomological realist answer, which takes laws as 
fundamental, preferring an appeal to the causal powers, capacities, and dis-
positions of entities.4 Laws have a lesser standing, metaphysically speaking, 
if they have any standing at all.
Consider molecular salt (NaCl). The molecules have several disposi-
tions, such as dissolving when observable quantities are placed in water 
and attracting other bits of matter by way of gravitation. But note that it is 
not the law of universal gravitation that is responsible for this attraction. In 
this view, objects with mass have the disposition to attract each other in a 
particular way. More precisely,
[Mass] is a disposition that manifests itself in the mutual attraction of 
massy objects. The presence of another mass m' acts as a stimulus on 
m (and conversely) for the manifestation of the disposition in terms of 
a mutual acceleration. As soon as there are at least two massive objects 
in a world, that disposition is triggered. It is essential for the property 
of gravitational mass to manifest itself in the mutual attraction of the 
objects that instantiate this property. That’s what gravitational mass is – 
the property that makes objects accelerate in a certain manner.
(Dorato and Esfeld 2016, 410)
Dispositions are the active powers in nature. Laws are epiphenomenal in 
this approach, as the underlying dispositions do all the metaphysical work. 
Law-statements, then, are merely convenient summaries of the behavior gov-
erned by those dispositions. If it sounds something like the Aristotelianism 
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discussed in the previous chapter, it is. Dispositionalism is the philosophical 
descendant of Aristotelian natures.
Dispositionalists also allow for modal truths and truth-makers – which 
is, metaphysically, a bridge too far for Humeans. They believe that disposi-
tions are responsible for true counterfactuals. For example, the truth-maker 
for “if you were to raise the temperature of a piece of paper to 246°C, it 
would ignite” is the disposition of the paper to burn (Mumford 2004, chap. 
1). Humeans, in contrast, do not believe that law-statements need meta-
physical truth-makers – a belief that sets their position apart from the others 
explained in this chapter.
This view has a number of strengths and prominent supporters, includ-
ing metaphysician Stephen Mumford (2004) and philosopher Nancy Cart-
wright (1989). Nonetheless, many philosophers of science are suspicious of 
this approach, even those who are not Humeans.
5.2.1 Critique
One reason for this is that dispositions tend to be thing-centered: substances, 
in a technical sense. A substance is an entity in which properties and causal 
powers reside according to the dispositionalist. However, many important 
physical properties are not embedded in material objects (Wilson 2006, 
261), center of mass, for example. This is a sometimes-measurable attrib-
ute – not merely something that can be calculated, like average height – yet 
there need be no object that exists at the center of mass of a system. The 
center of mass of our solar system is often thousands of miles from the sun. 
In what does this dispositional property reside when its location is empty 
space?5 As Jerry Fodor once put it, “Nothing cramps one’s causal powers 
like not existing” (2010, 121).
A second reason is based on the history of science. Dispositionalism rep-
resents a return to a more Aristotelian framework. But isn’t such a move 
at least a bit odd given that medieval versions had to be set aside for the 
scientific revolution to proceed? As we saw in Chapter 4, substantial forms 
were intentionally displaced by a law-centric approach. When natural phi-
losophers began thinking in these terms, they realized that God could have 
ordained many different sets of laws. Without direct revelation about these 
choices, the only way to discover them was empirical investigation and 
experiments. The point is that the shift from Aristotelian essences to laws 
spurred the development of empiricism in science – no small matter.
Not only did natural philosophers believe that laws exist but they also 
found them! We often call this era the “scientific revolution” because phys-
ics and chemistry thrived under this new philosophical foundation. If dis-
positionalism were right all along, why would their be the need to dismiss it 
in order to make such progress? Modern-day dispositionalists try to show 
that history never disproved their view and that, strictly speaking, all the 
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law-based discoveries were compatible with their metaphysics. I agree, 
and that would be important if one were already a dispositionalist. But if 
one comes to the question philosophically and theologically neutral about 
the primacy of dispositions versus laws, the history of science will seem to 
strongly favor the latter. But this is not the most important problem.
The main concern among philosophers of physics is that the appeal to 
causal powers is not only “hopelessly vague” (Smith 2002, 252), it is a step 
backward in terms of understanding. There are many aspects of modern 
physics that are now taken for granted, like the difference between force, 
energy, and momentum. But in the history of science, these were all hard-
won distinctions. They involved heated disputes among the followers of 
Leibniz and Newton, both of whom had empirical support of some kind or 
another.6 Today, things are far clearer. Instead of force simpliciter there are 
contact forces, special force laws, and fundamental forces. There are not 
just laws but entire families of differential equations, all developed with an 
eye toward helping understand the underlying physics. Why, then, would 
philosophers now want to retreat to the far less precise notion of disposi-
tions or causal powers? This seems to muddy the same waters it took centu-
ries to clear up within classical mechanics. Del Ratzsch expresses it this way:
Although this view has a number of attractions . . ., it is still seriously 
incomplete as an analysis until we know what sort of animal a dispo-
sitional property is. The attractiveness which this very fuzziness may 
permit may dissipate along with the fuzziness when we try to sharpen 
the picture up a bit.
(1987, 386)
Causal powers and dispositions are perhaps more intuitive than alterna-
tive approaches to law, but those prescientific notions lack precision. That 
is not a knock-down argument, nor is there one to be found. But it does 
explain why most philosophers of physics have not gravitated toward 
dispositionalism.
Before moving on, note that the rejection of causal powers does not mean 
that the idea of causation is thereby banned from science. While “cause” is 
a highly ambiguous notion, it is often still useful. When those ambiguities 
are cashed out, however, one is never left with an irreducible disposition or 
a causal power.
5.2.2 Dispositionalism and divine action
Dispositionalism is non-Humean. It does not avoid metaphysics at all 
costs, although laws take a backseat to the more fundamental notions 
of causal powers/capacities/dispositions. It is the latter that are responsi-
ble for the nomic regularities in nature. As such, nonviolationist worries 
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about God breaking his own laws are diminished. God did not decree any 
laws in this view; God created things with causal powers. What we call 
laws are epiphenomenal. Some theistic dispositionalists see special divine 
action as merely an alteration of the circumstances under which a given 
set of causal powers acts, working with nature’s capacities rather than 
suspending them. Hence dispositionalism allows for divine action without 
breaking any laws.
On the other hand, if “altering circumstances” allows for too limited a 
range of activity on God’s part, one can argue that God changes the causal 
powers themselves, at least for a time:
[The] only thing God has to do in order to bring about a particular 
effect is to change temporarily the dispositions of the natural kind(s) 
that will constitute the state of affairs that God’s special act of interven-
tion intends to bring about.
(Göcke 2015, 223)
Such a change need only affect causal powers locally. Even an event like the 
parting of the Red Sea could be explained by God changing the dispositions 
of the water molecules involved.
Nonetheless, such a move will not likely soothe every concern about 
divine action. Noninterventionists will still complain that these activities go 
far beyond the creating and sustaining of the universe and are therefore the-
ologically out of bounds. Some nonviolationists will be more sympathetic 
since no laws of nature are violated. Others will reject it, I suspect, since 
law-claims could be easily translated into disposition-claims. In Göcke’s 
proposal, for example, while no laws are violated, God is still overriding the 
natural capacities of objects. Some nonviolationists will surely argue that, 
having ordained the causal powers of nature, God would not later disrupt 
their guidance of natural processes. In other words, divine action is a viola-
tion if it interferes with those processes, regardless of whether the processes 
are grounded in laws or dispositions.7
5.3 Counterfactuals and possible worlds
As an interpretation of laws, this will be the least familiar to nonphiloso-
phers. While originally developed as a way to understand possibility and 
necessity, the notion of a possible world soon ramified across analytic phi-
losophy. “World” here does not mean planet or even universe. A possible 
world is an entire timeline for a universe. One possible world is a reality 
nearly identical to our own, with the exception that I am currently wear-
ing a red shirt rather than a blue one. That world is said to be “nearby” 
in the sense that that one change has little effect on other events. A more 
distant possible world is one in which the United States never entered World 
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War I. That, presumably, would have had wide-ranging consequences. One 
(infamous) position in this literature is modal realism, which says that the 
possible worlds are not merely abstract ideas – rather, they actually exist. Its 
foremost proponent was David Lewis:
I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in count-
less ways. But what does this mean? . . . I believe that things could have 
been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of 
what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe 
in the existence of entities that might be called “ways things could have 
been.” I prefer to call them “possible worlds.”
(1973b, 84)
As we have seen, Lewis did not appeal to possible worlds in his account 
of laws. (MRL reduces laws to law-statements within a deductive system 
of scientific knowledge.) Counterfactuals, the contrary truths found in 
other possible worlds, are instead used in Lewis’s analysis of causation. 
He argued that causal relations are a type of counterfactual dependence, 
and counterfactual dependence can be explained in terms of the structure 
of possible words (Lewis 1973a). In its simplest form, an event B caus-
ally depends on event A when the following is true: If A were to occur, B 
would occur, and if A were not to occur, B would not occur. The truth of 
these conditionals depends on the relative closeness of possible worlds. 
Hence, for Lewis, possible words are more fundamental than causation 
or laws.
Presently, the main proponent of a counterfactual approach to law is phi-
losopher Marc Lange (2009). To start, we should note that counterfactuals 
are famously context-dependent. Consider the counterfactual situation in 
which Caesar were in command in the Korean War. Which of the following 
would be true?
(1) If Caesar were in command during the Korean War, he would have used 
nuclear weapons.
(2) If Caesar were in command during the Korean War, he would have used 
catapults.
Lewis argued that the right answer depends on the context of the ques-
tion. There is no context-free fact-of-the-matter about which is correct. 
According to Lange, however, law-statements are different. Laws are stable 
regardless of context. This explains why “all of my pets are dogs” is a mere 
accidental generalization. It is not counterfactually stable:
(3) If each of my pets had canine mothers, all my pets would be dogs. (true)
(4) If my wife brought home a cat today, all my pets would be dogs. (false)
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However,
(5) If each of my pets had canine mothers, protons would be positively 
charged. (true)
(6) If my wife brought home a cat today, protons would be positively 
charged. (true)
The consequents in (5) and (6) are insensitive to changes in context. Lange’s 
claim is that laws display this sort of counterfactual stability, come what 
may. More precisely, law-statements are grounded in counterfactual sen-
tences exhibiting this sort of stability.
Lange’s account does much of the work philosophers want. First, it clearly 
demarcates laws from mere universal generalizations. The latter are not suf-
ficiently stable. Second, stability explains the (non-Humean) intuition that 
laws have a kind of necessity. Stability among counterfactuals allows us to 
determine those truths that are “naturally necessary,” which in turn point 
to those generalizations that are laws (Lange 2009, chap. 2). Third, Lange 
argues that his account can explain a variety of related ideas: the immuta-
bility of laws, the nature of metalaws (e.g., conservation laws that govern 
other laws), and the relation of law to chance (Lange 2009, chap. 3).
While these are significant, there is one overriding problem with taking 
relations among possible worlds as the truth-makers for law-statements. It 
is not counterfactual stability that lets us make inferences about the laws. 
It is our knowledge of the laws that grounds predictions about counterfac-
tual stability. How do I know that wearing a different shirt to class would 
not affect the charge of protons? Because we know the relevant laws. Our 
counterfactual judgments are parasitic in what we take the laws to be.8 This, 
I believe, is why few have rallied to Lange’s innovative approach. The meta-
physical priority seems to be exactly the opposite of what it should be.
This third view takes the structure of possible worlds to be more funda-
mental than either laws or causal powers. Its implications for divine action 
are less clear. Several metaphysical and theological questions would have 
to be answered first. For example, what is the ontological status of pos-
sible worlds? Does God passively know counterfactual truths, or does God 
instead determine their content? If God knows each of the possible worlds 
but does not have a hand in shaping them, the laws of nature are not within 
God’s control. While God will still choose which of the worlds to make 
actual, the relations between the worlds themselves simply are what they 
are. And it is these relations that are supposed to ground the laws.
One might say that since God does not ordain the laws in this view, there 
would be no conflict within God’s will if he were to intervene in nature. On 
the other hand, since God chooses which possible world will be actual, God 
is determining the events in this world, and so any intervention would be 
contrary to what God had determined. Which is the more natural position 
for a nonviolationist is not clear to me.
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In short, any account of divine action that takes laws to be grounded in 
possible worlds will first have to resolve several difficult metaphysical ques-
tions along the way, which is perhaps why no philosopher of religion has 
taken this approach, so far as I know.
I have argued that (i) Humean laws are too metaphysically lean to be 
laws of nature, (ii) causal powers are vague and do not comport well with 
the history of science, and (iii) counterfactual truths are dependent on more 
fundamental nomic relations. Nonetheless, each of these are live options 
that continue to be defended by theists and naturalists alike.
Let’s now move on to the last family of views.
5.4 Nomological realism
According to nomological realism, laws have their own metaphysical standing. 
They cannot be reduced to law-statements. They do not supervene on events 
or causal powers. Laws are fundamental. This, I believe, is what most people 
have in mind when they begin to think about the issues raised in this chapter.
5.4.1 Universals and necessitation
The best-known type of nomological realism is associated with philosophers 
David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, and Michael Tooley. They take laws to 
be grounded in necessary relations between universals.9 Consider the law-
statement “all metals conduct electricity.”10 What is its truth-maker? In this 
view, the terms “metal” and “electric conductor” refer to universals – prop-
erties that cannot be reduced to something more basic. If this law-statement 
is true, those universals will be related in such a way that the former neces-
sitates the latter.11 For any true law-statement “all Fs are Gs,” the universals 
F-ness and G-ness are related by way of necessitation. It is this relation that 
ultimately is a law of nature for Armstrong et al.
This answers several questions that Humean laws are unable to adequately 
address: First, what distinguishes a true law-statement from an accidental 
generalization – “all electrons have negative charge” versus “all my students 
are seated?” Only in the former case do the predicates refer to universals 
properly related. “My students” refers to a set, not a universal, and there 
is no necessitation between them and being seated. Any group of objects 
counts as a set, and as such it has little metaphysical significance. True law-
statements, on the other hand, are tracking actual relations between univer-
sals. Second, this type of nomological realism supports the uniformity of 
nature and therefore the trustworthiness of induction. There is no chance, 
for example, that electrons will stop having negative charge given the rela-
tion between the relevant universals. The future will continue to look like 
the past vis-à-vis the laws of nature.
It is hard to say which of the alternatives that Humeans despise most, 
but this one is surely a candidate. In this case, I have some sympathy. We 
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can detect metals, electrons, and charge, they say, but where are these 
universals to be found? If one already has reason to believe in univer-
sals, this is a good place to make use of them. If not, they seem like a 
metaphysical construct invented to solve a problem. Moreover, Armstrong 
leaves the necessitation relation as primitive and unanalyzable. But as Bas 
van  Fraassen complains, “necessitation” seems like a name for something 
that is wholly mysterious (1989, 104–7). There is no explanation for how 
necessitation comes to influence this particular a that is F and this b that is 
G. If one is going to take something as important as necessitation as basic, 
why not play that card sooner? This, it seems, is what philosopher of sci-
ence Tim Maudlin had in mind when positing the laws as foundational 
without any further need of analysis. We will take up that proposal in the 
next section.
Before moving on, there is an important presupposition about universals 
here that should be discussed. Armstrong et al. expect there to be relatively 
few properties that count as universals in physical laws. These are thought 
to correspond to common terms like “mass” and “charge” that appear in 
fundamental equations. A closer look at actual physics, however, reveals 
that dynamical properties are often the most important. Many of these 
are functions of position and momentum and have no handy description 
in either English or mathematics. Moreover, the language used to describe 
such properties varies between Newtonian, Lagrangian, and Hamiltonian 
formulations, none of which have a clear claim to being more fundamental 
(Wilson 2006, 260). The upshot is that if there are universals in Armstrong’s 
sense, they do not correspond to a list of attributes that has been read off 
from some set of fundamental law-statements, as its proponents seem to 
expect.
5.4.2 Laws as primitive
Given the undeniable importance of laws in science, Maudlin takes laws of 
nature as primitive. After all, every ontology has some bits that are basic 
and unanalyzed. Mauldin thinks law and the governance-relation are as 
good a starting place as any other:
My analysis of laws is no analysis at all. Rather I suggest we accept laws 
as fundamental entities in our ontology. Or, speaking at the conceptual 
level, the notion of a law cannot be reduced to other more primitive 
notions. The only hope of justifying this approach is to show that hav-
ing accepted laws as building blocks we can explain how our beliefs 
about laws determine our beliefs in other domains.
(2007, 18)
In other words, taking laws as foundational leads to an analysis of both 
dispositions and counterfactuals that is far more complete and natural than 
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trying to analyze laws from some other standpoint. It is this explanatory 
power that justifies taking the laws as basic. We should believe in laws 
because of the explanatory work that they do.
This is a bold speculative move on Maudlin’s part, but he is no doubt 
right about the role of laws in the history of science. As the long-term suc-
cess of a scientific theory tends to support its truth, perhaps the same can be 
said for nomological realism. The concept of laws has proven itself, even if 
our knowledge about those laws changes as science has progressed.
5.4.3 Early modern laws
At this point it should be clear that the early moderns discussed in Chapter 4 
were nomological realists. Descartes, Boyle, Newton and their contempo-
raries rejected Aristotelian causal powers in favor of law. What would they 
make of either Armstrong’s universals or Maudlin’s primitivism?
Surprisingly, they would reject both. As we’ve seen, there were several 
reasons why seventeenth-century philosophers moved away from Aristote-
lianism, including the obscurity of some of its main ideas. One important 
argument was that substantial forms were useless intermediaries between 
God and creation. An omnipotent being would not need such entities or 
powers to get nature to behave in the right way. Boyle in particular argued 
that they would make the creative activity of God less apparent (1744, 
4:361). Instead, God, directly and without mediation, governs his creation. 
Laws are nothing more than patterns within God’s will for how nature must 
behave. They were not thought of as autonomous agents that God created 
in order to govern nature.12 If that were God’s choice, substantial forms 
would be ideal. The early moderns did not exchange one set of governing 
entities for another; they rejected the middleman in favor of God’s direct 
rule, which they referred to as laws.13
This is decidedly not how the laws of nature are understood today. It is 
often taken for granted that if we can explain some phenomenon by appeal 
to law, there is no longer any need for God. God and law are put forward as 
rival explanations, as if it were mutually exclusive that either God or laws 
govern the universe. Such a dichotomy would have been virtually unheard 
of prior to the nineteenth century.14
This, then, is why I think that the early moderns would have rejected the 
types of nomological realism presented thus far. Armstrong and Maudlin 
take laws to be responsible for ensuring nomic regularities. Despite their 
differences, they agree that laws have a kind of metaphysical autonomy 
over and responsibility for why the universe runs the way it does. I believe 
the early moderns would see these as every bit the intermediaries that they 
were trying to get rid of with their rejection of Aristotelian essences. In 
their view, the laws had no independent standing or power to bring about 
anything. The laws are no more than God’s choices for how physical events 
shall proceed.
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Alvin Plantinga has recently named this third type of nomological realism 
decretalism (2016, 135). This is where Newton, Boyle, Clarke, et al. belong 
on the overall map of options for the laws of nature. Let’s consider it a bit 
further.
5.5 Decretalism
While decretalism is clearly a minority position today, there are several 
points to note. First, it is a form of nomological realism, which I have 
already argued is preferable to rival interpretations of law. Second, decretal-
ism is a conservative position for theists. No additional ontology is needed 
to ground the laws of nature: no substantial forms, no universals, no dis-
positions. Third, it has much in common with one of the main views in the 
philosophical landscape today, namely, Maudlin’s primitivism. Decretalism 
is therefore in good company. But while Maudlin leaves the governance rela-
tion unanalyzed, decretalism has an explanation. The laws are not abstract 
powers that must somehow be connected to actual events. God is directly 
responsible for the observed regularities in nature.15
One might question whether decretalism is really a type of nomological 
realism at all (Larmer 2017, 444n19). If there are no laws “out there” 
governing events, in what sense is this realism about the laws of nature? 
My only answer is that it fits better here than in any of the other camps. 
Decretalist laws transcend events themselves, and so the Humean will 
want nothing to do with them. Nor are they dispositions or capacities of 
natural entities. One could imagine a decretal dispositionalist who says 
that God created all causal powers by fiat and then embedded them in the 
corresponding entities,16 but such a view would inherit all the problems 
discussed in section 5.2.1. Finally, all nomological realists agree that it 
makes sense to talk about laws even in a sparse or an empty universe. It 
would still be a law, for example, that like charges would repel even if 
God annihilated all charged particles. What this claim means precisely 
will differ for Armstrong, Maudlin, and Plantinga, but they each will be 
able to affirm it given the primacy of laws. If this isn’t enough to justify 
including decretalism as a type of nomological realism, the only alterna-
tive is to see it as sui generis, without a home among the current list of 
options.
The Humean will no doubt be harrumphing at this point, complaining 
that we don’t have any more epistemic access to God than to Aristotelian 
substantial forms. Perhaps, but this is just one more place where the intui-
tions of Humeans and non-Humeans clash. Staunch empiricists must make 
do with a small ontology. Their critics argue that inference to the best expla-
nation and the need for truth-makers demand more from metaphysics. So 
no, the Humean does not like theistic explanations, but there’s a lot the 
Humean does not like. I can only say that while it would be nice to have a 
concrete empirical basis for every claim one believes, that is an ideal that 
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will never be realized. Physics itself cannot get by without unobservable 
entities or modality.
A related complaint is about obscurity: What exactly is the relation 
between God’s decrees and events? What does governance look like at the 
point of contact? That’s a perfectly good question, and there are two ways 
to approach it. One is to say that all how-questions eventually must come to 
an end. Take fundamental physics. Can anyone explain how the Higg’s field 
bestows mass on elementary particles? What precisely does the causal joint 
look like? Can anyone say how an exchange of particles binds electrons to 
a nucleus? Everyone has a set of brute facts that belie further analysis, even 
the Humean. That there is always another how-question someone might ask 
does not constitute a defeater.
The other approach is to note that “point-of-contact” language is based 
on an intuition that something is needed to explain change. There must be 
an active causal agent – personal or impersonal – to move a system from 
one state to the next. The question that all sides are trying to answer in this 
chapter is, What ultimately accounts for changes of state within a system 
that occur according to fixed regularities? Non-Humeans have historically 
favored one of two replies. The first was that entities have been endowed 
with causal powers that enable them to do such and such. Causal powers/
capacities account for regular change. If that approach is rejected, there 
is a tendency to go looking for something else that does roughly the same 
work, and laws seem to fit. They are what ensure that a system will progress 
from one state to the next in a predicable fashion. Both responses share a 
common intuition: “There must be something that moves systems from one 
state to the next in regular ways, if not causal powers then laws.” It is as 
if efficient causation were an office and the argument were merely whether 
laws or causal powers best fit that role.
Perhaps that’s right, but there is an alternative approach for the work that 
laws do, one inspired by Murray Gell-Mann’s so-called totalitarian princi-
ple in particle physics: Any process not forbidden will occur (1956, 859). 
What if the laws of nature do not compel change but rather forbid particu-
lar kinds of change? We are used to thinking of conservation laws working 
in this way, which is what Gell-Mann had in mind. Let’s try to push that 
idea a bit further.
5.5.1 Laws and constraints
Some qualifications are in order. There are two ideas in this subsection that 
I do not, strictly speaking, accept but will use for ease of exposition. The 
first is that nature runs along levels. We saw this in Chapter 2 in the con-
text of (strong/ontological) emergence and downward causation. In this pic-
ture, there is a level of mental states and causes that depends in part on the 
deeper level of neurophysiological states and causes, which in turn depends 
on an electrochemical level, and so on all the way down to fundamental 
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physics. Sometimes causes at a higher level are said to influence events at 
a lower one, mental states typically being the prime example. While seem-
ingly innocuous, this reified view of levels is what leaves emergentists open 
to the charge of causal redundancy discussed in section 2.5. To avoid this, 
all “levels-talk” here should be understood heuristically.
The second idea is a corollary. If, strictly speaking, there are no levels in 
nature, there will be no most fundamental level. The term itself, what phi-
losopher Alan Love calls “the f-word,” is a common bit of rhetoric to signal 
the importance of one’s work (“I’m working on fundamental questions in 
_____”). Physics to date certainly has not discovered a fundamental level, 
although particles in the standard model, strings, and other contenders con-
tinue to be proffered. There may instead be an infinite hierarchy of theories, 
each of which works well in its own domain of applicability (Sklar 2002, 
132–4). So once again, the imagery of levels here should be understood as 
a placeholder for an alternative, albeit messier, view of emergence (Bishop 
2012), (Koperski 2015, sec. 6.6).
Nomological realists sometimes think of laws as being akin to Newtonian 
forces. Freshman physics is replete with blocks sliding on inclined planes 
where forces are decomposed and the power of vector mechanics is revealed. 
The lesson is clear: Forces make things go. At a slightly more advanced 
level of physics, we see that the Newtonian picture is nearly impossible to 
apply in many contexts. Consider a bead threaded onto a rotating wire 
(Figure 5.1). The bead is going to slide, but the changing forces that (i) hold 
the bead on the wire and (ii) make it move are mathematically intractable. 
Historically, classical mechanics moved from a Newtonian framework of 
Figure 5.1 Sliding bead on wire.
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impressed forces to the Lagrangian approach based on energy and constants 
of motion. The latter starts with a state space of possibilities. Each point in 
the space represents one overall state of the system. The goal is to find how 
the system evolves from one state to the next. Doing so depends on finding 
constants of motion in the relevant equations: variables that do not change 
over time. Each constant identified simplifies the mathematics. If a sufficient 
number can be found, there will be only one way the system can evolve 
from any given set of initial conditions. While that might not sound like a 
revolutionary advance, much of the power of classical mechanics – and to 
a lesser extent quantum mechanics – is due to this discovery. It is often far 
more useful to lay down constraints on the space of possibilities than to 
infer behavior from component forces. Keep that in mind.
The notion of constraints also comes up when one entity is incorporated 
into a larger system, as philosopher Robert Bishop details (2006, 49). Free-
floating neutrons are not stable, having a half-life of eleven minutes. Con-
tained in the nucleus of an atom and subject to an additional set of laws, 
however, neutrons are mostly stable, with a half-life in the millions of years. 
That individual atom alone in space obeys the laws of quantum mechanics 
and gravity. If this atom undergoes molecular bonding, further constraints 
will be imposed. The atom is no longer free to behave in ways that it might 
have previously. The range of possible states is narrowed still more if this 
molecule is incorporated into a strand of DNA. The move from the suba-
tomic level to the atomic, molecular, genetic, and so forth imposes a series 
of restrictions on the neutron that we started with. The range of possibilities 
open to it is narrowed at each successive step.
A similar story can be told about most entities that are incorporated into 
systems of increasing levels of complexity (Bishop 2012, 68). Each level 
contains a new set of structures, relations, and laws. Those entities are most 
“free” in isolation, apart from whatever new restrictions are entailed by 
their inclusion into a larger system. Chemical and biological laws do not 
violate those at lower levels, but they do constrain the range of possibilities 
open to their constituent parts.
Bishop argues that this is the primary way of understanding laws as they 
emerge at different scales – as constraints on the less-restricted state space of 
free entities. The further up the ladder from fundamental physics one goes, 
the more constraints there are in terms of law.
Instead of thinking of laws merely as constraints emerging in higher-order 
systems, I suggest that we apply that idea all the way down. Laws never 
make things happen. That way of thinking, again, is rooted in a causal 
powers intuition. What, then, does account for change? There is no reason 
to turn to metaphysics for an answer. Forces and energy are responsible for 
moving systems from state to state, including forces that come into play at 
higher levels. Physics has solved the question of why particles, fields, and the 
systems composed of them are active. There is no need for causal powers, 
Aristotelian natures, or laws to answer that question.
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So what, then, do laws do? Consider again the question that is at the 
center of this chapter: What ultimately accounts for changes of state within 
systems that occur according to fixed regularities? Laws are not needed to 
account for the change part of the question. They are needed to account for 
the fixed regularities. Why isn’t the observable world a blooming, buzzing 
confusion? How is induction possible? These are the questions that laws 
are needed to answer. Nature is active.17 Any process not forbidden might 
in fact occur. Laws constrain nature to act in regular, sometimes predictable 
ways. That is true in the emergent structures mentioned earlier, and it is true 
at the most fundamental level of reality (if there is one).
This, then, is what decretalism amounts to. It is not that by decreeing 
the laws of nature that God thereby endows forces/fields/particles/strings/
energy – whatever precisely is most fundamental – with some sort of meta-
physical oomph that makes things happen. That is not what laws do. At 
every level, laws impose constraints. When God decrees a law of nature, a 
range of possibilities is being fixed. Consider the four fundamental forces. 
It is as if there were a vast parameter space for how those forces would 
behave: strength, range, ways of coupling with matter, etc. The laws/decrees 
constrain that space to the point that we have the forces as they exist in real-
ity.18 On my proposal, all laws at the level of fundamental physics function 
this way.
While laws-as-constraints is a departure from the early modern view that 
I favor, it will be helpful in fending off the objection that decretalism is 
merely occasionalism, the doctrine that God ultimately causes all physical 
events (section 8.4).19
5.5.2 Decretalism and divine action
Turning back to the question of divine action, consider again the idea of 
“breaking the laws of nature.” As we have already noted, the phrase is 
most naturally understood as an implication that there is some sort of 
entity or power that could possibly be broken. But the decretalist denies 
that when God ordains a law, something new comes into being. There is 
no structure or capacity that is a law that God might possibly disrupt. 
When nonviolationists talk about God’s “breaking” or “violating” the 
laws of nature, they seem to have in mind some other type of nomological 
realism.
On the other hand, there is a sense of “breaking a law” that does not 
require the reification of laws themselves. There is something objectively 
wrong, say, about moving a chess pawn three spaces: It breaks the rules. 
“Breaking” here is a metaphor. It does not entail that rules exist as something 
other than social constructions. Likewise, God could break a law insofar as 
some new act temporarily contradicts a previously ordained regularity, even 
if laws do not have any sort of independent existence. Some nonviolationists 
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see this as the main problem with intervention, not the metaphysics, as 
Robert Russell argues:
[Since] God’s intervention breaks the very processes of nature which 
God created and constantly maintains, it pits God’s special acts against 
God’s regular action, which underlies and ultimately causes nature’s 
regularities.
(2008, 584)
Whatever the precise metaphysics, the worry is that laws ultimately trace 
back to divine choices that interventions would contravene. Intervention 
therefore entails a conflict of the divine will, many nonviolationists argue, 
which is something that any model of divine action must avoid.
This means that decretalism does not by itself satisfy the objections of 
the nonviolationist, and so there is still a problem to be solved. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, however, it is not likely to be solved by an appeal to quan-
tum mechanics or chaos theory. And if Everett’s many-worlds interpretation 
continues its rise, the scientific consensus at the end of this century may be 
that nature is fully deterministic. Most nonviolationists believe that would 
signal the death of their program. Without ontological gaps in which God 
can act, the only remaining options are deism or naïve violationism. None-
theless, I will argue in Chapter 7 that a third way is possible: a decretalist, 
nonviolationist model of divine action that does not depend on prior gaps 
in the natural order. Before that, there is one last, often unanalyzed concept 
in this literature to be discussed.
Notes
 1 One reviewer asks whether the equation is the law, and that is the right question 
to ask. The answer depends on which view of laws discussed in this chapter that 
one holds. For most Humeans, the answer is “yes.”
 2 This point was repeatedly emphasized by an anonymous referee for Philosophia 
Christi in a previous version of this chapter, (Koperski 2017).
 3 For the Humean, it makes no sense to say that God could have a created a uni-
verse just like this one, but with different laws – something that most theists wish 
to claim.
 4 Those terms will be used interchangeably here.
 5 Some dispositionalists allow for causal powers in configurations of matter, not 
just of material beings (Dorato and Esfeld 2016). Even so, they still have dif-
ficulty with quantum mechanical properties, especially nonlocality.
 6 Free-fall experiments seemed to favor Leibniz. Inelastic collisions confirmed 
Newton’s position.
 7 See (Göcke 2015) and (Adams 2016) for models of SDA based on the priority of 
dispositions.
 8 More precisely, the claim here is not that we always know the relevant laws in 
every case or even care. The ancients were making counterfactual judgments well 
before the notion of laws for nature was widely accepted. The point is one of 
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metaphysical priority: Counterfactual truths depend on law; laws do not depend 
on counterfactuals.
 9 See (Carroll 2016, sec. 3) for an introduction.
 10 As we will see in Chapter 7, and as Robert Bishop notes (private correspond-
ence), this is actually a poor candidate for a law-statement. The word “law” is 
often applied to models and families of differential equations that are not strictly 
speaking laws or law-statements.
 11 At least in this possible world. For Armstrong, there are possible worlds in which 
these universals are not so related.
 12 For better or worse, theists soon came to accept intermediaries once again, 
whether in the form of laws as independent powers, vital forces, or something 
else (Brooke 1992).
 13 This is not to suggest that all natural philosophers at this time had a single well-
articulated view of laws. As I argued in Chapter 4, the view presented here is 
most clearly represented by Boyle and Clarke.
 14 As historian Matthew Stanley documents, Thomas Huxley intentionally and 
strategically set out to co-opt the uniformity of natural law from theism and 
recast it in terms of naturalism (2016).
 15 Even critics of nomological realism argue that it is best understood – perhaps 
only understood – in light of theism (Cartwright 1993, 299; Ott 2009, 249).
 16 This is close to Peter van Inwagen’s view (1988). Yong and Smith (section 2.4) 
are also decretalists of some type, perhaps this one.
 17 Instead of God first creating physical entities that then need to be constrained 
by laws, God’s decrees could be made anytime before the Big Bang. The mate-
rial universe would then evolve within the boundaries set by those laws, which 
in time leads to transparent space, the elements of the periodic table, and all 
the rest. The picture here is decidedly not Plato’s cosmology, where a Demiurge 
imposes order on a preexisting chaos.
 18 If the theoretical unification of forces is correct, this story will apply to one force 
but include the conditions for symmetry breaking.
 19 While the arguments for decretalism are matters of philosophy of science and philos-
ophy of religion, there is some biblical support for such a view, as theologian Daniel 
Treier has pointed out (private correspondence). In several places, the Old Testament 
describes God’s creation act in terms of decrees and boundaries. For example,
Job 38:4–11 (NRSV): Where were you when I laid the foundation of the 
earth? . . . Or who shut in the sea with doors when it burst out from the 
womb? – when I made the clouds its garment, and thick darkness its swaddling 
band, and prescribed bounds for it, and set bars and doors, and said, “Thus far 
shall you come, and no farther, and here shall your proud waves be stopped”?
Proverbs 8:24–30 (NSRV): When there were no depths I [Wisdom] was 
brought forth, when there were no springs abounding with water. . . . When 
he established the heavens, I was there, when he drew a circle on the face 
of the deep, when he made firm the skies above, when he established the 
fountains of the deep, when he assigned to the sea its limit, so that the waters 
might not transgress his command, when he marked out the foundations of 
the earth, then I was beside him, like a master worker; and I was daily his 
delight, rejoicing before him always.
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6  Determinisms
Philosophy 101 didn’t hold a lot of interest for me as a college freshman. 
Many of the ideas seemed obviously wrong, and I was more than ready to 
end the course once we got to Camus. One exception was the section on 
determinism and free will. While everyone’s intuitions fall on the freedom 
side of this debate, there are arguments to the contrary in virtually every 
area of philosophy.
Let’s say that the majority view is correct and our robust sense of freedom 
is an illusion. Why is determinism so bad? One reason is that it conflicts 
with ethical responsibility. A phrase that goes back to Immanuel Kant is 
“ought implies can.” If we tell students that they ought to do their own 
work and they ought not plagiarize, we will imply that it is within their 
power to do so. The claim will make sense only if plagiarizing or not is 
within their range of options. We would never tell them that they ought to 
levitate and ought not have veins, since those matters are beyond their con-
trol. But if determinism is true and students plagiarize their papers, it will 
not be in their power to do otherwise. Ethical commands make no sense in a 
deterministic world since no one actually has a range of options from which 
to choose. The future, instead, has one fixed path. Theologically, the same 
goes for God’s commands. It would make no sense for God to be angered 
by Israel’s failure to, say, repent in response to the prophet Amos’s warnings 
if they were literally not able to do so.
Examples like these explain why most philosophers take determinism as a 
problem to overcome. Physicists have a different attitude. For them, break-
downs in determinism are to be avoided. Indeterminism in physics typically 
signals that something has gone wrong in a theory or a model. Explaining 
this discrepancy is one of the goals of this chapter. To understand it, we 
must first see how the conventional wisdom about physical determinism 
goes awry. In the end, I will argue that insofar as physics is deterministic, it 
presents no obstacle to nonviolationist divine action. If there is a problem, 
it will lie elsewhere.
Let’s start with a few varieties of determinism to see which type is of inter-
est here.1
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6.1 Types of determinism
“Determinism” is usually shorthand for causal determinism: Every event 
has a sufficient cause. More precisely, given conditions {x1, x2, x3, . . ., xi} 
and event C, effect E must occur. Every event in a deterministic system is 
covered by such a conditional. Given the antecedent conditions and cause C, 
there is one unique E possible. Nothing is left to chance and nothing escapes 
the network of causes and effects, including our “free” choices. This sort 
of determinism is now typically recast in terms of the laws of nature, as we 
will see.
God’s omniscience leads to a second type of determinism, at least when 
it is taken prima facie. Omniscience traditionally includes knowledge of all 
future events. Let’s say, then, that God now knows that you will have pizza 
for dinner next Friday. Do you have the freedom not to have pizza for din-
ner on Friday? If you did and freely chose to have chicken instead, God 
would have had a false belief, which would not be compatible with omnisci-
ence. God’s beliefs about the future must come to pass. Hence, it seems that 
you do not have the ability to change the trajectory of the future and so do 
not have free will. While many solutions have been proposed to determin-
ism grounded in God’s knowledge of contingent events (Zagzebski 2017), 
the problem seems clear enough.
A third type of determinism comes from the philosophy of time, although 
fewer philosophers think this one poses a challenge to free will. In the 
B-series, eternalist, or block universe view of time, the future and the past 
exist as fully as the present does. There is no moment that distinguishes past 
from future. The entire timeline simply exists, and what we perceive as the 
flow of time is an illusion. The temporal slice of my drinking my coffee and 
writing this paragraph feels as if it’s in the present, but so do each of my 
other temporal slices spread out over space-time. One upshot of the block 
universe is that what we think of as the future is fixed. There is a fact-of-the-
matter regarding the exact number of copies this book will sell, the names 
of my great-grandchildren, and the other events I think of as being in the 
future, all of which are as unchangeable as those I think of as being in the 
past. It is in this fixedness that some find determinism:
[The] worry regarding this doctrine is that if the future participates in 
the same degree of existence as the past (and present), then how can the 
future be non-fixed and open? Or, more concretely, if the event of the 
Third World War exists eternally, then in what sense is that event – prior 
to its occurrence – not inexorable?
(Diekemper 2007, 429)
In other words, if there is an unchanging fact-of-the-matter regarding all 
events that I consider to be in my future, the outcome of which I have no abil-
ity to alter, it will be difficult to see in what sense I presently have free will.2
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Of the three, causal determinism is the most relevant to special divine 
action. Nonviolationists typically believe that there is no room for God to 
act in a deterministic universe:3
This determinism of physical causes involves the claim that the physical 
state of the world at a given time determines the physical state of the 
world for all future times. It is thus a modal notion. It denies that it is 
even physically possible that the present state of the world should give 
rise to more than one future state of affairs.
Physical determinism is fundamentally a claim about causality – the 
claim, namely, that all that happens is a necessary effect of antecedent 
efficient causes. At the same time, it claims that all physical occurrences 
are lawful. The universe is such that a given set of physical events can 
give rise to only one successor set.
(Clayton 2008, 187)
This explains in part why quantum mechanics is so important to nonvio-
lationists. If its standard interpretation is correct, fundamental physics will 
not be deterministic, thus allowing the possibility of divine action.
Given the worries about determinism mentioned so far, philosophers and 
theologians are sometimes puzzled by the different attitude found in physics. 
Instead of avoiding determinism, physicists try to preserve it. Breakdowns 
in determinism are the problem. Why? Well, if one wants useful predic-
tions, one will need the (nonprobabilistic) laws of nature to provide uniform 
results. Usually, when determinism fails, physicists think they have some-
thing wrong: either the theory is incomplete or a calculation is in error.4 Sin-
gularities – places where the laws break down – are occasionally accepted, 
but only when no other option presents itself. This explains in part the early 
rejection of the Big Bang and ongoing proposals for eliminating it.5
How can we account for these differing attitudes between physicists on 
one hand and philosophers and theologians on the other? The answer is 
that they are no longer talking about the same thing. The latter do not fully 
appreciate how “[over] the centuries, the doctrine of determinism has been 
understood, and its truth or falsity assessed, in different ways” (Butterfield 
2005). I will argue in the next two sections that the determinism of early 
modern philosophy is no longer the determinism of physics.
6.2 Causal determinism: the standard view
There were two main senses of determinism in play around the time of the 
scientific revolution: (i) as a law of universal causation and (ii) as the precise 
predictability of the future (Butterfield 2005). The first can be traced to Spi-
noza and Leibniz, the second to Laplace.6
Spinoza’s view can be summed up in two quotes: “In nature there is noth-
ing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of 
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the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (Ethics, 
Ip29); and “Nothing happens in nature that does not follow from her laws” 
(Theologico-Political Treatise, 6/19). Putting the two together, we find 
that everything that happens is necessary. Nothing is contingent. God has 
ordained the laws of nature, and all events follow necessarily from those 
laws. Since miracles would disrupt the fixed course of nature, there aren’t 
any. Spinoza thought that belief in miracles was due to our lack of knowl-
edge. If we understood all the causes involved, there would be no need to 
appeal to divine intervention.7
For Leibniz, the core idea was not nomological necessity but rather the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, which says that, for everything that happens, 
there must be a reason that determines why it is thus and not otherwise. 
Physicists soon turned this into a doctrine about causation: Each thing that 
exists has a cause, and the state of every system is caused by the immedi-
ate prior state (van Strien 2014a, sec. 5). The Law of Continuity, a less 
well-known Leibnizian principle, said that nature makes no leaps.8 More 
precisely, change from one state to another must go through all the inter-
mediate stages. Hence, a ball rolling from point A to point B must continu-
ously travel through all points in between. (This latter principle played a key 
role in the development of differential equations.) The Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and the Law of Continuity together imply causal determinism: All 
events form a continuous chain, no event “just happens,” and each event is 
determined by some prior reason or cause.
Laplace, in contrast, famously tied determinism to prediction. If an intel-
ligence knew all the forces involved and the state of every particle at a given 
instant in time, it would in principle be able to predict the exact state of the 
universe arbitrarily far into the future:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect 
of its anterior state and the cause of the one which is to follow. Given 
for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces 
by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings 
who compose it – an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit this data 
to analysis – it would embrace in the same formula the movements of 
the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for 
it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be 
present in its eyes.
([1814] 1902, 4)
This vast intelligence has come to be called a “Laplacian demon.” Such a 
being is an idealization, and not even modern supercomputers come close. 
Nonetheless, such predictions would be possible in a Newtonian world 
because its evolution is governed by deterministic laws. Or at least, that is 
the conventional wisdom on the matter.
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Now consider two statements from theologians regarding determinism 
and divine action. The first is from Philip Clayton:
The prior [i.e., more fundamental] question . . . is whether science even 
leaves a place for divine action. If Laplace were right, for example, and 
a strict determinism would allow us to predict all future states and ret-
rodict all past ones, then there would truly be no place for divine action.
(1997, 206)
The second is from Nicholas Saunders:
[In] a totally deterministic world . . . the causal nexus of science is drawn 
so tight that there is no real freedom for either God or human beings. In 
such a world Laplace’s famous demon reigns supreme. God cannot act 
in any creative way through the causality of science and still remain true 
to the deterministic rules put in place at creation.
(2000, 254)
Notice how much they share with Laplace and Spinoza. Clayton appeals 
to Laplacian prediction; Saunders, to prediction plus universal causation. 
Neither of them believes that we live in a physically deterministic world, but 
they take it that determinism would be fatal for any robust model of divine 
action. They also take it that classical mechanics describes just such a world. 
If classical mechanics were true, there would be no room for God’s ongoing 
causal influence within nature.
The conclusions presented in this subsection seldom meet with contro-
versy. In light of how physicists now understand determinism, however, they 
are also mostly false. Seventeenth-century views on the matter have not held 
up well over time.
6.3 Determinism and physics
To make that case, let’s revisit the Laplacian demon. The definition of deter-
minism in terms of mechanics and unbounded prediction has been refuted 
by chaos theory. If chaotic systems, which are perfectly Newtonian and clas-
sical, are added to the mix of nature, the demon will require an infinite 
amount of information about the state of the system – precision to the level 
of real numbers. An infinitesimal error in the initial conditions guarantees 
that predictions made for a chaotic system will fail. Yet such errors are inevi-
table since no instrument is infinitely precise.9
Let’s say there were some way to overcome this imprecision. Chaos would 
still thwart successful predictions because of limited computational capac-
ity. Computers have finite memory. The Laplacian demon is in the same 
boat. Laplace described it as a vast intelligence, not an omniscient one. It 
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does not have infinite computational capacity and would be as susceptible 
to round-off errors as any computer. Hence, its predictions about the future 
state of a chaotic system would fail. I believe that if Laplace had been aware 
of chaos, he would never have used this as an illustration of determinism. 
In what follows, we will ignore what any finite intelligence might be able to 
predict vis-à-vis determinism.
In modern physics, a theory is considered deterministic when, for any 
two systems S1 and S2 within the scope of that theory, if S1 and S2 have the 
same state at one particular time, they will evolve in precisely the same way 
for all future times.10 So take two systems: two identical clocks, two billiard 
ball tables, or two solar systems with the same configuration of planets. 
Determinism requires that, for any of those pairs of systems, if they have 
the same state at one point in time, they will evolve in lockstep for all future 
times. Once synchronized, the two will remain isomorphic unless something 
interferes or one of the systems degrades.
Many of the clearest examples of deterministic physics come from classi-
cal mechanics. If we think of classical mechanics as point-particle physics – 
which we shouldn’t, but let’s ignore that for now – the laws of physics will 
be expressed as ordinary differential equations. The question of determin-
ism can then be answered mathematically in terms of the existence and the 
uniqueness of solutions. For a set of equations and initial conditions, does a 
solution exist, and is that solution the only one? If the solution both exists 
and is unique, the model will be deterministic. A system correctly described 
by this model will always evolve in the same way from a given set of initial 
conditions. In terms of the system’s phase space (section 3.2.1), this means 
that state trajectories never cross. Each point in the phase space (i.e., each 
possible state of the system) will be mapped to a unique trajectory into the 
future.11 For first-order ordinary differential equations expressing functions 
that are suitably smooth, existence and uniqueness are guaranteed.
This, then, is the modern justification for saying that classical mechanics 
is deterministic. Classical mechanics is governed by differential equations, 
and the equations in textbook physics have unique solutions. In this light, 
determinism becomes a kind of metatheorem derived over the entirety of 
classical mechanics – something learned from or entailed by the physics 
itself. This metatheorem supports the idea that quantum mechanics was 
needed to introduce some measure of indeterminism.
One of the better-kept secrets in the philosophy of physics is that the con-
ventional wisdom is wrong – or at least oversimplified. Determinism has a 
far more complex relationship to classical mechanics.
But wait. Do we really need to discuss this further? We know that clas-
sical mechanics is only an approximation in the actual world. Who cares 
about the details?
The answer is that insofar as classical mechanics is taken to be a clear 
example of determinism, one that motivates the need for quantum mechan-
ics in the minds of many theologians and philosophers, it is important to 
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see what is wrong with this characterization. Both the ways in which deter-
minism fails in classical mechanics and the strategies used to restore it are 
important for understanding its place in modern physics.
Consider the qualifications already mentioned, which guarantee unique 
solutions to differential equations. Why should classical mechanics be lim-
ited to “suitably smooth” functions? Say that a point particle is situated at 
the top of a dome, with gravity but without friction. This seems like a per-
fectly acceptable classical system, one that might be discussed in freshman 
physics. Given well-behaved force functions, the particle will stay at the top 
of the dome forever unless perturbed. If not-so-well-behaved functions are 
permitted, specifically those that are not Lipschitz-continuous, the solutions 
to the equations will allow for the possibility that the particle moves off 
the dome at some arbitrary time without being perturbed (Norton 2008).12 
The easy solution is the one in which the particle remains in place forever. 
But there is a perfectly acceptable alternative in which it moves at some 
arbitrary time, thus violating the uniqueness of solutions to a simple initial 
value problem, which is a violation of determinism. Note that the motion 
“just happens” – no nudging, no new forces. The particle moves more or 
less of its own accord.13 This is not the run-of-the-mill instability one finds 
in a pencil balancing on its tip. In a so-called “Norton’s dome,” the singu-
larity at the top of the structure ensures that the particle will move at some 
time or another unless an infinite downward force is applied to keep it there 
 (Malament 2008, 800). While this is not intuitive, there is no controversy 
over whether such solutions to the equations exist. Norton’s dome is just 
not something that one is likely to bump into at the undergraduate level. 
If you still think this scenario is impossible and that the unperturbed parti-
cle must remain at rest, the question will become, Why is this impossible? 
Whatever the intuition, it must be based on something other than the laws 
of physics, which in this case are expressed by differential equations.14
What other solutions are not “suitably smooth” enough to guarantee 
uniqueness? Collisions, for one. A point-particle system is deterministic only 
if the particles do not collide, but we obviously do not live in that sort of 
world. In order to deal with collisions, physicists must replace point parti-
cles in their models with rigid bodies. The math for such systems is more 
complicated but not intractable. So maybe determinism can be preserved. 
That is, unless elasticity becomes important. If so, then rigid bodies will 
be replaced by the deformable ones found in continuum mechanics. But 
that takes us from the realm of ordinary differential equations to that of 
partial differential equations, which can be far more complex. The exist-
ence and the uniqueness of solutions for those equations are not so easily 
guaranteed.15 This means that, in a world of fluids and deformable bodies, 
determinism can only be guaranteed for a handful of special cases. If one 
allows for fractures – which of course happen in the real world – there is 
nowhere, mathematically, to turn to preserve uniqueness, and all bets are off 
regarding determinism.16
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This all leads up to something that is well-documented in the philosophy 
of physics: The pristine simplicity of classical mechanics is a myth.17 It is 
simple and deterministic at the level of freshman physics, but only because 
of the restrictions and idealizations used to keep it that way.
Perhaps this is overstated. Perhaps some parts of freshman physics have 
it right. How about a world of point particles with mass and gravity, but 
where collisions are forbidden? Surely that is a deterministic system! It’s 
nothing but Newton’s laws of motion and universal gravitation.
Some readers will recall that the two Voyager satellites were slingshotted 
around the sun to increase their velocities – a maneuver used in the first Star 
Trek series. Using a similar mechanism, mathematician Zhihong Xia proved 
that, in a system of five bodies, a particle could be flung to spatial infinity 
in finite time (1992). Philosopher John Earman points out that if this is an 
acceptable Newtonian system, running the same solutions backward in time 
will be as well. This produces his “space invader” example, with particles 
appearing from infinity in finite time (1986, 34). Such a possibility thwarts 
determinism insofar as the system prior to the invasion must now adapt to 
the presence of something new.18 The moral to the story is that in a “Newto-
nian space-time. . . [the universe] is not automatically ‘closed’ in the opera-
tive sense to outside influences” (Earman 1986, 34).
Finally, it is difficult to claim that classical mechanics entails determin-
ism when determinism and indeterminism are to some degree mathemati-
cally interchangeable (Atmanspacher and Rotter 2008), (Werndl 2011). As 
Jeremy Butterfield notes, “there are many examples of a set of differential 
equations which can be interpreted as a deterministic theory, or as an inde-
terministic theory, depending on the notion of state used to interpret the 
equations” (2005). A system described using equations with unique solu-
tions can be mapped to an indeterministic state space and vice versa. The 
choice of which to use is a matter of mathematical convenience. This means 
that “determinism is not a formal feature of a set of equations” (Butterfield 
2005). In other words, not even the existence and the uniqueness of solu-
tions are a guarantor of determinism.
The bottom line is that classical mechanics is not the realm of absolute 
determinism that so many suppose. Some of the breakdowns mentioned 
in classical mechanics are cleaned up by special relativity, but then general 
relativity adds new challenges. (Space-times that are not “well-behaved” 
[that is, globally hyperbolic] wreak havoc on initial value problems.) How 
is a physicist expected to make predictions under conditions such as these?
6.4 Rescuing determinism
Whether the subject is classical mechanics, special relativity, general rela-
tivity, or quantum mechanics, there are ways of preserving determinism in 
the face of counterexamples. If particles appearing from infinitely far away 
is a problem, one will impose new boundary conditions at spatial infinity 
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that keep all our particles in-house and bar the door to space invaders. 
Xia’s proof could also be negated by eliminating idealized point particles 
and infinite potential wells, even though neither of these is impossible in 
terms of classical mechanics alone (Earman 2007, 1386). That works, says 
Earman, but “smacks of making determinism true by making it a postulate 
of wishful thinking” (2004, 26). In other words, sure, it fixes the problem. 
But what is the physical basis for saying this cannot happen in a classical 
world?
A closely related approach would be to simply ignore these counterex-
amples. One might declare them physically impossible, even though they 
are perfectly coherent from a mathematical point of view. Physicists in the 
nineteenth century did just that in order to preserve determinism (van Strien 
2014b, 180–82). In fact, the only way to ensure that determinism holds 
across the whole of classical mechanics is to assume it as an axiom, as V. I. 
Arnold does (1988, 2). And remember, there is a reason for this. Physicists 
and engineers need to solve equations, run simulations, and make predic-
tions. Indeterminism gets in the way.
This, however, is a problematic response. The claim that classical mechan-
ics is deterministic is never interpreted as “physicists have imposed deter-
minism on mechanics for pragmatic reasons.” Most believe that this sort of 
determinism is something that physics has taught us. Determinism is sup-
posed to be entailed by classical mechanics – a state of affairs that would be 
true if not for quantum effects. Instead, determinism is invoked as a reason 
to ignore the counterexamples. The need to impose new constraints proves 
the point that determinism cannot be derived from classical mechanics (or 
from any area of physics, for that matter). Of course, if one assumes abso-
lute determinism in the form of an axiom, the results will be deterministic. If 
P is a premise in an argument – even a hidden premise – one will certainly be 
able to derive P in the conclusion. But let’s not pretend that we have learned 
anything from the exercise.19
In short, the role of determinism in physics is far more nuanced than it 
is commonly assumed to be. Laplace himself knew that there were break-
downs like the ones already discussed and that there was no way to prove 
the uniqueness of solutions across all of mechanics. In other words, the pre-
dictions of the Laplacian demon were not possible given what was known 
at the time about the laws of physics. So why did Laplace believe that the 
world was deterministic? In his famous paper, metaphysics, not physics, was 
the basis for determinism. In particular, he explicitly appealed to Leibniz’s 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, which Laplace states as follows: “Current 
events are connected with preceding ones by a tie based upon the evident 
principle that a thing cannot come to existence without a cause which pro-
duces it” ([1814] 1902, 3).20 So while it is widely assumed that Laplace was 
merely applying Newtonian mechanics to the whole of nature, he knew the 
mathematics could not guarantee determinism. But that was all right, he 
thought, since philosophy has already shown it to be true!
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To introduce some jargon, Laplace was making use of a metatheoretic 
shaping principle (Koperski 2015, 25–29). Shaping principles are philo-
sophical beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality and how best 
to understand it. Science depends on such principles to distinguish good 
theories, explanations, and methods from bad ones. Metaphysical shaping 
principles include concepts like the uniformity of nature, ideas about causa-
tion, and the view that reality is to some degree mind-independent and law- 
governed. In Laplace’s day, one would have included Leibniz’s Law of 
Continuity on this list, as well as others that we no longer hold. For Laplace 
and other physicists of his era, good physics was deterministic physics. Inso-
far as a theory failed to be deterministic, it was flawed. According to the 
shaping principles of the time, one should strive to isolate and remove any 
discontinuities from the description of God’s mechanistic creation.
Maxwell also understood determinism as a shaping principle:
If, therefore, those cultivators of physical science . . . whose style is 
recognised as marking with a scientific stamp the doctrines they prom-
ulgate, are led in pursuit of the arcana of science to the study of the 
singularities and instabilities, rather than the continuities and stabilities 
of things, the promotion of natural knowledge may tend to remove that 
prejudice in favour of determinism which seems to arise from assuming 
that the physical science of the future is a mere magnified image of that 
of the past [italics added].
(1873, 823)
Maxwell takes determinism to be a “prejudice” brought to the table by 
his contemporaries, one that should be resisted in some cases. To see that 
determinism is not entailed by physics, however, one must get beyond the 
standard examples and into “the arcana of science.”
Max Planck was more optimistic, but he concurred that
the law of causality is neither right nor wrong; it is rather a heuristic 
principle, a guidepost, and in my opinion the most valuable guidepost 
we possess, to navigate the colorful confusion of events and to indi-
cate the direction in which scientific research must proceed in order to 
achieve fruitful results.
(1932, 26)
While “law of causality” is not strictly synonymous with “determinism,” 
there is significant overlap between the two. Planck’s justification for using 
it as a shaping principle was that it had shown its worth over time.
Like all shaping principles, this one can get push-back from new discover-
ies, which inevitably leads to controversy. The Bohr-Einstein debate is one 
famous case. Einstein’s view of good science was rooted in the same basic 
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intuitions as those of Planck. He believed that insofar as quantum mechanics 
implied indeterminism, nonlocal causes, and indeterminate values of state, it 
must be wrong. Bohr instead argued that the new physics required a change 
of shaping principles. In his view, good science would henceforth look dif-
ferent, at least at the level of fundamental physics. Bohr won, although the 
victory was less than absolute. Einstein still has his counterinsurgent sup-
porters, along the lines of David Bohm (section 3.7.1).
Let’s sum up the discussion thus far. For close to a century now, scientists 
have told us that there are important differences between the realm of quan-
tum mechanical and that of observable objects. The quantum world is a 
menagerie of unintuitive goings-on, including irreducibly random events. In 
contrast, the realm of our experience is typically classical and deterministic. 
(This is why engineers are seldom taught much about quantum mechanics. 
It is irrelevant to almost all their concerns.)
But why do we believe that it took the discovery of quantum mechan-
ics to break the grip of determinism? Two reasons. First, because Newton, 
Laplace, Euler, Boscovich, and the other heroes of classical mechanics said 
that the physical world is deterministic. As we have seen, however, they 
believed in physical determinism because of prior metaphysical commit-
ments that few scientists now share, like the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
Instead of inferring determinism as a consequence of scientific discoveries, 
they brought it with them as a presupposition.
Second, taking the breakdowns in determinism realistically would com-
plicate our understanding of the classical realm. It is much easier to simply 
declare them “nonphysical events.” After all, no one literally believes in clas-
sical mechanics anymore, so getting the details right is not all that important 
when teaching undergraduates. At the end of the day, physicists use deter-
minism for the same reason engineers use linear models for processes that 
they know are nonlinear: It is what they need to do to get solutions to the 
equations. But these sorts of considerations are merely pragmatic, and prag-
matism is a rather flimsy foundation on which to base belief in the unbroken 
determinism of the classical realm. In any case, philosophers and theologi-
ans ought not interpret these pragmatic uses of determinism as foundational 
truths entailed by the science itself. Butterfield sums up the current situation:
[Formulations] of determinism in terms of causation or predictability 
are unsatisfactory. And once we use a correct formulation, it turns out 
that much of classical physics, even much Newtonian physics, is inde-
terministic; and that parts of relativity theory are indeterministic (owing 
to singularities). Furthermore, the alleged indeterminism of quantum 
theory is very controversial – for it enters only, if at all, in quantum 
theory’s account of measurement processes, an account which remains 
the most controversial part of the theory.
(2005, sec. 2)
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In the end, determinism is like most ideas along the border of philosophy 
and science. It seems simple enough at first, but becomes increasingly com-
plex once the details are considered, even within classical mechanics.
Determinism has played an important role in the literature on divine 
action since both noninterventionists and nonviolationists see it as an obsta-
cle. But their worries are misplaced. If determinism is what Leibniz and 
Spinoza thought, yes, it will be a problem. God could not act within such a 
world without breaking the laws of nature. But if determinism is what mod-
ern physics takes it to be – a shaping principle supported by the existence 
and uniqueness of solutions to the governing equations – it will not be a bar 
to divine action. If some aspect of physics prevents divine action, determin-
ism will not be it.
Another idea – one that is often conflated with determinism – might fit 
the bill. Let’s consider whether causal closure can bear the weight that deter-
minism cannot.
6.5 Causal closure
The idea shows up in two different contexts. The causal closure of the physi-
cal (CCoP) in the mind-body debate entails that causation at the level of 
physics is closed and complete in a way that biology is not.
At first pass the causal closure of physics says that every physical effect 
has a sufficient physical cause. If this thesis is true, it distinguishes phys-
ics from all other subject domains. The biological realm, for example, 
is not causally closed in this sense, since biological effects often have 
non-biological causes, as when the impact of a meteorite precipitated 
the extinction of the dinosaurs.
(Papineau 2009, 53–54)
CCoP says that if a physical effect has a cause, that cause will be physical. 
(The conditional allows for uncaused events and even nonphysical causes 
as long as they do not influence the physical.) Physicalists invoke closure 
as a way to fend off arguments from mind-body dualists and emergentists 
(see section 2.5). If CCoP is true, mental causes or causes above the level of 
physics will not have any effect on lower-level physical objects and events. 
The simplest physicalist position is to say that nonphysical causes will one 
day be reduced to physical ones.21
Theists typically reject CCoP insofar as they reject physicalism and onto-
logical reductionism. Some also believe in downward causation, whereby 
causes at higher levels produce effects at lower ones, including the physical 
level. This would also constitute a violation of CCoP.
In the context of divine action, closure is a doctrine that applies to the 
whole of nature, not merely to the level of physics. The issue here is the 
causal closure of nature (CCoN), the completeness of the entire natural 
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realm. According to CCoN, natural effects have only natural causes, but 
these might include causes that act across levels. It is this variety of clo-
sure that distinguishes noninterventionism from nonviolationism. The for-
mer accepts CCoN: Special divine action is not possible (in part), because 
nature is a closed network of causes. For the latter, CCoN is an obstacle 
to be overcome. If it were exceptionless, nonviolationism would collapse 
into noninterventionism. Finding ways to avoid or overcome causal closure 
was the underlying motivation behind each of the models of divine action 
discussed in Chapter 2. It is surprising, therefore, that it gets so little scru-
tiny. There is little in the way of “defense” anywhere to be found. CCoN is 
simply assumed to be part of the worldview handed down by science, or at 
least it was prior to the discovery of quantum mechanics. “As we know, in 
classical physics, nature is a closed causal system described by deterministic 
equations” (Russell 2008, 157).
The same lack of defense could describe CCoP thirty years ago, as 
 Papineau discovered (2002, 45). Given its importance, he believed that 
closure could not be left as a bit of reductionist lore, and he has become 
its foremost defender. Since many of his arguments are also applicable to 
CCoN, we will consider the most important ones and draw out their impli-
cations for CCoN where appropriate.22
6.5.1 Evidence 1: physiology
Papineau’s main argument in favor of CCoP is that all the empirical evi-
dence is consistent with known physical forces. Physiology is a mature sci-
ence, which after decades of successful research shows that there is no need 
to posit any sort of force or causation beyond the physical (2002, 255–56). 
Scientists who study the brain and the body have found no sign of minds or 
irreducible mental properties.
Papineau concludes that the case for CCoP is simply a matter of evidence, 
but this is misleading. It is instead an appeal to parsimony. Physiology has 
failed to find evidence of any nonphysical causes. If there were any, he says, 
there would at least be anomalies that could not be explained in terms of 
physical causes alone. Ockham’s razor dictates that nonphysical causes be 
rejected or, at the very least, that they be recognized as inert vis-à-vis physi-
cal processes.
Noninterventionists like this argument and believe that it holds across 
the sciences, thus extending CCoP to CCoN. Nonviolationists do not. They 
believe in special divine action but typically in a way that remains hidden 
from scientific discovery. Hence, an absence of scientific evidence ought not 
be interpreted as evidence of the absence of divine action.
Here, I think, nonviolationism has it right. When it comes to CCoP, the 
truth is that dualism and all the other nonphysicalist programs were never 
refuted as much as they were ignored (Bishop 2010, 209). The physiological 
research that Papineau touts is all about the nonmental, either uncovering 
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detailed mechanisms or understanding how one subsystem is integrated into 
a whole. Any question about the mind is carefully bracketed to the side, 
virtually guaranteeing that mental causes will not be detected (Lowe 2010, 
74–75). That’s fine in terms of scientific methodology, but let’s not pretend 
that exhaustive knowledge of the interplay of nerves, muscles, and joints 
will ever be able to explain why my arm is moving. That event involves 
the mental: I want my coffee and intend to grasp the mug. Perhaps medical 
research should remain methodologically agnostic about the mental. But if 
scientists have tacitly agreed to not investigate that question, no amount of 
scientific progress would count as evidence against an irreducible mental 
realm. To claim that the matter has been resolved by the evidence begs the 
question.
What of Ockham’s razor? Let’s grant that physicalism has the leaner 
ontology. And let’s agree that whether in science or philosophy, parsimony 
is a virtue. As the non-Humeans in Chapter 5 would be quick to point out, 
however, it is not the only one. Explanatory power and scope typically pull 
in the opposite direction from simplicity. Reductionist physicalism is parsi-
monious. Does it have the resources to explain what is currently known in 
science, let alone the mental? “Unlikely” is the charitable answer. (“No” is 
the correct one.) In any case, the argument has now turned to matters of 
metaphysics and explanatory virtues and away from the promise that the 
issue had been resolved by the evidence alone.
Is CCoN in any better shape? Again, it seems to beg all the interesting 
questions. Where is the evidence for CCoN? When has it ever been inves-
tigated? Under methodological naturalism,23 researchers can probe every 
detail of nature, but they cannot consider the supernatural when forming 
scientific explanations. But if the question of divine action were disallowed 
from the start, the whole of science, no matter how advanced, would not 
constitute evidence against it.
6.5.2 Evidence 2: conservation laws
Papineau’s second appeal to evidence in favor of CCoP points to conserva-
tion laws, especially our understanding of force since the nineteenth century 
(2002, 245). Unlike Newton’s mechanics, which was compatible with all 
kinds of forces, including possibly mental ones, conservative forces have spe-
cial properties. The events produced by conservative forces must allow key 
physical quantities to remain constant over time. The most familiar of these 
are total energy and momentum, which the four fundamental forces pre-
serve.24 Dissipative forces, like friction, are generally taken to be reducible to 
these four nondissipative ones. Papineau argues that conservation laws pre-
vent nonphysical causes from having an effect on the physical unless those 
causes are able to store and release energy in a deterministic way (2009, 
56–57). The qualifier could be met in principle but seems unlikely. After all, 
what sort of energy storage mechanism could a nonphysical force have?
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Still, Papineau grants that nothing within physics guarantees that all 
forces will be conservative. The claim that there are no real nonconservative 
forces is based on the idea that any putative example can be reduced (2002, 
249–50). This allows dissipation to be used heuristically by engineers and 
applied scientists without granting that it, strictly speaking, exists. In the 
end, this is an expression of faith in the reduction of nonfundamental forces, 
one often shared by those working in particle physics but doubted by spe-
cialists in condensed matter. There is a similar division among philosophers 
of science. Reductionists happily write promissory notes to cover unfulfilled 
reductions (“science will figure it all out in time”). Emergentists doubt this 
will ever be the case. Insofar as this matter involves difficult questions about 
metaphysics and reductionism, it is hard to see how the argument is merely 
a matter of the evidence, as Papineau claims that it is. In short, CCoP is not 
a truth that science has discovered.25
Even so, except for the reductionist language, this argument for CCoP 
does provide support for CCoN. Both noninterventionists and nonviola-
tionists reject models of special divine action that require the breaking of 
a law. They would take seriously any argument based on conservation of 
energy and/or momentum that supports causal closure.
If the appeal to conservation is the best argument in favor of CCoP and, 
by extension, CCoN, as I believe it is, it will have an odd circularity. Non-
violationists say that special divine action will be rejected if it entails the 
breaking of the laws of nature. They then point to classical mechanics, 
which many believe entails determinism and causal closure. In a classical 
world, CCoN would pose a huge constraint on divine action. So far, so 
good. When pressed for arguments in support of CCoN, however, we find 
the best have to do with conservation laws. The argument started with the 
laws of nature, took a detour into closure, and ended up back in law. As far 
as I can tell, we could simply drop CCoN from the conversation. Any con-
straint on nonviolationism boils down to the relevant laws of nature. Talk 
of closure is an unnecessary complication.
Having sorted through the problems presented by determinism and causal 
closure, we have finally tracked down the real culprits, namely, conservative 
forces and conservation laws. If science presents an obstacle to nonviola-
tionist divine action, this will be it. Conservation, however, is a big topic, 
one that my own model of divine action will have to address. A full treat-
ment will be put off until the next chapter.
6.5.3 Classical mechanics one more time
Could one at least say that CCoN would have been a problem had classical 
mechanics continued to reign? It is still correct to say that current physics 
allows for divine action where previous science did not, right?
No. It should be clear from looking back over the counterexamples to 
classical determinism that closure runs into all the same problems. Classical 
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mechanics does not entail CCoN, as Earman’s space invader example shows. 
Classical space-times allow particles to appear from and exit to spatial 
infinity in finite time. As Earman concludes, once again, “[In a] Newtonian 
space-time. . . [the universe] is not automatically ‘closed’ in the operative 
sense to outside influences” (1986, 34). As we saw earlier, one can fix the 
problem by stipulating boundary conditions that forbid such influences. But 
if one needs to gerrymander the boundary conditions to ensure closure, the 
theory alone will not entail it.
This contradicts the familiar story that the discovery of quantum mechan-
ics was needed to free us from CCoN and determinism. In my view, there is 
a kind of mythology that appears in the divine action literature. Determin-
ism and closure will be seen as ancient foes to be overcome if we believe in 
theism instead of mere deism. But good fortune! We have discovered the 
new magics of top-down causation, quantum mechanics, and chaos, which 
can slay the beast and open the gate a bit so that God might act in the world.
But what if the pressing need for a hero in this story is misplaced? As we 
have seen, physics was never the abode of the type of determinism or closure 
that early modern philosophers had in mind. Polkinghorne gets it exactly right:
It is clear that physical closure of the causal nexus of the world has not 
been established, so that claims that science has disproved the possibil-
ity of providential agency can be seen to be false. Belief in divine action 
is no more necessarily negated by an honest science than is belief in free 
human agency.
(Polkinghorne 2006, 67; quoted in Göcke 2015, n. 5)
With those constraints now thrown off, we can turn our attention to a model 
of divine action that does not depend on exotic physics, that would have 
been viable in a fully classical world, and that will be viable if deterministic 
interpretations of quantum mechanics replace collapse-interpretations.
Notes
 1 A third option that will not be discussed is compatibilism, which is usually adver-
tised as a middle ground between (libertarian) freedom and determinism (Kane 
2011, sec. IV). Libertarians prefer to call it “soft determinism,” as it purports to 
establish a type of freedom but ultimately cedes all the important questions to 
the determinist.
 2 One reply is that those future events depend in part on my decisions at the time 
(Kevin Timpe, private conversation). Say that the Templeton Foundation decides 
to support a third book of mine in 2025, which would be a wise and noble 
investment on their part. Even if that event is now ontologically fixed, it only 
comes about (in part) because of my decisions and actions leading up to it. Some 
argue that eternalism is therefore not in conflict with libertarian freedom.
 3 As I mentioned in section 1.3, the exceptions to this rule tend to be philosophers 
such as Alston, Plantinga, and Larmer.
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 4 One famous example is the so-called “hole argument,” which seemed to indi-
cate that general relativity was not deterministic. Most physicists now believe 
that this apparent violation of determinism was due to a naïve understanding 
of gauge invariance, although the “history of physics shows that the primary 
reason for seeing gauge freedom at work is to maintain determinism” (Earman 
2007, 1378).
 5 The Steinhardt/Turok ekpyrotic cyclic model (http://wwwphy.princeton.
edu/~steinh/npr/) posits another universe that collides with our own every tril-
lion years or so. The energy released from the most recent collision is what we 
call the Big Bang, but such events would have happened repeatedly in the past 
according to this proposal. Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology (2006) also 
posits many Big Bangs in the past and the future. The difficulty for Penrose is 
explaining the extreme low-entropy of the past. He does so by treating black 
holes as entropy eaters. It is widely believed that black holes have a fixed lifes-
pan. Once they evaporate – a long, slow process – they take entropy with them, 
essentially recharging the battery of the universe. Neither has generated much 
support, but the search continues for ways to incorporate the Big Bang into a 
more holistic model in which it no longer appears as a singularity.
 6 Although there are many examples of early modern philosophers arguing for one 
or the other. See (van Strien 2014a).
 7 Elsewhere, Spinoza says,
If a stone has fallen from a room onto someone’s head and killed him, they 
will show, in the following way, that the stone fell in order to kill the man. 
For if it did not fall to that end, God willing it, how could so many circum-
stances have concurred by chance (for often many circumstances do concur 
at once)? Perhaps you will answer that it happened because the wind was 
blowing hard and the man was walking that way. But they will persist: why 
was the wind blowing hard at that time? why was the man walking that way 
at that time? If you answer again that the wind arose then because on the 
preceding day, while the weather was still calm, the sea began to toss, and 
that the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on – for there is no 
end to the questions which can be asked: but why was the sea tossing? why 
was the man invited at just that time? And so they will not stop asking for the 
causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, i.e., the sanctuary 
of ignorance.
(Ethics, I, Appendix)
 8 The Law of Continuity is arguably derived from the Principle of Sufficient Rea-
son, although Leibniz himself never explicitly made that connection (van Strien 
2014a, 29).
 9 Both Pierre Duhem ([1906] 1954, 139) and Max Born (1969, 78–82) recognized 
this well before the term “chaos theory” was coined.
 10 Cf. (Butterfield 2005). This definition can be amended in cases where gauge 
freedom complicates the notion of state (Müller and Placek 2018).
 11 In dissipative systems, multiple states might all end on the same attractor and so 
are unique only up until then. Once on the attractor, the state trajectories will 
coincide.
 12 See (Svozil 2018, sec. 17.4) for more examples of classical indeterminism once 
Lipschitz continuity has been relaxed.
 13 Not everyone agrees with this characterization. A less provocative description 
is that, since the surface is infinitely slippery, the particle must move unless it 
is subject to an infinite gravitational force. But when it will move and in which 
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direction are not determined by the equations of motion. Hence uniqueness fails 
(and determinism along with it).
 14 Robin Collins has objected (private correspondence) that this is an overly lean 
view of classical mechanical laws and that other principles must be brought 
into play to bridge the gap from mere mathematics to physics. Here, I adopt 
John Earman’s position that “the field equations or laws of motion of the most 
fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the 
form of the basic laws of nature” (2004, 21). And while we might agree that still 
more “physical principles” are needed to get from the equations to mechanics, it 
is precisely the status and the justification of such principles that is in question in 
this chapter.
 15 The Clay Mathematics Institute offers a $1 million prize for proving the exist-
ence of solutions to the Navier-Stokes equations in three dimensions (Earman 
2007, 1384). These are the equations governing classical fluid flow.
 16 The idea that determinism might break down in this manner is not new. The 
nineteenth-century French physicist Joseph Boussinesq suggested that mechani-
cal systems involving singular solutions to differential equations might be the 
physical basis for free will (van Strien 2014b, 175–76). James Clerk Maxwell 
made similar explorations in this area (1879, 757).
 17 For more ways that determinism can fail within classical physics, as well as the 
constraints added to preserve it, see (Earman 2007, sec. 3).
 18 Parabolic partial differential equations in a Newtonian world, like the Fourier 
heat equation, present similar problems (Earman 1986, 42). There are also 
worlds with progressively smaller particles in something like a Newton’s pendu-
lum toy, with smaller and smaller bodies, where the last particle in the limit does 
not move at all (2004, 22–23). Like the space invader example, the equations 
are time-reversal invariant (i.e., they apply just as well if the whole process went 
in the opposite direction). Hence, if this is physically possible in a Newtonian 
system, so too is a string of particles at rest spontaneously beginning to collide.
 19 There is a parallel set of issues in the philosophy of science literature on the use 
of causality in physics (Smith 2013). While some believe the idea that causes 
precede their effects is loosely based on an inductive generalization, others take 
it to be a constraint on good science.
 20 For more discussion see (van Strien 2014a, 26–27).
 21 “The biological, meteorological, and mental causes won’t be eclipsed by the 
physical causes, simply because they will be one and the same as the physical 
causes – they will be ‘non-physical’ only in the sense that they are normally 
referred to using specialist (biological, meteorological, mental) terminology, and 
not because they are ontologically different” (Papineau 2009, 55).
 22 See (Lim 2015) for a complete exposition and analysis of how these arguments 
in philosophy of mind mirror those in philosophy of religion.
 23 The standard distinction to be made here is between ontological and methodo-
logical naturalism. The former is a metaphysical doctrine: All that exists is natu-
ral stuff; there is nothing supernatural. The latter says that although ontological 
naturalism might be false, scientific explanations must be restricted to natural 
events and entities. For arguments for and against methodological naturalism, 
see (Koperski 2015, chap. 5).
 24 Two of the four are well-known: gravity and electromagnetism. The remain-
ing two, the strong and the weak nuclear forces, are important for subatomic 
physics.
 25 Papineau-critic E. J. Lowe argues that reductive physicalists no longer appeal to 
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7  Neoclassical special divine 
action
One danger of tying any philosophical program too closely to science is 
that science changes. Fundamental physics has stagnated in this genera-
tion. Resolving that stagnation might require theories not yet imagined. The 
model of special divine action presented in this chapter is less vulnerable to 
such changes. It does not depend on quantum mechanics or relativity and 
would be just as viable if classical physics were true, hence “neoclassical.”
There is, however, one more controversy regarding the laws of nature that 
must be discussed. The issue is somewhat orthogonal to the issues discussed 
in Chapter 5. There, the question had to do with the metaphysics and the 
origin of the laws. Here, the goal is to demarcate laws in physics from a 
cloud of related ideas that are often called laws. What we will find is that the 
word “law” gets tossed around too freely. Although this imprecision is not 
normally a problem, if we are concerned about what constitutes the break-
ing of a law of nature, more care will be required.
The next section might seem like a detour, but distinctions made here 
allow the neoclassical model to be presented in a straightforward manner. 
The chapter concludes with an important objection based on conservation 
laws.
7.1 Ceteris paribus laws?
Let’s begin with the difference between laws and law-statements. Newton’s 





.1 But since it can 
be written down, that equation must technically be a law-statement. From 
the nomological realist’s perspective, if a law-statement is (approximately) 
true, the law of nature that it describes – a part of the metaphysical land-
scape – makes it true. Law-statements are the best models we have for under-
standing the laws. The distinctions to be made in this section come from a 
close examination of how law-statements work in physics. That said, it is 
cumbersome to keep referring to law-statements instead of simply Boyle’s 
law or Ohm’s law. In this section, then, I will ignore the law/law-statement 
distinction for ease of exposition. The reader should remember, however, 
that any law that can be written down is actually a law-statement.
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On to the controversy, in which philosopher Nancy Cartwright is a key 
voice. Her argument is based on the claim that the laws do not work as 
advertised. Consider universal gravitation. Is it true? Not of any charged 
bodies, she argues, since they are also subject to Coulomb’s law. Given this 
additional influence, no charged body ever acts precisely as described by 
universal gravitation. In fact, no particle has ever acted in accordance with 
Newton’s law of gravity, which considers only the force on two masses. 
Since gravity has an unlimited range, every object in the universe is attracted 
by every other particle that has mass.2
Cartwright’s diagnosis is that universal gravitation, like all laws, contains 
an implicit ceteris paribus condition (tr: “other things being equal”). Col-
loquially, this clause means that laws hold only as long as nothing unusual 
happens. One can expect a tennis ball, when it is released, to fall toward the 
floor, unless my golden retriever is nearby. In that case, all bets are off. This, 
then, is what universal gravitation says:
If there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work, then two 
bodies exert a force between each other which varies inversely as the 
square of the distance between them, and varies directly as the product 
of their masses.
(Cartwright 1983, 58)
Except in a theoretical universe in which there are only two particles, the 
antecedent is never met, what Peter Lipton calls the “problem of instantia-
tion” (1999, 157). An analogous situation holds for Kepler’s laws of plan-
etary orbits. No planet obeys Kepler’s laws, which do not account for the 
perturbations of other planets in the solar system. The lesson some infer is 
that laws, strictly speaking, apply only to idealizations, including that of 
being a perfectly isolated system (Hüttemann 1998, 129; Lipton 1999, 155). 
“[There] are no exceptionless quantitative laws in physics. . . . [The] funda-
mental laws of physics do not represent the facts” (Cartwright 1983, 46, 58).
In Cartwright’s view, this significantly weakens the case for nomological 
realism. Laws do not work the way we assume. Her alternative is to reject 
laws in favor of capacities:
[The] logic that uses what happens in ideal circumstances to explain 
what happens in real ones is the logic of tendencies or capacities. What 
is an ideal situation for studying a particular factor? It is a situation 
in which all other ‘disturbing’ factors are missing. And what is special 
about that? When all other disturbances are absent, the factor manifests 
its power explicitly in its behaviour. When nothing else is going on, you 
can see what tendencies a factor has by looking at what it does. This 
tells you something about what will happen in very different, mixed cir-
cumstances – but only if you assume that the factor has a fixed capacity 
that it carries with it from situation to situation.
(1989, 190–91)
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So ceteris paribus, opposite charges attract, says Cartwright, but not 
because it is a law. Regularities in nature are due to capacities that can 
be made perspicuous in isolated circumstances, like lab experiments. 
The more common situation is for different capacities to be in play at 
once, producing the often complex behaviors we observe in the real 
world.
The claim that laws contain implicit ceteris paribus (CP) exceptions is 
now common. Among philosophers of science, it is also quite controver-
sial. Cartwright et al. rightly note that there is some sort of contingency 
associated with the laws of nature. The question is whether this contin-
gency is best understood as CP conditions built into the laws themselves. 
It is not.
Let’s start once again with the idea that the most reliable law-statements 
in physics are the best models we have for the laws. Now recall the super-
intelligence known as a Laplacian demon (section 6.2). One might think 
that a being with absolute knowledge of the laws of nature in a closed 
deterministic universe should be able to accurately predict the future. But 
that leaves out a crucial piece of information. For such a prediction to 
be possible, even in principle, the intelligence would need to know the 
absolute state of the universe at a point in time. In terms of the differential 
equations that the Laplacian demon would be solving, this information 
constitutes the initial and boundary conditions of the system. The first 
thing to note, then, is that these are not part of the laws. Even in a classi-
cal world, the laws of nature do not in themselves determine events. The 
future state of a system depends on contingent, nonlawlike information. 
That much is familiar.
As philosopher Sheldon Smith argues, this not an adequate place to stop. 
The distinction between laws, initial conditions, and boundary conditions 
is correct, but
this taxonomy misses many features of modeling which are vital to the 
understanding of the role laws play in constructing concrete descrip-
tions of motion. What is generally missed is the distinction between a 
differential equation, the solution of which describes the concrete tem-
poral behavior of a system, and the laws (e.g. Newton’s second law or 
Universal Gravitation) used to derive the differential equation.
(2002, 243)
Let’s unpack this. How do we get from laws to a model of some concrete, 
physical arrangement, from, say, universal gravitation to a textbook exer-
cise about planetary motion?
The steps were codified by Leonhard Euler in the eighteenth century 
 (Wilson 2016, Section 2).
A) Determine what sort of system one is trying to model: particles, rigid 
bodies, elastic bodies, etc.
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Point particles are (typically) the easiest to model in terms of the mathemat-
ics. I limit the remaining steps to particle-based systems, although they have 
been extended to others.
B) Determine the relevant forces acting on these bodies: gravitational 
attraction, electrical repulsion/attraction, etc.
C) For each particle, determine how each force acts on that particle along 
some set of Cartesian coordinates.
This is the decomposition of forces one learns in freshman physics. Deter-
mine the degree to which gravity pulls on particle α along the x-axis, y-axis, 
and z-axis. Do the same for particle β, and so on down the line. Repeat this 
for each particle and every other force acting on the system, if there are any. 
The choice of axes is arbitrary, so at least one will be chosen to make the 
decomposition easiest (e.g., let the force of gravity act directly along the 
y-axis).
D) For each particle, sum up the forces along each axis: ∑Fαx, ∑Fαy, ∑Fαz, 
∑Fβx, ∑Fβy, . . .
E) For each particle, set the sum of forces along the x-axis equal to its mass 
times the acceleration in the x direction. Do the same for each axis and 
repeat for each particle.






since acceleration is the second derivative of position. There will be three 
force equations for each particle, one for each axis, providing a set of dif-
ferential equations to solve.
So, then, what is the law of universal gravitation, and what role does it 
play? Is it what Cartwright claims?
If there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work, then two 
bodies exert a force between each other which varies inversely as the 
square of the distance between them, and varies directly as the product 
of their masses.
(1983, 58)
No! The point of summing the forces along each axis is to allow for the 
possibility that more than one force is at work. In classical mechanics, there 
could in principle be many types of forces in play on the particles over 
and above gravity and electromagnetism, each one subject to the Euler pro-
cedure. Vector decomposition is designed to account for any number of 
forces on each particle. There is no implicit ceteris paribus condition about 
the absence of forces other than gravity. Universal gravitation provides one 
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force vector for each particle in step (B). Other forces are incorporated in 
precisely the same way. There is nothing wrong, false, or CP-provisional 
about the force laws in (B).
The only place where something remotely like a ceteris paribus condition 
is involved is the choice of idealizations. That is, one must decide which 
forces are insignificant and what sort of system is to be modeled. Idealiza-
tions in step (A) might include taking a block to be a rigid body. Those in 
step (B) might include allowing that block to move on a frictionless plane. 
We may also choose to ignore the force contributions of all masses except 
Earth in a case where all other forces are negligible. Even in that case, uni-
versal gravitation is still not treated as false. The law is instead used to 
decide when the influence of other bodies can be safely ignored (Earman, 
Roberts, and Smith 2002, 285). In other words, we believe the law is cor-
rect. The only decision to be made is which bodies will contribute a meas-
urable influence. One could always consider the gravitational pull of the 
moon, adding it to the decomposition of forces. Doing so will, however, (i) 
greatly complicate the mathematics and (ii) not register within the number 
of decimal places likely to be calculated. In any case, this pragmatic choice 
has nothing to do with whether the law of gravity is true.
Where are the laws in the Euler recipe? Two places. First, there are the 
force laws: universal gravitation, Coulomb’s law, etc. If we move beyond 
point particles, friction and contact forces will be added to the list. Sec-
ond, there are the laws of motion, here Newton’s second law. What are not 
laws are the differential equations produced at the end of the procedure, 
which will be integrated for a solution. These equations cannot be gener-
ated without laws, but they are not themselves laws. Nor are the “nonnomic 
elements” needed to solve these equations: the initial conditions, boundary 
conditions, and idealizations (Smith 2002, 247).
Force laws, which get much of Cartwright’s attention, are upstream in 
(B). To make a case for CP-laws, this is where the focus must be, not on 
the differential equations tracking the evolution of some individual system. 
Cartwright tries to show that universal gravitation is flawed given that no 
bodies behave in the way that the law dictates. The problem with this analy-
sis is that universal gravitation by itself says nothing about the behavior of 
bodies. Universal gravitation is a force law. Force laws are essential in the 
Euler procedure, but it is the differential equation produced at the end that 
describes the behavior of a system. The force laws imply nothing about state 
changes over time. It is this conflation of laws with the differential equations 
that rely on them that leads to the misdiagnosis of CP-laws.
Let’s draw some conclusions from this. First, not everything commonly 
called a law is one. (More precisely, some statements given the honorific 
“law” do not refer to a law of nature.) Consider Kepler’s laws. Their cor-
rected form can be derived by the Euler procedure from the equations for 
central-force motion. Kepler’s laws are not laws, however. They depend on 
a set of conditions and idealizations. Given other initial conditions, the same 
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laws (central-force and Newton’s second) will yield hyperbolic solutions – 
e.g., some comets make a one-time pass around the sun, rather than an 
ellipse, such as the planets do. If one is going to make a case for CP-laws, the 
examples need to be legitimate law-statements, not merely generalizations 
that are loosely called “laws.”
Second, the Euler process requires both laws and nonnomic conditions 
to derive differential equations. In addition there will be idealizations—
also non-nomic—regarding which particles to account for. A physicist or a 
Laplacian demon armed with complete knowledge of the laws would not 
be able to make any predictions, since the laws alone, again, entail noth-
ing about the behavior of any concrete system. Predictions are based on 
solutions to the differential equations produced at the end of the Euler pro-
cedure. For Kepler’s laws and the other examples of supposed CP-laws in 
physics, the examples are either mischaracterizations of what the law says, 
like Cartwright’s (this section, 127), or differential equations for some sys-
tem or other, which are not laws.
Smith’s conclusion is that if there are any CP-laws, they haven’t yet been 
discovered in physics (2002, 258). Moreover, any support that ceteris pari-
bus language is thought to bestow upon capacities and causal powers is 
likewise undermined.
The model of divine action we have been working toward might now 
seem anticlimactic. So much ground has been cleared that the implications 
may be obvious. In any case, there isn’t much work left to be done.
7.2 The neoclassical model
The goal has been to find a model of nonviolationist special divine action 
that allows for a significant degree of freedom on God’s part but is not 
dependent on the sometimes fickle interpretations of modern physics. Tak-
ing it from the top, then, it starts with decretalism, a type of nomological 
realism. The regularities observed in nature are best explained by laws, but 
those laws have no independent existence. They are not powers “out there” 
in nature; rather, they are ultimately the decrees of God. Moreover, these 
decrees are matters of constraint. The laws – not law-statements – of elec-
tromagnetism for particles and fields, for example, dictate that the relevant 
forces apply only to specific types of entities with fixed degrees of strength, 
range, etc. The laws don’t “make things go,” as it were. Electromagnetic 
force does that, at least in this example. The law constrains the ways in 
which this force behaves.
Of all the distinctions made thus far, the one between law and nonnomic 
information is the most important vis-à-vis nonviolationism. Nothing in the 
Euler procedure prevents the introduction of new influences on a system. 
Consider two balls colliding on a pool table. If we assume a perfectly elastic 
collision – an idealization – this will be a simple system to model. But what 
if we tilt the table just prior to the collision? That will produce changes in 
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the decomposition of forces, the force of friction, and a couple of other 
factors, bringing about a new differential equation at the end. But the laws 
will not change. Universal gravitation remains what it is. The same for the 
laws of mechanics. (More precisely, the law-statements that appear in steps 
(B) and (E) are unchanged because the laws of nature to which they refer 
are unchanged.) All the nonnomic components in the Euler procedure are 
subject to change, but not the laws. We make such changes routinely, like 
the tilting of the table. If you want a slogan, it is this: The laws never break; 
they flow. The laws adapt to change. This was true when we thought that 
nature was Newtonian, and it remains true in the age of quantum mechanics 
and relativity.
In support of this last claim, consider two distinctively quantum phenom-
ena: The first are vacuum fluctuations. Even in a universe devoid of matter, 
quantum fields would still exist and be subject to fluctuations that sometimes 
produce particles. This is related to the spontaneous emission of radiation: 
Particles appear in places where they had not previously been (Svozil 2018, 
sec. 14). Second, there is the phenomena of quantum tunneling. Consider an 
electron trapped in a negatively charged field. The electron cannot move if 
it is repulsed on all sides. Classically, this system would remain precisely as 
it is unless the field degrades. Given Schrödinger’s equation, which takes the 
place of Newton’s second law in the Euler procedure, there is a slight chance 
that the electron will “tunnel” through the barrier and appear elsewhere. In 
both examples, the appearance of particles from “nowhere” does not break 
any laws of nature. The gravitational and the electromagnetic fields adapt to 
these new particles, and they would do so even if much larger bodies were 
involved.
Changes to nonnomic conditions do not violate the laws of nature. 
Nature allows for change that the laws can seamlessly adapt to. We make 
such changes with every conscious act. If so, I see no reason based on phys-
ics to say that a divine person cannot likewise bring about change without 
breaking the laws – with one objection looming (section 7.3). Once the laws 
of nature are distinguished from behavior that is the result of those laws and 
nonnomic conditions, we find a vast space of contingency in which God can 
act. This is the neoclassical model of special divine action.
But how is it “neoclassical?” Isn’t this contingency somehow dependent 
on the ontological openness introduced by quantum mechanics? If nature 
were classical and deterministic, surely any divine action would violate the 
laws.
The point of the previous chapter was that this intuition is based on a 
faulty understanding of determinism and causal closure. Deterministic sys-
tems are not the obstacle to divine action that they are often portrayed to be. 
The outdated view that I argued against, as Earman says, is
contrary to the modern conception of determinism according to which 
laws allow for contingency in “initial conditions” and necessitate only 
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conditionals of the form “If the initial conditions are such-and-such, 
then the state at a later time will be so-and-so.”
(2000, 9)
This “modern conception of determinism” fits into the same framework as 
that of the Euler procedure. The laws are needed to derive differential equa-
tions that model the behavior of particular systems. But those models are not 
themselves laws, nor are the nonnomic conditions Earman is referring to.
Having established that nonviolationist divine influence is possible even in 
a classical world, what does that influence look like? What does God do? The 
answer depends on matters of ontology. To say what influence God brings 
about depends on what exists to be influenced. Particles? That seems unlikely 
now that quantum fields have taken center stage in physics. Particle physicists 
take particles to be manifestations of excited fields. That view should survive 
whatever the outcome of research on string theory and its rivals. If fields lie 
at the foundation of all physical existence, divine action on this model will be 
directed at changing the states of those fields, which will then adapt to those 
changes as discussed. Note, however, that this answer approaches ontology 
from a reductionist point of view, as if the only “real” entities were whatever 
existed at the most fundamental level. Emergentists will complain – rightly, 
in my view – that what the other sciences study is as real as quantum fields. 
Not all phenomena can be reduced to fundamental physics, and our ontology 
should be expanded in order to accommodate this.
If the reductionist is correct, neoclassical divine action will be brought 
about when God influences the fields that underlie the rest of physical real-
ity. If the emergentist is correct, God will also interact with higher-level 
phenomena in ways appropriate to them. For example, a relatively rigid 
macroscopic body could experience a contact force without touching 
another body. The range of divine influence depends on what exists and 
how emergent systems undergo change.
Noninterventionists will not be interested in this model, since it allows 
for divine action over and above God creating and sustaining of the uni-
verse. Fair enough. For my part, I think that while noninterventionism is 
not technically a type of deism, it is too near a neighbor to be of interest. 
Nonviolationists allow for a greater range of divine action as long as it does 
not break the laws of nature. That’s fine, but worries about violations must 
be founded on what the laws of nature actually are, not on conventional 
wisdom. This is why so much of the work done here and in previous chap-
ters involves the laws of nature. Airy generalizations about the laws invite 
pseudoproblems that dissolve under scrutiny.
But perhaps we have not yet considered all the relevant laws.
7.3 Objection: conservation laws
The account thus far has focused on force laws and laws of motion. There 
is an objection, typically aimed at interventionism, that seems to apply here 
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as well. If God were to change any of these nonnomic conditions, that influ-
ence would thereby violate the conservation of energy and conservation of 
momentum:
[The] laws of nature [do] not easily allow for divine intervention – at 
least not direct divine intervention – because that will involve an imma-
terial agent acting on or within a material context as a cause. . . . This is 
not possible; if it were, either energy and information would be added 
to a system spontaneously and mysteriously, contravening the conserva-
tion of energy . . . or God would somehow be acting deterministically 
within quantum indeterminacy.
(Stoeger 1995, 244)
The literature on special divine action condemns violations of conservation 
laws as a fatal flaw given their status as “indispensable to science” (Kauf-
man 1968, 185n10).
[Conservation of energy and momentum] are understood to hold with-
out exception; they are not defeasible. . . . The notion that local energy 
and momentum are not conserved is a radical notion: there is no evi-
dence for it in physical science, and massive evidence to the contrary.
(Fales 2013, 299–300)
If the neoclassical model entails the violation of conservation laws, many 
will reject it out of hand.
There are three replies to this charge, which get stronger as we go.
7.3.1 Closed systems
As many have noted, conservation laws are not absolute. There are condi-
tions under which they hold and others in which they do not. Any under-
graduate text will point out that conservation of energy and momentum 
apply only to closed or isolated systems. If the system is influenced by out-
side forces or if particles enter or leave, conservation will fail.
As Plantinga argues, if God were to act on such a system, it would not 
be closed and so conservation would not apply (2011, 78).3 Conservation 
laws are conditional. If God were to act on a system, the relevant conditions 
would fail to be met and so those laws would not apply.
While there is something right about this response to the conservation 
law objection, it is the weakest of the three. One reason is given by Hans 
Halvorson:
[While] I agree with Plantinga’s hedging of the Newtonian laws, I don’t 
like the idea that these laws are hedged because the universe is an “open 
system” in the sense that local physical systems can be “open.” Typically 
by “open system” we mean a subsystem of a larger physical system. But 
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since God is not physical, the universe is not a subsystem of some larger 
physical system.
(2013, 25)
The physicist’s idea of an open system tacitly includes its placement within 
a larger physical system. This would not be the case for God’s influence, 
and so there is something wrong with calling a system open when divine 
action is at work. Supernatural causes cannot change a closed system into 
an open one.
The second reason for preferring a different reply is that the closed/open 
distinction is not relevant in the more technical definitions of conservation. 
The closed system condition is used in undergraduate texts for pedagogi-
cal reasons, but specialists prefer the more rigorous approach discussed in 
section 7.3.3.
7.3.2 General relativity
The second reply will surprise many readers: Conservation of energy does 
not apply in general relativity with an expanding universe. There are several 
ways to approach this, but the simplest is that the total energy of the uni-
verse is continually increasing, and so it is not conserved (Misner, Thorne, 
and Wheeler 1973, 467; Wald 1984, 69–70; Jaffe and Taylor 2018, 414). 
Although there are ways of defining gravitational energy to mitigate the 
problem, most experts, like cosmologist Sean Carroll, think this is a fool’s 
errand:
It’s clear that cosmologists have not done a very good job of spreading 
the word about something that’s been well-understood since at least 
the 1920’s: energy is not conserved in general relativity. . . . The point 
is pretty simple: back when you thought energy was conserved, there 
was a reason why you thought that, namely time-translation invari-
ance. A fancy way of saying “the background on which particles and 
forces evolve, as well as the dynamical rules governing their motions, 
are fixed, not changing with time.” But in general relativity that’s simply 
no longer true. Einstein tells us that space and time are dynamical, and 
in particular that they can evolve with time. When the space through 
which particles move is changing, the total energy of those particles is 
not conserved.
(2010)
This is the majority view regarding conservation of energy in general relativ-
ity.4 It agrees with the approach in the previous subsection in that conserva-
tion is not absolute. There are conditions for it to hold, and those conditions 
can fail. And when it fails, physics does not come crashing down.
If God is – putting it crudely – acting from outside the universe, the uni-
verse will constitute the system that God is influencing even if the effects are 
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local. But that influence will not constitute a violation of conservation of 
energy, since conservation does not hold in our expanding universe.
While this reply is stronger than the one based on closed systems, there 
are some minority voices that raise concerns (Pitts forthcoming). It may be 
that general relativity offers still more technical reasons for being averse to 
divine action. Let’s turn, then, to the best of the three responses to the con-
servation problem.
7.3.3 Noether’s theorem
The three replies share the same basic logic: (i) Conservation is not a meta-
physical given that all systems must adhere to, (ii) there are conditions for 
it to apply, and (iii) when those conditions are not met, conservation is no 
longer an issue. The roots of the third solution can be found in the second, 
but they can be put in a way that is independent of cosmology.
First, we need to consider some of the basics of Lagrangian mechanics. 
While the term might be unfamiliar, it is by no means exotic from a physi-
cist’s point of view. Lagrangian mechanics is largely equivalent to Newto-
nian mechanics, but it allows for solutions to equations that are otherwise 
intractable. One difference is that energy plays a central role. As Pitts argues 
(2019, sec. 2), if conservation of energy is going to hold, this will be the 
realm where it is evident. Moving to quantum mechanics will only raise 
new problems.
A Lagrangian L is a mathematical description of the energy of a system, 
both kinetic and potential. Take a simple example, such as a weight on 
the end of a spring moving back and forth along a surface (Marion and 
Thornton 1988, 193). Let’s simplify further by stipulating that it is an ideal, 
frictionless spring oscillating in one dimension without gravity. The kinetic 
energy of the spring is the familiar 
1
2
2mv , where v = ẋ, the time derivative of
position. The potential energy is 
1
2
2kx , where k is a constant that depends 
on the nature of the spring. The Lagrangian is the kinetic minus the  potential 





2 2 . Instead of Newton’s second law, Lagrangian 
mechanics uses the Euler-Lagrange equation. Having found L, one can 
plug it into the Euler-Lagrange equation in order to derive the model for a 
specific system, such as that of the moving spring. This is the Lagrangian 
analog to step (E) in the Euler procedure. Of course, it all gets far more 
complicated. The Lagrangians will become harder to find if we allow for 
motion in three dimensions, include gravity, have a system with many par-
ticles, or move to fields that are spread out over space. Moreover, getting 
from the Euler-Lagrange to the solutions of a given differential equation 
is difficult and sometimes impossible outside textbook examples. The best 
that physicists can often do is to simulate the behavior of the model on 
computers.
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The relevance of all this to the question of conservation is due to a famous 
discovery known as Noether’s (first) theorem. In 1915, Emmy Noether 
proved that conservation of various types could be inferred from mathe-
matical symmetries. A symmetry or an invariance means that something 
remains the same while other things change. Look at a sphere that is all one 
color. If you move to the other side of the sphere or even peer at it from 
above, it looks the same. Not so for, say, a pyramid. The view from the side 
is different from the view from above. A sphere exhibits a type of spatial 
symmetry that a pyramid does not. How the sphere looks is invariant with 
respect to the angle at which you approach it.





2 2 , the 
kinetic energy minus the potential energy stored in the spring. Notice that 
L depends only on the position x and velocity ẋ of the spring. Although the 
state of the system is constantly changing, L remains the same. It is invari-
ant with respect to time. Mathematically, if a function does not explicitly 
depend on time, when you take its derivative with respect to time, the result 







According to Noether’s theorem, we have just shown that conservation of 
energy applies to the ideal spring. The Lagrangian of this system is invariant 
with respect to time, a type of symmetry. Noether proved that if this sym-
metry pertains, conservation of energy will hold for that system.5 (Another 
type of symmetry is related to conservation of momentum, but let’s ignore 
that for now.) What is less well-known is that she also proved the converse 
albeit with a few more restrictions (José and Saletan 2006, 251): Roughly, 
if conservation holds, there will be symmetry. The conditional goes both 
ways. Taken together, Noether showed that if there is no time-translation 
invariance – if, in other words, that symmetry fails to pertain, then energy 
will not be conserved.
Back to the ideal spring. Let’s now say that the mass is magnetic and we 
set the spring next to an electromagnet. Let the output of the electromag-
net vary according to a simple sine wave, stronger and weaker over time. 
This means that L no longer applies. A new L* will require another term 
representing the influence of the electromagnet and that influence is going 
to change over time. That new term will include sin t, which takes on dif-







0, and this is sufficient to show that, in this new system, conservation 
of energy fails. If there is no symmetry with respect to time, there will be no 
conservation of energy.
Once again, things will get more complicated in systems composed of 
many bodies or fields, but the basic relation between a Lagrangian time-
translation invariance and conservation of energy is the same. If a Lagran-
gian explicitly involves time, the system’s energy will change over time, 
translation symmetry will fail, and there will be no conservation of energy. 
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If a Lagrangian is independent of time, translation symmetry will hold, and 
the system will conserve energy.6
The bottom line is that it is not unusual in physics or engineering for 
energy not to be conserved. Conservation does not hold for mechanical sys-
tems with friction, aeronautical systems with drag, or any system subject to 
a time-varying influence. The most familiar parts of chaos theory pertain to 
nonconservative systems.7 (Whether conservation can be restored in these 
examples is discussed in the following pages.) As Pitts points out (2019, 
4.5), the physics of fields and continua employs mathematics (continuity 
equations) that quantify the degree to which conservation fails. It is not an 
all-or-nothing proposition, and the failure of conservation does not signal a 
catastrophe for physics.
The application of this to divine action is straightforward. Let’s say that 
God primarily acts on fields – the “reductionist option” discussed in sec-
tion 7.2. When God excites a local field, that system is being subjected to a 
time-varying influence. By Noether’s theorem and its converse, the lack of 
time-invariance means that conservation of energy does not apply to that 
system during God’s activity.8 Conservation is not violated.
Although Noether’s theorem was proved over a century ago, some will 
still be reticent to accept the arguments in this section. One reason is the 
belief that the examples can always in principle be changed so that con-
servation of energy is restored. In the case of the spring, one could rewrite 
the equations to include the electromagnet and the source of its electricity 
in one grand Lagrangian where time invariance would once again hold. 
In examples with friction or drag, the lost energy can be recaptured in the 
form of heat. Many believe that it is always possible to expand the system in 
question in such a way that conservation is restored. Fales makes this point:
Take a gas in a closed, isolated container. The total energy and momen-
tum of the gas molecules will remain unchanged over time. But if we 
heat the container over a flame, the energy content of the gas will 
increase; the system is no longer closed. However, we can restore the 
energy balance by extending the boundaries of our system to include 
the flame (the source of heat): the total energy for the gas plus the heat 
source will, once again, be conserved.
(2013, 300)
This, then, presents a problem for divine action.
Matters are different when God supplies energy (or momentum) to an 
otherwise closed physical system. If we now extend the “boundaries” 
of the system to include God, energy/momentum will not be conserved. 
For God has no mass/energy, and it makes no sense to speak of His hav-
ing lost or gained energy in a transaction with nature. According to the 
theist, God creates energy ex nihilo.
(Fales 2013, 300)
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Hence, the appeal to Noether’s theorem fails.
The question then becomes whether one can always redraw the bounda-
ries of a system in this manner so as to restore conservation. Is that the case?
Not in cosmology, it is not. There is no way to redraw the boundaries so 
that the universe is part of some larger system.9 If there were, the problem 
in section 7.3.2 would be solved. Nor would this idea restore conservation 
to the popular Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of quantum 
mechanics in which it fails (Gao 2017, 145). The belief that conservation 
can always be restored is reductionist. It assumes that measurable dissipa-
tive forces (like friction) can be completely reduced to conservative ones. 
Yet there is no theorem, theory, or observation that supports this. Although 
physicists are not always sensitive to philosophical distinctions, one popular 
textbook gets this exactly right:
It must be reiterated that we have not proved the conservation laws 
of linear momentum, angular momentum, and energy. We have only 
derived various consequences of Newton’s laws; that is, if these laws 
are valid in a certain situation, then momentum and energy will be con-
served. But we have become so enamored with these conservation theo-
rems that we have elevated them to the status of laws and we have come 
to insist that they be valid in any physical theory, even those that apply 
to situations in which Newtonian mechanics is not valid, as, for exam-
ple, in the interaction of moving charges or in quantum-mechanical sys-
tems. We do not actually have conservation laws in such situations, but 
rather conservation postulates that we force on the theory.
(Marion and Thornton 1988, 74, emphasis in original)
Note that last sentence again.
What Marion and Thornton describe here fits with an idea that we have 
dealt with before. Beliefs that are fruitfully imposed on scientific theorizing 
and practice are what I refer to as “metatheoretic shaping principles” (sec-
tion 6.4). The uniformity of nature is one. The idea that effects never pre-
cede their causes is another. They are metaphysical theses that have proven 
their worth over time. The postulate that only conservative forces exist and 
that conservation of energy can always be restored in dissipative systems 
is another example. But like all such principles, this one is subject to chal-
lenges, suspensions, and changes (Koperski 2011, 34–39).10 In the steady-
state model of cosmology, Fred Hoyle, Hermann Bondi, and Thomas Gold 
explicitly rejected conservation of energy in order to avoid the Big Bang 
singularity and a finite age of the universe (Lowe 2010, 41). The idea that 
conservation is absolute gives it a status that it does not have in physics, as 
philosopher of physics Jeremy Butterfield sums up:
[The] principle of the conservation of energy is not sacrosanct. The prin-
ciple was formulated only in the mid-nineteenth century; and although 
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no violations have been established hitherto, it has been seriously ques-
tioned on several occasions. It was questioned twice at the inception 
of quantum theory (namely, the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory, and the 
discovery of the neutrino). And, furthermore, it is not obeyed by a cur-
rent relevant proposal . . . for solving quantum theory’s measurement 
problem [i.e., GRW].
(1998, 146–47)
Even the best metatheoretic shaping principles can be traded off for other 
desiderata. The idea that conservation can always be preserved is no 
exception.
The neoclassical model allows for causal influences that are not time-
invariant, but it is a misdiagnosis to say that conservation laws have thereby 
been violated. Noether’s theorem sets conditions for conservation to apply. 
When these conditions fail to be met, there can be no violation of conserva-
tion laws.
7.4 Nearby views
I have at least three predecessors in the conceptual neighborhood: philoso-
phers Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and Robert Larmer.11 The latter two 
point back still further to C. S. Lewis ([1947] 1978, 59).
Alston begins by making a now-familiar point. Determinism and causal 
closure are not metaphysical or scientific absolutes. Yes, scientists often 
assume them both, and this assumption has been fruitful. Nonetheless, “All 
our evidence is equally compatible with the idea that natural causal determi-
nation is sometimes, or always, only approximate” (1994, 48).
Alston treats determinism and closure as metatheoretic shaping princi-
ples – useful presuppositions in science, but not the sort of thing that one 
would expect to prove unconditionally or that stands irrefutable, come what 
may. His conclusion would have fit nicely into Chapter 6: “The upshot of 
all this is that, despite the enormous press given the thesis of determinism, 
I feel that it is not really a serious threat to the traditional way of thinking 
of God’s actions in the world” (1994, 51). This traditional way of thinking 
about divine action, he says,
does involve thinking of God as bringing things about other than they 
would have been had only natural factors been operative. But whether 
that implies a “violation” of natural laws depends on how we think 
of the latter. To suppose that it does is to presuppose that natural laws 
specify unqualifiedly sufficient conditions. . . . But we are never justified 
in accepting laws like this. The most we are ever justified in accepting 
is a law that specifies what will be the outcome of certain conditions in 
the absence of any relevant factors other than those specified in the law.
(1994, 50)
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While Alston does not explicitly mention ceteris paribus exceptions, that 
seems to be what he has in mind.12 A law prescribes a given outcome unless 
something interferes. As I have argued (section 7.1), there is a better way 
to understand the contingency in nature that the laws allow, although that 
view had not yet been defended in print when Alston was writing. Under 
the Euler procedure, neither force laws nor the laws of motion themselves 
specify any outcome.
Plantinga likewise starts his analysis with determinism and causal closure:
What we’ve seen so far is that classical science doesn’t entail either 
determinism or that the universe is in fact causally closed. It is there-
fore entirely consistent with special divine action in the world, including 
miracles. Hands-off theologians [i.e., noninterventionists] can’t prop-
erly point to science – not even to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
classical science – as a reason for their opposition to divine interven-
tion. What actually guides their thought is not classical science as such, 
but classical science plus a gratuitous metaphysical or theological addi-
tion – one that has no scientific credentials and goes contrary to classical 
Christianity.
(2011, 83–84)
The “gratuitous addition” is the imposition of the causal closure of nature 
as absolute. While the point is essentially correct, I reject the idea that deter-
minism and closure are metaphysical/theological additions to science. All 
metatheoretic shaping principles lie in an overlapping conceptual space 
between theoretical science and philosophy. Science cannot do without such 
principles. While they can be misapplied or mistakenly thought to hold 
without exception, they are not gratuitous additions somehow foreign to 
science itself.
Plantinga goes on to take causal closure as a necessary condition for the 
laws to apply:
Indeed, on this conception it isn’t even possible that God break a law of 
nature. For to break a law, he would have to act specially in the world; 
yet any time at which he acted specially in the world would be a time 
at which the universe is not causally closed; hence no law applies to the 
circumstance in question and hence no law gets broken.
(2011, 82–83)
The conditional nature of laws in view here works best for conservation 
laws. God’s action negates closure, which in turn negates time-invariance, 
and so conservation of energy no longer applies. But this is not the way that 
force laws or the laws of motion work in the Euler procedure. Those laws 
always apply, but they adapt to changes made in nonnomic conditions. They 
do not depend on causal closure in the way that Plantinga has in mind here.
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Robert Larmer’s earliest work on divine action and the laws of nature 
predates that of Alston and Plantinga. He makes the clearest distinction 
of the three between laws and the contingent conditions upon which they 
depend:
Scientific explanations must make reference not only to laws of nature 
but also to the material conditions to which the laws apply. . . . It is, 
for example, impossible to predict what will happen on a billiard table 
by making reference solely to Newton’s laws of motion. One must also 
make reference to the number of balls on the table, their initial position, 
the condition of the felt, the angle the cue stick is held at, and so on. This 
means that, although we often speak as though the laws of nature explain 
the occurrence of an event, in and of themselves, this is not the case.
(2014, 38–39)
Couching this in terms of explanation gives it an epistemological slant, but 
the idea that the laws are dependent on conditions that are not fixed in place 
is clear. Larmer then applies this to divine action:
This basic distinction between the laws of nature and the stuff of nature 
suggests that miracles can occur without violating any laws of nature. If 
God creates or annihilates a unit of mass/energy, or simply causes some 
of these units to occupy a different position, then He changes the mate-
rial conditions to which the laws of nature apply. He thereby produces 
an event that nature would not have produced on its own but breaks 
no laws of nature.
(2014, 39)
In a field-based ontology, it would be better to talk in terms of excitation and 
dampening rather than creation/annihilation. Nonetheless, our two views 
can be harmonized except for Larmer’s rejection of decretalism (2017).
While tensions remain between the accounts mentioned here and my own, 
there is a clear family resemblance. My contribution, if successful, will be to 
have placed these ideas on a somewhat more rigorous foundation, especially 
in the application of the Euler procedure and Noether’s theorem. Still, the 
overall account contains a lot of moving parts, starting with decretalism and 
going down to the conservation of energy. I doubt that many will endorse 
the entire package. I do hope, however, that this model is able to move the 
needle a bit in the debate on special divine action.
Let’s now turn to some objections not yet discussed.
Notes
 1 Before a physicist has a chance to complain, this familiar version lacks the vector 
notation needed to form a differential equation.
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 2 That isn’t quite right, given the restrictions on faster-than-light signals in special 
relativity, but the point still works for particles in the observable universe.
 3 See also (Larmer 2014, chap. 2).
 4 Philosopher Robin Collins and physicist Ulrich Mohrhoff explain this further in 
the context of conservation objections to mind-body dualism (Collins 2008, sec. 
IV; Mohrhoff 1997, sec. 3).
 5 More precisely, time-translation invariance entails that something is conserved 
according to Noether’s theorem, but it is not always energy (Smith 2008, 335).
 6 A related set of conclusions applies to quantum mechanics, but the focus there 
will be on a Hamiltonian. If is time-dependent (i.e., lacks time invariance), con-
servation of energy fails (Jaffe and Taylor 2018, 405).
 7 Any dynamical system with an attractor is dissipative (i.e., nonconservative), 
including strange attractors (section 3.2.1). As Ben Nasmith notes (private cor-
respondence), the notion of a conservative force and conservation of energy are 
related, but they are by no means synonymous.
 8 Some theologians will object that this sort of divine action is too “episodic” and 
that the notion of God acting “from outside” the universe fails to honor God’s 
immanence. If so, one could change the account to say that all fields are continu-
ally subject to divine action, but only sometimes does this influence register as a 
measurable excitation.
 9 Topologically disconnected universes within a multiverse, if there were one, 
would not be the sort of redrawing of boundaries in view here.
 10 Consider another shaping principle: the uniformity of nature. This says that the 
laws of nature work the same everywhere in the universe, an undeniably useful 
bit of metaphysics presupposed by science. But there is no proof it is true without 
exception and will remain so. It is certainly not something that can be observed, 
nor does it follow from any scientific theory (hence the problem of induction). 
The more rigorously defined descendants of uniformity, the homogeneity and the 
isotropy of space, are common cosmological idealizations that are known to be 
false, strictly speaking.
 11 Leigh Vicens has argued for a two-pronged approach to special divine action 
(2012, 334). The neoclassical view would fit within the second prong, as would 
Rope Kojonen’s defense of Plantinga (2019).
 12 See also (Alston 1999, 189–90).
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8  Four objections
With any book-length project, there are bound to be many objections, and 
I do not pretend to address them all. Still, there are a few that I would 
like to discuss in this last chapter. The first is often aimed at nonviolation-
ist models of divine action by noninterventionists. The worry is that any 
account in which God plays such a direct role improperly treats God as 
merely one more efficient cause among many. The second objection applies 
to the family of views of which mine is a part. Critics believe that such 
models allow for too much freedom on God’s part. The third is a stand-
ard Humean criticism aimed at most theistic explanations. The final objec-
tion is an old problem for decretalist interpretations of the laws of nature: 
occasionalism.
8.1 God as efficient cause
In Chapter 7, I argued that both we and God have the ability to change non-
nomic conditions in nature. In neither case are the laws of nature broken. 
The laws instead seamlessly adapt to such changes. Some will take this as 
one aspect of God and persons having libertarian freedom. Others will see 
it as problematic. The latter argue that when finite beings with free will 
make such changes, they are playing their ordained role within the created 
order. But to say that God acts likewise is to reduce God to one more effi-
cient cause in competition with natural causes. Some claim that such a view 
is a type of idolatry: treating God as a mere creature (Burrell and Moulin 
2008, 640–42). “The living God is not part of the causal nexus of the cre-
ated world. Inserting divine action into indeterminate systems reduces holy 
Mystery who creates and sustains the whole world to a bit player” (Johnson 
2015, 168).1 This objection is most common among Thomist theologians, 
such as Ignacio Silva:2
[It] is important to bear in mind that when someone objects that God 
is taken to act as a “cause-among-causes,” the objector does not mean 
that God should not be taken to be a cause. Rather, what the objec-
tor means is that God does not act as a secondary cause among other 
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secondary causes. The objection thus wants to affirm the importance of 
God’s transcendence; therefore it stresses the fact that when God causes, 
God always causes as a primary cause, and never as a secondary, cre-
ated cause. In this sense, the main problem with seeing God as acting as 
a cause among causes . . . is that it limits God’s transcendence, placing 
God’s causality at the level of secondary created causes.
(2014, 13–14)
So while God causes events, “cause” is not a univocal concept that can be 
applied the same way to creatures as it can be to God (Silva 2014, 16). Fail-
ing to recognize the distinction reduces God to a secondary cause on par 
with other agents.
Of the four objections discussed in this chapter, I admit to having the least 
sympathy for this one. Perhaps it has greater force within an Aristotelian-
Thomist metaphysic that I do not share. The critic allows for only two kinds 
of divine action. God caused all creatures to exist and continues to sustain 
that existence, including their causal powers (Silva 2014, 17). But that much 
is surely uncontroversial, apart from the appeal to Aristotelian causes. Vir-
tually all theists – and many deists (Larmer 2017b) – agree that God created 
and sustains all beings other than himself. The only question is whether God 
is restricted to this sort of causation. William Alston’s reply to this objection 
seems to me to be exactly right:
These theologians seem to think that if God shares any activity, status, 
or category with creatures, that pulls Him down to their level. . . . But 
these scare tactics will not establish that position. In what respects does 
bringing about particular effects in the world reduce God to the level of 
creatures? It will certainly imply that both He and creatures are engaged 
in bringing about states of affairs; that is, they are both agents. But 
it is a mere rhetorical flourish to say that this puts Him on our level. 
Obviously there is a world of difference, all the difference there can be, 
between an infinite-source-of-all-being bringing about X, and you or me 
bringing about X. The fact that we are both engaged in bringing about 
something should not panic us into denying the differences between cre-
ator and creature that the Christian tradition has insisted on. In short, 
I see no merit whatsoever in these allegations.
(1994, 53–54)
In other words, what exactly is the problem here? If one is already commit-
ted both to the distinction between primary and secondary causation and to 
the idea that God directly acts only in the former, a number of nonviolation-
ist models of divine action will be objectionable, including my own. With-
out that prior commitment, however, this sort of criticism loses its force. It 
is a problem only within a questionable metaphysical framework.
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8.2 Anything goes
A second worry applies to any model that rejects the absolute causal closure 
of nature (section 6.5). Philosopher Kirk McDermid argues that doing so 
undermines the very notion of laws of nature. While taking aim at Robert 
Larmer, his objection applies equally to the family of views discussed in 
section 7.4:
[Without] causal closure of the physical, it appears that almost anything 
goes! . . . [The] “open-systems” proponents’ apparent motivation – to 
allow for the production of miracles, while minimizing interference 
with the lawful progression of physical events – seems laudable, but by 
denying CCP [i.e., causal closure] they have obviated any requirement 
for subtlety or discretion in divine intervention. Rejecting it wholesale 
makes natural laws metaphysically toothless – a result I am not sure 
they would be particularly happy with.
(McDermid 2008b, 128)
This is the sort of argument more often used against violationism. The laws, 
McDermid believes, are greatly diminished if the universe is an open system. 
Moreover, the distinction between laws and contingent nonnomic condi-
tions seems to entail that “the natural is never sufficient to determine the 
natural” (2008a, 161). We should instead be able to affirm the “determina-
tive sufficiency of the natural in substantive respects” (162).
In response, I would first point out that the laws of nature remain unbro-
ken and unchanged in the neoclassical model; hence, it is not “anything 
goes.” Nonetheless, there is a certain aesthetic to the closed metaphysical 
determinism of Spinoza, in which the “determinative sufficiency” of nature 
is assured. Perhaps that is a bit further than McDermid would like to go, but 
on the spectrum of views between Spinoza’s and that of naïve intervention-
ism, his certainly seems to lean hard toward the former.
If one’s intuitions are that God simply doesn’t do all that much vis-à-vis 
creation other than sustain its existence, I do not have much to say. The 
one thing that I would insist on is that any criticism grounded in the laws 
of nature be based on physics and chemistry – those sciences where laws 
play a central role. We should be wary of either breezy generalizations or 
things that look suspiciously like metaphysical naturalism repackaged as 
SCIENCE.3 I have argued that physics allows for far more contingency in 
nature than that which conventional wisdom dictates. That may both surprise 
and disappoint noninterventionists and some nonviolationists. Perhaps there 
are theological reasons for denying that God has so much freedom to act. If 
so, others are welcome to take up that debate. The issues addressed here are 
matters of physics and philosophy of science. If the arguments are sound, they 
will constitute a significant advance for the divine action literature.
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8.3 Hume versus decretalism
The Humean has a standard complaint that was not addressed in Chapter 5. 
Decretalism explains the regularities in nature by appealing to God. But isn’t 
that an inherently weak explanation given that one can use God to fix virtu-
ally any conceptual problem? Even a non-Humean might worry that such a 
move sounds like a God-of-the-gaps at the level of metaphysics.
Let’s first note that, given the problems discussed in section 5.1, no one 
should take this objection as a reason to opt for a Humean interpretation of 
laws. If theistic metaphysicians and philosophers of religion reject decretal-
ism, they will overwhelmingly favor dispositionalism or some other variety 
of nomological realism. No matter which is chosen, God will enter the pic-
ture at some point. Virtually all theists believe that God has ordained the 
laws of nature, regardless of whether one thinks the laws should be cashed 
out in terms of dispositions, relations between possible worlds, or nomolog-
ical realism. The dispositionalist, for example, holds that God created the 
dispositions and causal powers and that events are influenced accordingly. 
The point is that every theistic view regarding laws will face the Humean 
criticism at whatever point God is involved. There is no unique problem 
here for decretalism.
Moreover, the objection implies that God has been brought into the ques-
tion of laws in an ad hoc way to fix a conceptual problem that otherwise 
cannot be fixed. Is that true? It seems plausible from a contemporary point 
of view. That there are laws of nature is undeniable given a basic knowledge 
of science. Philosophers offer different ways to make sense of that idea, 
which we explored in Chapter 5. Given the need to account for the laws 
of nature, it might well seem as if the decretalist uses God to solve a prior 
conceptual problem.
That narrative, however, is wholly anachronistic. The idea that there are 
laws of nature arose in the seventeenth century from within a theistic frame-
work (section 4.2). Natural philosophers were not invoking God to solve a 
standing problem of how to make sense of the laws of nature. They were 
bringing about a revolution in science and metaphysics by introducing the 
idea of laws and displacing the Aristotelian alternative. It is the Humean 
who needs to find inventive ways to underwrite the use of laws from a natu-
ralistic point of view. As Nancy Cartwright observes, “I think in the concept 
of law there is a little too much of God. We try to finesse the issue . . . [but] in 
the end the concept of a law does not make sense without the supposition of 
a law-giver” (1993, 299). I would ask the naturalistic Humean why he needs 
make use of such a thoroughgoingly theistic idea – laws – in the first place.4
In the end, this objection is one more skirmish in the overall clash 
between naturalism and theism. If the latter is rationally justified, employ-




As philosophy majors work their way through the history of philosophy 
sequence, they discover ideas that fall somewhere between implausible 
and laughable. One of these is occasionalism. Today, one might think of 
it as a type of antirealism about causation. This is due to the fact that 
occasionalists deny that there are any natural causes. They instead hold 
that the only being with the capacity to bring about change is God. If the 
laws are divine decrees and all events are subject to those laws, (it would 
seem) God will cause all physical events. As Nicolas Malebranche wrote, 
“there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; . . . the 
nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; . . . [and] all 
natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes” (Oeuvres 
complètes de Malebranche II, 312, translated in Lee 2016). Many early 
moderns held such a view.
Decretalism about the laws of nature is often thought to entail occasion-
alism.5 Plantinga himself has embraced the label (2016), no doubt causing 
some consternation among his admirers. To many, occasionalism is, intel-
lectually, a bridge too far.6 If decretalism inevitably leads to occasionalism, 
the neoclassical model will have a problem.
This entailment makes sense from a historical perspective that recognized 
three options. The first is what Alfred Freddoso calls “mere conservationism”:
God contributes to the ordinary course of nature solely by creating 
and conserving natural substances along with their . . . causal pow-
ers or capacities . . . When [created] substances directly produce an 
effect. . ., they alone are the immediate causes of that effect, whereas 
God is merely an indirect or remote cause of the effect by virtue of His 
conserving action.
(Freddoso 1994, 133)
This is the thinnest variety of theism, whereby God creates and sustains the 
universe but does nothing else. While it engendered a great deal of support 
in contemporary theology, “almost all the important figures in the history 
of philosophical theology have rejected it as philosophically deficient and 
theologically ‘unsafe’ ” (Freddoso 1991, 555). The more popular position 
historically has been “concurrentism”:
[A] natural effect is produced immediately by both God and created 
substances. . . . [Secondary] agents make a genuine causal contribution 
to the effect. . . . [But] they do so only if God cooperates with them con-
temporaneously as an immediate cause. . . . which renders the resulting 
effect the immediate effect of both God and the secondary causes.
(Freddoso 1994, 134)
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This is the view of historical Thomism. Both concurrentism and mere con-
servation stand in opposition to occasionalism whereby “God alone brings 
about effects in nature; natural substances . . . make no genuine causal con-
tribution at all to any such effect . . . God alone is a genuine efficient cause.” 
(Freddoso 1994, 133–34).
Of these three, decretalism can only be a type of occasionalism. Mere 
conservation is what I have called “noninterventionism”: There is no divine 
action other than creating and sustaining. Concurrentism is a variety of 
Thomism that was discussed in section 2.2. By process of elimination, only 
occasionalism remains. But I do not buy this entailment. Perhaps at one 
time this trilemma adequately captured the available options. Today, it is no 
longer sufficient.
Freddoso’s occasionalist takes God to be continually intervening when-
ever there is causal work to be done in nature. A falling tree cannot snap a 
power line, says the occasionalist, because substances lack causal powers. 
Hence, God breaks the power line when the tree makes contact. A similar 
story holds for every instance of causation. But for the nomological realist, 
there is no need for such interventions. For most events described by phys-
ics, “cause” is just an imprecise way of describing how nature is evolving 
according to the laws, known or unknown. Moving from an explanatory 
framework where causes and causal powers take center stage to one where 
they have been replaced by laws solves the problem. There are no “missing 
causes” that God must make up for.
The critic has a ready response to this. The decretalist variety of nomo-
logical realism takes laws to just be matters of divine will. If that is so, Fred-
doso is correct. God is doing all the work, regardless of whether one calls it 
causation or something else.
But that doesn’t capture the sort of decretalism in mind here. Nature 
behaves in regular ways, and that regularity is ultimately a matter of divine 
command. Does God therefore act within each sequence of events in order 
to sustain cause-and-effect relations? I don’t see why. It is not the case that 
every time a force acts on a mass, God intervenes so that acceleration fits 
Newton’s second law. Rather, God decreed once and for all that mass will 
accelerate in such and such a way under an impressed force. The relation 
between force, mass, and acceleration remains what it is henceforth. A law 
is a one-time decree that needs no further action on God’s part. There is no 
special work regarding the laws for God to do apart from sustaining the 
universe in existence.
Larmer is not impressed by this response. He offers several criticisms 
of a paper that was the predecessor of Chapter 5 (Larmer 2017a). While 
I believe that his complaints can be rebutted without much difficulty, there 
is one exception. Let’s start with an example. Consider two electromagnets 
attracting each other. Under the occasionalism of, say, a Malebranche, it is 
not the case that the generator causes the two magnets to attract each other – 
there is no such thing as natural causation. God instead causes the two to 
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attract and move. In trying to avoid occasionalism, I deny that God steps in 
at this point. The decrees of God are issued once and for all, and nature acts 
accordingly. To emphasize my break with dispositionalism, I wrote that the 
magnets move by virtue of Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism. It is that 
last clause that Larmer focuses on:
[It] is clear either these particles, bodies, and fields will have essential 
natures upon which the laws of nature supervene, or their actions will 
be caused by something external to them. If their action is caused by 
something external to them, then the cause will either be God directly 
or some intermediate created entity such as the laws of nature conceived 
in a nonoccasionalist way.
(2017a, 446)
And so Larmer allows for three options: (i) dispositionalism and causal pow-
ers, (ii) some form of nomological realism other than decretalism whereby 
the laws have their own ontology, or (iii) God as the cause of all events in 
nature. Given the trilemma and my rejection of the first two options, Larmer 
argues that I am stuck with the third, which is occasionalism.
Perhaps, but label it what you will, the sort of decretalism explained here 
is not the causal anti-realism held by Malebranche and attacked by Fred-
doso. God does not step in at each point of contact to be the sole causal agent 
in nature. I see nothing incoherent about God’s one-time-for-all decrees for 
what regularities nature will henceforth instantiate. A necessary condition is 
that God continues to sustain creation in existence, but that alone does not 
entail that God causes all events.
This does not deal with Larmer’s central point, however. I did say with 
respect to the magnet example that electromagnetic laws are responsible 
for its motion. Yet in my view the laws are divine decrees. Hence, in some 
ultimate sense, God is the one making things go, as it were, which seems to 
be a type of occasionalism.
Clearly not all of the views expressed in that earlier paper are consistent 
with those of the model presented here. To say that the laws of nature are 
responsible for bringing about events wrongly gives in to the dispositional-
ist’s intuition that something metaphysical must be responsible for change – 
if not causal powers, laws. And if the laws are divine decrees, God will 
be causally responsible. Many decretalists, including perhaps Plantinga, are 
fine with that, but there is a better approach.
In section 5.5.1, I argued that laws do not make events happen. Laws 
instead constrain the way that things go. For example, God has decreed that 
electrostatics will work only according to an inverse square relation. But 
the right answer to the magnet example is not that Maxwell’s laws cause 
the magnets to move; rather, it is that electromagnetic forces do. Fields are 
real. From a reductionist perspective, quantum fields are the ground floor 
of physical reality. God’s decrees regulate the behavior of those fields, but 
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the decrees/laws do not bring about change. Laws are not efficient causes. 
Historian John Henry shows the proper approach for the decretalist to take:
If God wishes to make a moving brick capable in its own right of break-
ing a glass window, he can. God does not have to surreptitiously break the 
window for the brick, because he lacks the wherewithal to make the brick 
do it itself. For the [decretalist],7 occasionalism is based on a pernicious 
absurdity (that God has to directly involve himself in absolutely everything 
that happens in the world, no matter how corrupt or degrading), deriving 
from an arrogant proscription of what God can and cannot do.
(2009, 85–86)
Occasionalism, Henry rightly says, is an unnecessary type of hyperinterven-
tion, one that decretalists need not accept.
Consider another example. Say that a conveyor belt lifts balls out of a bin 
one at a time and places them at the top of an inclined plane. The ball then 
rolls down the plane, but it is free to move left or right as the wind blows. 
Say then that I carve a channel straight down the plane so that the ball can-
not move side to side. All the balls now roll in a uniform way. So why do the 
balls roll down the plane? Clearly, the answer is gravity. Why don’t the balls 
move slightly to the side, as they had previously? Because the channel acts as 
a constraint on their motion. What we should not say is that I make the ball 
move. I made the channel but play no causal role in the process after that.
For the decretalist, laws are one-time decrees that act as constraints, in 
this case on the behavior of gravity. The gravitation constant must remain 
the pull of gravity must forever be proportional to the distance between 
masses, and so on. But it is gravity, not God, that pulls the ball down the 
plane. Physics is capable of describing change in terms of force and energy. 
There is no need for either causal powers or the metaphorical finger of God 
to continually move things along.
And so I hereby renew my denial: The version of decretalism presented 
here is not a kind of occasionalism. It is not the case that God is the efficient 
cause of every event.
8.5 Last words
Having reached the end of the story, do I believe that many readers will 
adopt the entire neo-classical model of divine action? Of course, they 
should, but sadly no. There are too many places where one might disagree. 
Perhaps it’s the decretal view of laws. Perhaps it’s the physics-based account 
of determinism. There are a lot of moving parts. But by laying out the 
enterprise from beginning to end, I hope to encourage others sympathetic 




 1 Elizabeth Johnson aims this criticism specifically at Russell’s QM-NIODA, which 
I called divine quantum determination in section 3.1, but she makes it clear that 
the problem applies here as well (2015, 167).
 2 Others include (Edwards 2010, 63) and (Dodds 2016,153). For a critique and 
more, see (Sollereder 2015).
 3 This is one of Plantinga’s (2011) main points. It has merit.
 4 The concept of laws is the first on a long list of ideas in science with theistic 
roots. If the Humean naturalist wants to make use of them, he or she should give 
an account should be given in naturalistic terms. This challenge is laid out in 
 (Koperski 2017).
 5 Nancy Cartwright makes this charge explicit: “[Decretalism] is a kind of Occa-
sionalism: the source of the necessity of the relations between force and mass and 
acceleration is that, whenever God sees a force acting on a mass, He ensures that 
the acceleration is what it’s supposed to be. That would be the Occasionalist sense 
of calling the relationship between F, m and a ‘necessary’ ” (2015, 119).
 6 “Contemporary theologians, philosophers of religion and philosophers of science 
widely debate (and largely disagree) about what could be the best account of 
divine action. Nevertheless, they seem to have reached a consensus about what 
such an account should not be. The majority of the authors engaged in this debate 
refer to ‘occasionalism’ as the position that any satisfying account of divine action 
must avoid” (Sangiacomo 2015, 115).
 7 Henry uses “voluntarist” here, which in context includes decretalism.
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